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Recently, regulating the modern trade remedies in the context of non-market economy 
always raises vigorous debates, which potentially challenges the efficiency of the 
dispute settlement regime in the WTO. Following a finding by the Ministry of 
Commerce of the PRC in July 2020 that the non-market conditions exist in the US 
energy and petrochemical sector, the terminology of “non-market economy” is no 
longer an emblematic of countries with particular market situation (“PMS”) such as 
China. In fact, all WTO members are potential targets of “non-market economy” 
treatment nowadays in the trade remedies investigations. However, the WTO trade 
remedies agreements are ambiguous on regulating the trade behaviours of the modern 
“non-market economies”, which provides no substantial references about the 
implementation of trade remedies. Therefore, the unclear provisions raise controversary 
over trade remedies applications and brings uncertainty to trade disputes settlements, 
which is contrary to the “predictable and transparent” principle of the WTO.  
 
This research aims to prevent the abuse of trade remedies through exploring the 
appropriate interpretation and application of the WTO trade remedies agreements, using 
the “double remedy” issue of China as a special case. It contributes to the promotion of 
good international economic governance and increasing the predictability and stability 
of the WTO dispute settlement on the remedies. Specifically, it originally provides 
proposals from both anti-dumping and countervailing perspective to clarify the 
procedure of trade remedies investigations. 
 
To avert the abuse of countervailing measures, this research submits that the potential 
subsidization behaviour, especially by a “public body”, in the anti-subsidy 
investigations should be conscientiously evaluated. Accordingly, this research 
contributes substantially on the clarification of term “public body”. It provides the 
specific criteria to define the “public body” by the doctrinal analysis of WTO tribunal 
reports and international treaties, which provides predictability to identify a subsidy.  
 
To avoid the abuse of anti-dumping measures, this research contends that it is crucial 
to carefully determine the normal value in the anti-dumping investigations. This 
research further demonstrates that when calculating dumping margin of either market 
or non-market economies, the primary choice in determining the normal value shall be 
based on the actual cost of production, even though such a cost is considered to be 
“distorted”. When it is necessary to construct the normal value, all factors related to the 
cost in that country, including “price distortions”, should be considered ‘as long as they 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Statement of the problem  
 
The WTO has confronted a dilemma clarifying the controversary over the trade 
remedies applications in the context of “non-market economy”. On 17th July 2020, the 
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (MOFCOM) in its anti-dumping investigation found 
that non-market conditions exist in the US energy and petrochemical sector and 
‘accordingly swapped out US exporters’ costs in calculating the dumping margin.1 
This is a big reversal of roles because the US has constantly imposed trade remedies on 
China and reasoned by China’s “non-market economy” status, such as the United States 
- Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China 
Case.2  
 
The recent development between the US and China is a microcosm of the dilemma that 
the WTO has confronted. Following the announcement of the MOFCOM, the 
terminology of “non-market economy” is no longer emblematic of countries with 
particular market situation (“PMS”) such as China. In fact, the WTO cases, such as the 
European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina Case and the 
Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate Case, have demonstrated that 
all WTO members are potential targets of “non-market economy treatment” nowadays.3 
 
1 Henry Gao, ‘The US Is Now Officially a Non-Market Economy, According to China’ (International Economic 
Law and Policy Blog) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-officially-a-non-market-economy-
according-to-china-.html> accessed 10 July 2020; Zhiguo Yu and Sandeep Thomas, ‘The US Is Now a “Non-Market 
Economy” – Anti-Dumping Ruling by China’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-a-non-market-economy-anti-dumping-ruling-by-
china.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ielpblog+%28International+
Economic+Law+and+Policy+Blog%29> accessed 10 July 2020. The ruling is available only on the Chinese 
webpage of MOFCOM. Direct link to the ruling http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/trb/202007/20200717145528534.pdf.  
2 For example, see Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010; Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 
2011. 
3 See Appellate Body Report, Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate, WT/493/AB/R, adopted 
12 September 2019; Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016. 
As highlighted by James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, “countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, 
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Accordingly, the modern “non-market economy treatment”, such as the significant 
distortions and the PMS approach, has considerable effects on trade beyond that of the 
traditional “non-market economy” issue.  
 
However, from the WTO’s perspective, the term “non-market economy” is nowhere 
defined in any GATT or WTO agreements, the WTO trade remedies agreements are 
ambiguous on regulating the trade behaviours of the modern “non-market economies”, 
which provides no substantial references about the implementation of trade remedies.4 
Therefore, the WTO dispute settlement regime is confronting increasing challenges due 
to the controversary over trade remedies applications raised by the blurry “non-market 
economy” treatment under the WTO trade remedy agreements. The pressing question 
here is how to clarify the procedure in trade remedies investigations in the context of 
“non-market economy”, thus sticking to the “predictability” principle and maintaining 
the function of the WTO.  
 
In this regard, analysing the “double remedy” issue 5  of China is effective and 
significant. China is a representative sample and subject of the “non-market economy” 
issue, which is based on three interactive points. First, China has large economic 
volume, which significantly contributes to the global trade. Second, an increasing 
number of disputes in the trade remedies investigations have occurred between China 
and WTO members due to the “non-market economy” issue. Third, the landmark 
 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Vietnam” were also subject to NME 
treatment in anti-dumping investigations and especially linked with issue of state interference. See James J. 
Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis of China’s 
WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market 
Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. See Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” 
Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 261. 
4 See James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis 
of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in ames J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-
Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
5 The “double remedy” issue refers to a special situation where a subsidization behaviour is offset by both anti-
dumping duty and countervailing duty, which is prohibited but not thoroughly addressed by WTO law. 
 19 
disputes of the “double remedy” issue are between the US and China, which 
demonstrates that the current WTO trade remedy agreements are ambiguous on 
regulating the trade behaviours of modern “non-market economies”. 
 
China’s economy has seen specular growth rate and achieved an important status in 
global trade. Since the early 1980s, China’s GDP has ‘doubled every seven years whilst 
exports have doubled every four years’.6 In 2009, China surpassed Germany as the 
world’s top exporter with 10.4% global trade, an increase of about a third since 1978.7 
In 2013, China surpassed the US as the world’s largest trading nation.8 
 
A growing number of disputes have accompanied rapid economic growth. Between 
2009 and 2015, ‘China-related cases accounted for 90% of the cases brought by the 
four largest economies – the US, the EU, Japan and China - against each other’.9 It is 
clear from trade remedy investigations that China is the main target of anti-dumping 
activities by both the US and the EU since the 1990s, as investigations for China 
accounted for 13-14% of total anti-dumping activities.10 Since China’s access to the 
WTO in 2001, anti-dumping activities targeting China by the US increased dramatically 
from 13% to 27%.11 Similarly, they increased from 14% to 29% by the EU in the 
2000s.12 For the EU, China’s share of anti-dumping cases increased significantly to 44% 
in the 2010s, so it is undoubtedly the leading target country for anti-dumping activity.13  
 
 
6 See Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 619, 619. 
7  See World Trade Organization (ed), The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-Existence to 
Coherence (WTO 2011) 31 <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2020; Dukgeun Ahn and Jieun Lee, ‘Countervailing Duty against China: Opening a Pandora’s Box 
in the WTO System?’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 329, 330; Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” 
Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 261, 261. 
8 See Angela Monaghan, ‘China Surpasses US as World’s Largest Trading Nation’ The Guardian (10 January 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/10/china-surpasses-us-world-largest-trading-nation> accessed 11 
July 2020. 
9 Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law 
Journal 261, 263. 
10 See Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 619, 619; Chad 
Bown, ‘Global Antidumping Database’ <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/temporary-trade-barriers-
database-including-global-antidumping-database/resource/dc7b361e> accessed 10 July 2020; Mark Wu, ‘The 
“China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 261, 263. 
11 See ibid. 
12 See ibid. 
13 See ibid. 
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The rise of trade remedy issues relating to China is obviously bringing challenges to 
the WTO dispute settlement. The root of the challenge, however, is not simply the large 
volume of China-related cases in front of the WTO. It, rather, relates to its “non-market 
treatment” and the ambiguous provisions regulating it under the WTO legal system. As 
there are no substantial references about the implementation of trade remedies in the 
context of non-market economy, any trade remedies disputes relate to China is an 
independent case, which potentially increases the workload and affects the efficacy of 
the WTO in settling disputes.14  
 
Notably, the China’s Accession Protocol to WTO (CAP), as ‘an integral part of the 
WTO Agreement for that newly acceded Member concerned’, allowed WTO members 
to sidestep some controversies related to China’s economic structure, especially in the 
field of trade remedies. 15  Accordingly, WTO Members can resort to China’s 
commitments in the CAP and derive a process from normal regulations in WTO law 
when tacking special issues. For example, Article 15 of the CAP provides legal basis of 
discriminatory treatment when calculating dumping margins of China’s exports. 
However, as the provision prescribing the “non-market economy treatment” in CAP 
expired in 2016, China’s “non-market economy treatment” is again raising a 
controversy. Some experts insist that the CAP continues to justify the “non-market 
economy treatment” for China.16 And if not, China’s trading partners will have to resort 
to the WTO rules negotiated in the Uruguay Round, for example, Article VI of the 
 
14 James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou, ‘Introduction: Non-market Economies in the Global Trading System - 
The Special Case of China’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global 
Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020; Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” 
Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 261, 270.  
Mark Wu has analysed six aspects relating to the China’s “uniqueness”, see Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge 
to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 261, 264. 
15 See Xuewei Feng, ‘The Termination of the Grandfather Clause in China’s Accession Protocol and the Normal 
Value Construction After Fifteen Years of Accession’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market 
Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, 
‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global 
Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
16 Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ (2015) 10 Global Trade 
and Customs Journal 176; Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 
2016 Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade 
and Customs Journal 244; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special 
Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272. 
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GATT 1994.17 A question raised here is whether these blurry rules can specifically deal 
with China’s special situation. 
 
In particular, two issues are emblematic of WTO’s dilemma in the context of “non-
market economy”.18 The first issue is the determination of an entity established by a 
government to serve as a “pass-through” vehicle for subsidies.19 With respect to China, 
is an entity with links to the state qualified to provide a subsidy under WTO rules? In 
the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China Case, China filed a complaint at the WTO rebutting the US’s 
affirmative determination of China’s state – owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and 
state – owned enterprises (SOEs) being “public bodies”, which were qualified to 
conduct subsidization under ASCM. The Panel sided with the US, but the Appellate 
Body held the opposite view (in respect of SOE), it declared that ‘the precise contours 
and characteristics of a public body are bound to differ from entity to entity, State to 
State, and case to case’.20  
 
The WTO tribunal’s decision clarifies only limited Chinese firms that may belong to 
“public bodies”. And even for those confirmed “public body”, such as SOCBs, there 
still has the controversary. According to the tribunal, the Bank of China (BOC) is a 
“public body” based on several factors such as state ownership; relevant Chinese 
commercial banking law; and risk management and analytical skill of SOCBs. For 
example, Article 34 of China’s Commercial Banking Law stipulates that banks must 
‘carry out their loan business upon the needs of the national economy and the social 
 
17 Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against China 
Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 225; 
Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
18 See James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou, ‘Introduction: Non-market Economies in the Global Trading System 
- The Special Case of China’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global 
Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020; Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” 
Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 261. 
19 See ibid. 
20 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 317. 
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development and under the guidance of State industrial policies’.21 According to the 
tribunal, the BOC is a “public body” because its governmental factor is formally 
acknowledged by Chinese law. Nonetheless, commentators remain sceptical of the 
tribunal’s arguments noting that ‘a lack of business flair, as illustrated by inadequate 
risk management and analytical skills and poor loan-making practices, has little to do 
with whether SOCBs are exercising government authority’ and also ‘Article 34 of the 
Commercial Banking Law is a very general statement and its implications to the SOCBs’ 
loan business are not clear’.22  
 
Compared with the SOCBs, many Chinese firms, especially the SOEs, may not have 
formal links with the state like the BOC. Potential issues may arise, for example, would 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)'s ability to 
remove a firm’s top management suffice to render the firm a “public body”? For now, 
the Appellate Body is relying on a standard of “government authority” to evaluate a 
“public body” but without clarifying what is necessary to demonstrate such authority.23 
Nevertheless, the WTO cannot avoid these questions. Since the United States - 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China 
Case, the “public body” issue has raised three disputes.24 Even without China as the 
party at issue, there is still a high percentage that occurs. In the United States – 
Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India 
Case, the tribunal rejected the US argument that one can identify whether a firm is a 
 
21 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. 
22  Ming Du, ‘China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law’ (2014) 63 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 409, 439. 
23 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
24 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014. Panel Report, United States - Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/ R, adopted 14 July 2014. Appellate Body Report, 
United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 
July 2019. 
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“public body” on account of whether the government can employ the resources of an 
entity that it controls as its own.25  
 
Another issue in front of the WTO is the “non-market economy treatment” of China in 
the anti-dumping investigation post-2016.26 The CAP allows WTO Members to apply 
an alternative methodology to calculate the dumping margins on China’s products, and 
such “non-market economy treatment” is considered to inflate the normal value thus 
increasing the quantum of anti-dumping duties to be levied.27 However, the provision 
prescribing the “non-market economy treatment” expired in 2016, vigorous debates 
followed on how to interpret the legal effect of such expiry.28 Although from this 
research’s point of view, the CAP cannot justify the continuance of the “non-market 
economy treatment”, the interpretations of the CAP do not preclude WTO Members 
from applying the general rules set out in Article 2 of the WTO Anti-dumping 
Agreement (ADA) and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Based on the fact that a 
“particular market situation” and “in the ordinary course of trade” are arcane and 
ambiguous thresholds for special anti-dumping treatment in Article 2 of the ADA and 
Article VI of the GATT 1994, a question raised here is whether these rules can deal 
with China’s special economic structure. As a very creative practitioner in this regard, 
the EU has made revisions to its anti-dumping regulations by replacing the “non-market 
 
25 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014, at para 4.27–4.29. 
26 James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou, ‘Introduction: Non-market Economies in the Global Trading System - 
The Special Case of China’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global 
Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020; Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” 
Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 261, 270. 
27 See ibid. 
28 Researchers share different opinions on this issue. For example, Bernard O’Connor considers that after the expiry 
of subparagraph (a)(ii) of Article 15, the remaining provisions of Article 15 still apply, such as the chapeau of 
paragraph (a) and subparagraph (a)(i), allow WTO members to calculate dumping margins not based on domestic 
prices in China. See Barbara Barone and others, ‘Market Economy Status for China after 2016?’ (European 
Parliament 2016) <http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:QA0216255:EN:HTML> accessed 10 July 
2020; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ (2015) 10 Global 
Trade and Customs Journal 176; Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after 
December 2016 Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 
Global Trade and Customs Journal 244; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of 
a Special Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272. 
 
Edwin Vermulst et al. insist that since 12 December 2016, WTO members can no longer use a surrogate country 
method or a similar methodology targeting China but must use Chinese domestic prices or costs. See Edwin Vermulst, 
Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against China Post-2016: Are 
Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 225. 
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economy treatment” with a country-neutral methodology dealing with market 
distortions caused by a state intervention. 29  This is reflected in the EU – Price 
Comparison Methodologies Case where three major issues are included: (1) whether 
Article 15 of the CAP continues to allow the “non-market economy treatment” for 
China; (2) whether Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994 provide 
sufficient flexibility for a surrogate method to calculate dumping margins when 
confronting price distortions associated with government intervention; and (3) whether 
the revised EU anti-dumping regulations conform to WTO anti-dumping rules. 30 
Despite the case being suspended on 14 June 2019 by the Panel, there is no doubt that 
the answers to these three issues should be explored in this research.31 
 
The controversy over interpreting the WTO agreements in the context of “non-market 
economy” is further embodied by the issue of “double remedies” where the 
determination of subsidies in the countervailing investigation and the “non-market 
economy treatment” in the anti-dumping investigation are two triggers in the United 
States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China Case.32 The “double remedy” issue is a special situation where a subsidization 
behaviour is offset by both anti-dumping duty and countervailing duty, which is 
prohibited but not thoroughly addressed by WTO law.33 Regarding the implementation 
 
29 Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against China 
Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 225; 
Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
30 See European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516). See also Weihuan Zhou 
and Delei Peng, ‘EU - Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market Economy 
Methodology in Light of the Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 52 
Journal of World Trade 505. 
31 For unknow reason, on 7 May 2019, China asked the panel to suspend its proceedings in accordance with 
Article 12.12 of the DSU. And the panel granted China’s request on 14 June 2019. See 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm. 
32 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
33 The Appellate Body addressed the concept of “double remedy” in its report, according to the Appellate Body, 
“‘double remedies’ may arise when both countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties are imposed on the same 
imported products.” However, a simple combination of anti-dumping duty and countervailing duty may not lead to 
“double remedies”. Rather, “double remedy”, also referred to as “double counting”, refers to “circumstances in which 
the simultaneous application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same imported products results, at 
least to some extent, in the offsetting of the same subsidization twice.” That is to say, the purpose of both duties is 
to offset the subsidy that is offered to the importing product, thus the imposition of two duties causes the subsidized 
measure amount to be offset twice. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 541. See 
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of countervailing duty, a potential controversy here is the determination of subsidy. The 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) stipulates that a “public 
body” is jointly referred to as a government whose behaviour could constitute the 
granting of subsidy but without clarifying what is necessary to identify the term of 
“public body”.34 Therefore, it leaves a vacuum in the identification of an entity with 
links to the state, such as SOEs in China, and its qualification to provide a subsidy under 
the WTO rules.35 With respect to the implementation of anti-dumping duty, a potential 
controversy relates to the justification of the “non-market economy treatment”. As 
analysed before, the expiry of the provisions in the CAP and ambiguous thresholds in 
the ADA and the GATT 1994 raise challenges to appropriate interpretations as 
embodied in the EU – Price Comparison Methodologies Case.36 
 
Notably, it is suspicious that the simultaneous application of anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures seldom occurs in one case. It is argued that there is a general 
situation of duty imposition where ‘more than two-thirds of all anti-subsidy 
investigations in the EU are paired with an anti-dumping investigation against the same 
non-EU producers’. 37  Since 2010, the US has conducted 142 trade remedy 
 
also Brian D Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies’ (2014) 
17 Journal of International Economic Law 105; Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ (2017) 
16 World Trade Review 619; Dukgeun Ahn and Jieun Lee, ‘Countervailing Duty against China: Opening a Pandora’s 
Box in the WTO System?’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 329. 
34 Pursuant to Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, a subsidy refers to “a financial 
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member”. It then explains “financial 
contribution” in four forms as follows:  
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct 
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or 
more of the type of functions illustrated in 
(i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from 
practices normally followed by governments. 
35 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
36  See European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516) 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm. See also Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - Price 
Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market Economy Methodology in Light of the 
Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
37 Besides, commentators also mention Jacob Viner who, in his seminal book on dumping, made the point that “in 
general, an export subsidy induces dumping, while a domestic subsidy does not,” which makes domestic subsidy 
more likely to raise a situation of “double remedy”. See Jorgen D Hansen and Jorgen UM Nielsen, ‘Subsidy-Induced 
Dumping’ (2014) 37 World Economy 654; Edwin Vermulst and Brian Gatta, ‘Concurrent Trade Defense 
Investigations in the EU, the EU’s New Anti-Subsidy Practice against China, and the Future of Both’ (2012) 11 
World Trade Review 527. 
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investigations of China, with 74 anti-dumping and 66 anti-subsidy investigations 
respectively.38 The impact of trade remedy measures shall neither be underestimated. 
Under the non-market economy methodology, ‘anti-dumping margins in US cases 
against China have averaged 154% as compared with an average of 49% for other 
targeted countries’.39 There is no doubt that large anti-dumping margins’ influence on 
domestic industries will not be neglected by any country. As Jesse Kreier comments on 
the China’s anti-dumping investigations on US n-propanal exporters in July 2020: 
 
[T]he 145 alleged subsidies include many of the same programs investigated in the 
n-propanal AD case and alleged in the parallel AD investigation. Thus, the issue 
whether government interventions are properly addressed by AD, CVD or both, 
once again presents itself.40 
 
As a remarkable issue in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, the “double remedy” 
issue is inevitably discussed by experts.41 A generally accepted “breakthrough” on this 
issue relates to the “non-market economy treatment” from the anti-dumping dimension. 
One reason of this “breakthrough” lies in a “loophole” regulating the issue of “double 
remedies” in GATT 1994. Article VI:5 of GATT 1994 prohibits the “double remedy” 
issue originated from export subsidies, but it keeps silent on domestic subsidies.42 Why 
 
38  See China Trade Remedies Information under the supervision of China’s Department of Commerce, 
http://cacs.mofcom.gov.cn/cacscms/view/statistics/ckajtj.  
39 Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 619, 621. 
40 See Zhiguo Yu and Jesse Kreier, ‘China and Distortions - Bis’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/08/china-and-distortions-bis.html> accessed 20 August 2020. 
41 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. Research of “double remedies” see for example, Brian D 
Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies’ (2014) 17 Journal of 
International Economic Law 105; Prusa (n 5). Katarzyna Kaszubska, ‘Double Remedy: Beyond the Non-market 
economy status’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading 
System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
42 Pursuant to Article VI: 5 of the GATT 1994:  
“No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation 
of dumping or export subsidization”. 
It is clear that WTO law is aware that a subsidy may result in a misapplication of trade remedies and thus tries to 
prevent this situation, but it is suspicious why WTO law uses the specific term “export subsidy” rather than the 
general conception “subsidy”. The dispute settlement body in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case provides a potential explanation.  
The Panel considered that “these terms are self-explanatory in their intention to limit the scope of the prohibition in 
Article VI:5 to situations involving export subsidies”. And “because the explicit prohibition in Article VI:5 is limited 
to potential ‘double remedies’ in respect of export subsidies, Members could not have intended to prohibit the 
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did Uruguay Round negotiators “skip” the “double remedy” issue by domestic 
subsidies? One of the concerns is that domestic subsidies are generally not increasing 
the dumping margin, thus not leading to related anti-dumping measures.43 As analysed 
by the Appellate Body in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, a domestic subsidy 
normally affects the domestic and export prices of a product in the same way and to the 
same extent.44 Since any lowering of prices attributable to the subsidy will be reflected 
on both sides of the dumping margin calculation, the overall dumpling margin will not 
be affected by subsidization.45 However, under the “non-market economy treatment”, 
the surrogate price will replace the normal domestic price, thereby increasing the 
dumping margin and resulting in a high volume of anti-dumping duty. 46  The 
countervailing duty and anti-dumping duty then offset the domestic subsidy. 
 
In response to this issue, calculating the “pass-through” rate and reduce the duplication 
of duties is proposed by experts. 47  “Pass-through” rate, in the context of “double 
remedy” issue, refers to the extent that a subsidy is passed through to the price and 
reflected in the calculation of dumping margin. Theoretically, a scientifically calculated 
“pass-through” rate could reduce the injury of “double remedy” issue by eliminating 
price discrimination under subsidization, and this is reflected in US GPX law. 48 
 
imposition of ‘double remedies’ in respect of domestic subsidies in Articles 19.3 or 19.4 of the SCM Agreement, 
which are, on their face, silent on the issue of ‘double remedies’. ” 
The Appellate Body, however, disagreed with the Panel that the omission of domestic subsidy stipulated in Article 
VI refers to limit the scope of “double remedy” within export subsidy. It notes, rather, that Article VI:5 prohibits the 
concurrent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping 
or export subsidization.  
43 Brian D Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies’ (2014) 17 
Journal of International Economic Law 105. 
44 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
45 See ibid. 
46 Ilaria Espa and Philip I Levy, ‘The Analogue Method Comes Unfastened - The Awkward Space between Market 
and Non-Market Economies in EC-Fasteners (Article 21.5)’ (2018) 17 World Trade Review 313. 
47  See for example, Thomas J Prusa and Edwin Vermulst, ‘United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China: Passing the Buck on Pass-Through’ (2013) 12 World Trade 
Review 197; Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 619; Brian 
D Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies’ (2014) 17 Journal 
of International Economic Law 105. 
48  On March 6, 2012, US Congress enacted anti-dumping provisions (GPX Law), which provided the US 
Department of Commerce with a legal basis to apply anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties to China’s 
products; and through providing adjustments (by calculating pass-through rate) to anti-dumping duties to avoid the 
situation of “double remedies”. See Public Law 112–99, 112th Congress, 126 STAT. 265 (MAR. 13, 2012). 
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However, it is in practise difficult to calculate the influence of subsidy on a relevant 
price and separate it from anti-dumping duty. According to the GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. 
United States Case, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) expressed that it did not 
have a method for identifying overlapping remedies, the Court also admitted that it is 
difficult for the Commerce to decide the degree and extent of potential “double remedy” 
issue.49 Besides, the “pass-through” method belongs to a remedy behaviour, which 
means it aims to eliminate the injury of unfair trade remedy measures. Comparatively, 
a preventative method is preferential as it predicts the risk and prevents the existence 
of future injury by providing transparent regulations through the interpretation of law. 
 
Accordingly, this research argues that it is requisite to interpret the WTO provisions 
prescribing the “non-market economy treatment” in the context of the “double remedy” 
issue. This research first argues that provisions of the CAP stipulating the “non-market 
economy treatment” are of significant importance in dealing with the issue of “double 
remedies”. Relating viewpoints stem from China’s economy status post-2016. In other 
words, whether WTO Members should grant China market economy status in the wake 
of the expiry of the provisions in the CAP.50 The discussion then developed into a 
debate on the justification of the “non-market economy treatment” due to the expiry of 
the provisions in CAP. The proponents of a justifiable “non-market economy treatment” 
insist that the remaining provisions of the CAP still permit the continuance of special 
treatment.51 And opponents assert that WTO Members can not resort to the CAP for 
 
49 Based on the case, the Commerce explained that “it would not allow a constructed export price (‘CEP’) offset or 
a circumstances of sales (‘COS’) adjustment in this investigation because Commerce ‘cannot accurately determine 
the specific indirect selling expenses incurred on sales reflected in the surrogate financial statements’”. The Court, 
in its latter analysis, stated that “it is too difficult for Commerce to determine, using improved methodologies, and 
in the absence of new statutory tools, whether and to what degree double counting is occurring”. See GPX Int'l Tire 
Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1345 (CIT 2010) ("GPX III"). 
50 Matthew R Nicely, ‘Time to Eliminate Outdated Non-Market Economy Methodologies’ (2014) 9 Global Trade 
and Customs Journal 160; Michael (II) Flynn, ‘China: A Market Economy Notes’ (2016) 48 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 297; Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard 
International Law Journal 261. 
51 See for example, Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is 
Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ 
(2015) 10 Global Trade and Customs Journal 176; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why 
the Use of a Special Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs 
Journal 272; Laurent Ruessmann and Jochen Beck, ‘2016 and the Application of an NME Methodology to Chinese 
Producers in Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 457. 
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such treatment.52 This research, in chapter 5, argues that the expiry of provisions in the 
CAP does not necessarily refer to a transfer of China’s economy status. Nevertheless, 
WTO Members cannot resort to the CAP to apply a discriminatory treatment. And such 
discriminatory treatment for China cannot be based on its special market status. 
 
Apart from the CAP, another legal basis of the “non-market economy treatment” relates 
to the ADA and the GATT 1994. The EU 2017 anti-dumping regulation were enacted 
to deal with the dilemma that its “non-market economy” provisions of the 2016 
regulation may not efficient in the wake of Article 15(a)(ii) CAP’s expiry in December 
2016.53 It triggered a discussion on the EU’s new anti-dumping provisions and their 
consistency with the thresholds for special treatment in the WTO anti-dumping rules. 
This research agrees with the viewpoint that the EU “country-neutral” approach may 
not conform to the WTO regulations.54 It contends that to prevent the abuse of anti-
dumping measures, it is crucial to carefully determine the normal value in the anti-
dumping investigations. This research, in chapter 6, further concludes that when 
calculating dumping margin of either market or non-market economies, the primary 
choice in determining the normal value shall be based on the actual cost of production, 
even though such a cost is considered to be “distorted”. When “non-market economy 
treatment” is necessary to construct the normal value, all factors related to the cost in 
that country, including “price distortions”, should be considered ‘as long as they reflect 
the prevailing conditions in the market of exportation’. 
 
52  See for example, Jochem De Kok analysed China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO and concluded WTO 
Members may ‘no longer have resources to an NME methodology’ based on the Protocol. See Jochem De Kok, ‘The 
Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations against Imports from China’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic 
Law 515; Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu and Tianzhu Han, ‘China’s Market Economy Dilemma and Its Interplay with 
EU Anti-Dumping Law’ (2019) 27 Asia Pacific Law Review 102; Roberto Soprano, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness 
in the Interpretation of the Protocol of Accession of China to the World Trade Organization: Market Economy 
Considerations in Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (2019) 46 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29; Weihuan Zhou, 
‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese 
Journal of Comparative Law 345; Vermulst, Sud and Evenett (n 20); Minyou Yu and Jian Guan, ‘The Non-Market 
Economy Methodology Shall Be Terminated After 2016’ (2017) 12 Global Trade and Customs Journal 16. 
53 Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A Breach 
of WTO-Law?’ (Social Science Research Network 2018) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3175742 13 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3175742> accessed 9 July 2020. 
54 See for example, Tietje and Sacher (n 55); Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market 
Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 
887; Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 20220. 
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The significance of the subsidy determination has been neglected in the context of the 
“double remedy” issue. It is noticed that the subsidy determination constitutes an 
integral part of the “double remedy” issue in the United States - Definitive Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, but the 
“breakthrough” in the “double remedy” issue preferably relies on the side of anti-
dumping measure.55 The “public body” issue, as emblematic of subsidy determination, 
has limited interpretations. Experts rely on the Appellate Body’s blurry standard that is 
“government authority” without clarifying what is necessary to demonstrate such 
authority. 56  This research, in chapter 3, highlights the significance of the  
interpretation of the subsidy determination when preventing the issue of “double 
remedies” through analysing its rationale and development in the US domestic cases. 
Furthermore, being inspired by Mavroidis, Janow and Bhala, this research argues that 
the recent emerging negotiations of FTAs, especially the CPTPP, shed light on the 
interpretation of the “public body”.57  
 
Moreover, as one of the major disputes in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, how to identify an 
entity as an extension of the state is a core question that should be answered by the 
WTO. Specifically, how to evaluate SOEs in China with links to the state and its 
qualification to provide subsidies under the WTO rules. Entities in China, especially 
SOEs, “are embedded in a network composed of dense and complex links with the 
state”.58 Government agencies, for example SASAC, have centralised control over 
 
55 See for example, Dukgeun Ahn, ‘United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China.’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 761, 767. Appellate Body Report, United 
States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, 
adopted 11 March 2011, at para 317. 
56 See Ru Ding, ‘“Public Body” or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise’ (2014) 48 Journal of World Trade 167. 
Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
57 Petros C Mavroidis and Merit E Janow, ‘Free Markets, State Involvement, and the WTO: Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Ring’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 571; Raj Bhala, ‘TPP, American National Security and 
Chinese SOEs’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 655. 
58 Li-Wen Lin, ‘A Network Anatomy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 583. 
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SOEs,59 which is potentially an overlap with the ambiguous interpretation of “public 
body”. It may raise the controversy that an SOE is potentially a “public body”, thus its 
behaviours are potentially countervailable. This research, in chapter 4, proposes criteria 
to identify a “public body”, which provide a reference for subsidy determination. It 
further highlights that the regulation and reform of SOEs in China are not guarantee 
those entities are distinguished from “public bodies”. 
 
Conclusively, this research aims to prevent the abuse of trade remedies and maintain 
the function of the WTO through re-interpretation of the WTO trade remedies 
agreements, using the “double remedy” issue of China as a special case.  
 
1.2 Research gap and its importance 
 
The research gap can be illustrated in three points. First, significance of subsidy 
determination has been neglected in the context of “double remedy” issue. Second, 
criteria to determine a “public body” is ambiguous. Third, it is requisite to interpret the 
“non-market economy treatment” in the context of “double remedy” issue under the 
WTO agreements.  
 
1.2.1 The “double remedy” issue is reflected from both anti-dumping and 
countervailing dimensions 
 
Mentioning the issue of “double remedies”, a common “breakthrough” relates to the 
“non-market economy treatment” from the anti-dumping dimension, which leads to a 
delusion that the anti-dumping perspective is the only origin of “double remedy” issue.60 
 
59 Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law 
Journal 261. 
60 See for example, Dukgeun Ahn, ‘United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China.’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 761, 767. Katarzyna Kaszubska, ‘Double 
Remedy: Beyond the Non-market economy status’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market 
Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
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One reason of this “breakthrough” lies in a “loophole” regulating the issue of “double 
remedies” in the GATT 1994. Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 prohibits the “double 
remedy” issue originated from export subsidies, but it keeps silent on domestic 
subsidies.61 Why did Uruguay Round negotiators “skip” the “double remedy” issue by 
domestic subsidies? One of the concerns is that domestic subsidies are generally not 
increasing the dumping margin, thus not leading to related anti-dumping measures.62 
As analysed by the Appellate Body in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, domestic subsidy 
normally affects the domestic and export prices of a product in the same way and to the 
same extent.63 Since any lowering of prices attributable to the subsidy will be reflected 
on both sides of the dumping margin calculation, the overall dumpling margin will not 
be affected by subsidization.64 However, under the “non-market economy treatment”, 
the surrogate price will replace the normal domestic price, thereby increasing the 
dumping margin and resulting in a high volume of anti-dumping duty. 65  The 
countervailing duty and anti-dumping duty then offset the domestic subsidy.  
 
 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. Appellate Body Report, United States 
- Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 
11 March 2011, at para 317. 
61 Pursuant to Article VI: 5 of the GATT 1994:  
“No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation 
of dumping or export subsidization”. 
It is clear that the WTO law has aware of the subsidy may result in a misapplication of trade remedies thus trying to 
prevent this situation, but it is suspicious why WTO law use specific “export subsidy” rather than general conception 
“subsidy”. The dispute settlement body, in United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China Case, provides potential explanations.  
The Panel considered that “these terms are self-explanatory in their intention to limit the scope of the prohibition in 
Article VI:5 to situations involving export subsidies”. And “because the explicit prohibition in Article VI:5 is limited 
to potential ‘double remedies’ in respect of export subsidies, Members could not have intended to prohibit the 
imposition of ‘double remedies’ in respect of domestic subsidies in Articles 19.3 or 19.4 of the SCM Agreement, 
which are, on their face, silent on the issue of ‘double remedies’. ” 
The Appellate Body, however, disagree with the Panel that omission of domestic subsidy stipulated in Article VI 
refers to limit the scope of “double remedy” within export subsidy. It notes, rather, that Article VI:5 prohibits the 
concurrent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping 
or export subsidization.  
62 Brian D Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies’ (2014) 17 
Journal of International Economic Law 105. 
63 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
64 See ibid. 
65 Ilaria Espa and Philip I Levy, ‘The Analogue Method Comes Unfastened - The Awkward Space between Market 
and Non-Market Economies in EC-Fasteners (Article 21.5)’ (2018) 17 World Trade Review 313. 
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However, the subsidy issue as an origin of the “double remedy” issue should attract 
more attention. The issue of “double remedies” did not come up overnight. Chapter 3 
provides an analysis of “double remedy” issue from a national “countervailing case” 
into an international dispute. As Chapter 3 discusses, the first case addressing the issue 
of “double remedies” in US is the GPX case where the US Department of Commerce 
(DOC) for the first time applied countervailing measures to NMEs like China. The GPX 
cases reflect a historical development that US courts tried to regulate the countervailing 
disputes with anti-dumping provisions since the subsidy issue first appeared in a 
national court.66  
 
The importance to address subsidization as part of the “double remedy” issue is also 
highlighted by the WTO tribunals in the United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, which analyses in chapter 
2. One major concern analysed by the Appellate Body is the constitution of “double 
remedy” issue under circumstances of two subsidies.67 With respect to the provisions 
prohibiting the issue of “double remedies”, the Appellate Body rebutted the Panel’s 
analysis that “these terms are self-explanatory in their intention to limit the scope of the 
prohibition in Article VI:5 to situations involving export subsidies”.68 It noted, rather, 
that Article VI:5 prohibits the concurrent application of anti-dumping and 
 
66 GPX Cases have experienced several appeals, in order to identify different decisions in cases, the Court of 
International Trade followed the naming conventions used by the parties in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United 
States, 893 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1304-06 (CIT 2013) as follows:  
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1291-92 (CIT 2008), reh'g denied, 593 F.Supp.2d 
1389 (CIT 2008) ("GPX I"); GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231 (CIT 2009) ("GPX II"); GPX 
Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337 (CIT 2010) ("GPX III"); GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 
Slip Op. 10-112, 2010 WL 3835022 (CIT Oct. 1, 2010) ("GPX IV"); GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 
732 (Fed.Cir.2011) ("GPX V"); GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed.Cir.2012) ("GPX VI"); 
GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States, 893 F.Supp.2d 1296 (CIT 2013) ("GPX VII"), aff'd, 780 F.3d 1136 
(Fed. Cir.2015); GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States, 942 F.Supp.2d 1343 (CIT 2013) ("GPX VIII"). 
67 Literally, under an export subsidy, a situation of “double remedy” may occur when such export subsidy will 
“result in a pro rata reduction in the export price of a product, but will not affect the price of domestic sales of that 
product. That is, the subsidy will lead to increased price discrimination and a higher margin of dumping. In such 
circumstances, the situation of subsidization and the situation of dumping are the ‘same situation’, and the 
application of concurrent duties would amount to the application of ‘double remedies’ to compensate for, or offset, 
that situation.” 
In general, a domestic subsidy, however, will affect the domestic and export prices to the same extent, thus the 
subsidy will be reflected on both sides of the dumping margin calculation, so the overall dumping margin will not 
be affected by subsidization. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, paras 568-569. 
68 See ibid. 
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countervailing duties to compensate for the “same situation of dumping or export 
subsidization”. 69  “Same situation” indicate the issue of “double remedies” under 
domestic subsidy should be under the guidance of the WTO law (specific analysis of 
“same situation” please see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). The Appellate Body further 
reaffirmed the illegality of “double remedy” issue by contending that it violated 
requirements in Article 19.3 of the ASCM that trade remedy duties shall be collected 
“in appropriate amounts”. 70 The tribunals’ attitudes on subsidies in the context of 
“double remedy” issue is thus obvious, which highlights the significance of the subsidy 
dimension. As commented by Xuewei Feng, ‘the right route and the applicable tool to 
offset such subsidization is the application of the SCM Agreement, and not the AD 
Agreement’.71 
 
1.2.2 There are no clarified criteria to identify a “public body” 
 
Regarding the research of “public body” issue, three points are of value to concern. 
First, when interpreting “public body”, experts rely on the Appellate Body’s report in 
the United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China Case – standard of “government authority” – without clarifying 
what is necessary to demonstrate such authority.72 For example, both Dukgeun and Ru 
discussed WTO tribunals’ analysis of the “public body” issue in the United States – 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China 
Case.73 Dukgeun gave an introductive description of tribunals’ analysis and Ru further 
classified “public body” by three categories based on the report of the Appellate Body. 
 
69 See ibid. 
70 See ibid. at para. 547. 
71 See Xuewei Feng, ‘The Termination of the Grandfather Clause in China’s Accession Protocol and the Normal 
Value Construction After Fifteen Years of Accession’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market 
Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
72 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
73 Dukgeun Ahn, ‘United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China.’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 761, 767; Ru Ding, ‘“Public Body” or Not: Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprise’ (2014) 48 Journal of World Trade 167. 
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Nevertheless, the criteria of “public body” are still vague. Since the United States – 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China 
Case, the “public body” issue has raised three disputes.74 Even before the United States 
– Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China 
Case, there is one case addressing factors of a “public body”.75 Therefore, this research 
argues in chapter 4, apart from the United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, other cases are also 
relevant in identifying a “public body”. 
 
Second, the assessment of SOEs in China in the context of the “public body” issue is 
necessary. Only when connecting with practical issue, the arcane and ambiguous term 
“public body” is more likely to be precise. Whether China’s SOEs belong to “public 
bodies” thus qualifying to conduct subsidies is one of major arguments in the United 
States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China Case.76 As the Appellate Body did not give a clear answer to this question, 
potential research is required in this regard. As highlighted by Wu, China has a unique 
economic structure, commercial entities in China has multiple connections with state 
or Party, which distinguishes with other economic structure. In this regard, existing 
research on China’s SOEs can be further explored in the context of the “public body” 
issue. For example, Ru summarised three approaches of “public body” determination 
from the United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China Case and applied them to assess China’s SOEs.77 When 
evaluating SOEs in China, Ru mainly relied on Chinese Corporate Law. Comparatively, 
 
74 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014. Panel Report, United States - Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/ R, adopted 14 July 2014. Appellate Body Report, 
United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 
July 2019. 
75 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
76 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at paras 568-569. 
77 Ru Ding, ‘“Public Body” or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise’ (2014) 48 Journal of World Trade 167. 
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this research argues that more materials are available to evaluate China’s SOEs. 
Especially regarding state intervention, the relationship between government and SOEs 
in China is more reflected in national law, to be specific, the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises.78 Concerning reform of 
SOEs in China, more details can be traced by the Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises, 
such as an attempt at independent market player.79 Those documents could provide 
detailed features of SOEs when analysing in the context of the “public body” issue. 
 
Third, being inspired by Petros, Merit and Raj, the recent emerging negotiations of 
FTAs also shed light on the explanation of the “public body”, which has not been 
discussed by experts. Petros and Merit, in their research, highlighted the lack of 
practices regarding the ‘treatment of NMEs in the context of preferential trade 
agreements’, which is also the case for “public body” interpretation.80 They then, in 
Section four, concluded the contribution of SOE related rules stipulated in TPP.81 Raj 
discussed TPP in the context of national security. The research made the point that the 
regulation of SOE definition in TPP is a reflection enhancing national security.82 
Although they did not directly address the referential meaning of preferential trade 
agreements as regards the “public body” issue, they do indicate that trade agreements, 
especially FTAs (Free Trade Agreements), are aware of the potential risk of SOEs and 
seek a solution to prevent further disputes within the legal regime of agreements. In 
fact, as discussed in Chapter 4, CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
 
78  The law is published by the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.moj.gov.cn/Department/content/2009-01/20/592_201254.html accessed 26 March 2020. See English 
version translated by lawinfochina.com, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=7195&lib=law accessed 26 March 
2020. 
79 The Guideline is published on the official website on the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm accessed 26 March 2020. See English version 
translated by lawinfochina.com, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=26c39a43ea095fcebdfb&lib=law# accessed 
26 March 2020. The reform of SOE has several rounds which can be classified by different periods. More of previous 
reform see Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao and Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired Reform 
of State-Owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977. 
80 Petros C Mavroidis and Merit E Janow, ‘Free Markets, State Involvement, and the WTO: Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Ring’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 571. 
81 See ibid. 
82 Raj Bhala, ‘TPP, American National Security and Chinese SOEs’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 655. 
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for Trans-Pacific Partnership),83 have a referential meaning in compliance with WTO 
provisions.84 And those provisions reflect the latest understanding of concepts and trade 
rules by contracting parties, which also contain a practical reference when interpreting 
the “public body”. 
 
1.2.3 Interpreting the “non-market economy treatment” in the context of “double 
remedy” issue under the WTO agreements 
 
To tackle the “double remedy” issue from the anti-dumping dimension, a generally 
accepted thought is to calculate the “pass-through” rate and reduce the duplication of 
duties.85 “Pass-through” rate, in the context of “double remedy” issue, refers to the 
extent that a subsidy is passed through to the price and reflected in the calculation of 
dumping margin. Theoretically, a scientific calculated “pass-through” rate could reduce 
the injury of “double remedy” issue by eliminating the price discrimination under 
subsidization, and this is reflected in US GPX law.86 However, it is in practice difficult 
to calculate the influence of subsidy on a relevant price and separate it from anti-
dumping duty. According to the GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States Case, the US 
Department of Commerce (DOC) expressed that it did not have a method for identifying 
overlapping remedies, the court also admitted that it is difficult for the Commerce to 
decide the degree and extent of potential “double remedy” issue.87 Besides, the “pass-
 
83 The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) aiming to be a free trade 
agreement is now involving 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including New Zealand, Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Viet Nam. Its predecessor is Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), which is a free trade agreement that would liberalize trade and investment 
between 12 Pacific-rim countries. 
84 Article 6.8 of the agreement clearly addresses that trade disputes between parties are governed by WTO rules, 
such as ADA (Anti-dumping Agreement) and ASCM (Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measure). 
85 See for example, Brian D Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Remedies’ (2014) 17 Journal of International Economic Law 105; Thomas J Prusa and Edwin Vermulst, ‘United 
States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China: Passing the Buck on 
Pass-Through’ (2013) 12 World Trade Review 197; Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ 
(2017) 16 World Trade Review 619. 
86 On March 6, 2012, US Congress enacted anti-dumping provisions (GPX Law), which provided US Department 
of Commerce with legal basis to apply anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties to China’s products; and 
through providing adjustments (by calculating pass-through rate) to anti-dumping duties to avoid the situation of 
“double remedies”. See Public Law 112–99, 112th Congress, 126 STAT. 265 (MAR. 13, 2012). 
87 Based on the case, the Commerce explained that “it would not allow a constructed export price (‘CEP’) offset or 
a circumstances of sales (‘COS’) adjustment in this investigation because Commerce ‘cannot accurately determine 
the specific indirect selling expenses incurred on sales reflected in the surrogate financial statements’”. The court, 
in its latter analysis, stated that “it is too difficult for Commerce to determine, using improved methodologies, and 
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through” method belongs to a remedy behaviour, which means it aims to eliminate the 
injury of unfair trade remedy measures. Comparatively, a preventative method is 
preferential as it predicts the risk and prevents the existence of future injury by 
providing transparent regulations through the interpretation of law. 
 
Accordingly, this research argues that it is requisite to interpret the WTO provisions 
prescribing the “non-market economy treatment” in the context of the “double remedy” 
issue. This research first argues that provisions of the CAP stipulating the “non-market 
economy treatment” are of significant importance in dealing with the issue of “double 
remedies”. Relating viewpoints start from China’s economy status post-2016. In other 
words, whether WTO Members should grant China market economy status in the wake 
of the expiry of the provisions in CAP.88 The discussion then evolved into a debate on 
the justification of the “non-market economy treatment” due to the expiry of the 
provisions in the CAP. The proponents of a justifiable the “non-market economy 
treatment” insisted that the remaining provisions of the CAP still permit the 
continuance of special treatment.89 And opponents asserted that WTO Members can 
not resort to CAP for such treatment.90 This research, in chapter 5, argues that the 
expiry of provisions in the CAP does not necessarily refers to a transfer of China’s 
economy status. Nevertheless, WTO Members cannot resort to the CAP to apply 
 
in the absence of new statutory tools, whether and to what degree double counting is occurring”. See GPX Int'l Tire 
Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1345 (CIT 2010) ("GPX III"). 
88  For example, Yong-Shik Lee, ‘Should China Be Granted Market Economy Status? In View of Recent 
Development’ (2017) 3 China and WTO Review 319. 
89 See for example, Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is 
Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ 
(2015) 10 Global Trade and Customs Journal 176; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why 
the Use of a Special Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs 
Journal 272; Laurent Ruessmann and Jochen Beck, ‘2016 and the Application of an NME Methodology to Chinese 
Producers in Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 457. 
90 See for example, Jochem De Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations against Imports from China’ 
(2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 515; Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu and Tianzhu Han, ‘China’s Market 
Economy Dilemma and Its Interplay with EU Anti-Dumping Law’ (2019) 27 Asia Pacific Law Review 102; Roberto 
Soprano, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of the Protocol of Accession of China to the World 
Trade Organization: Market Economy Considerations in Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (2019) 46 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 29; Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A 
Preliminary Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345; Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and 
Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less 
Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212; Minyou Yu and Jian Guan, ‘The Non-Market 
Economy Methodology Shall Be Terminated After 2016’ (2017) 12 Global Trade and Customs Journal 16. 
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discriminatory treatment. And such discriminatory treatment on China cannot be based 
on its special market status. 
 
Apart from the CAP, another legal basis of the “non-market economy treatment” relates 
to the ADA and the GATT 1994. The EU 2017 anti-dumping regulations were enacted 
to deal with the dilemma that provisions regulating the non-market economy in the 
2016 regulation may not efficient in the wake of Article 15(a)(ii) CAP’s expiry in 
December 2016.91 It triggered discussions on the EU’s new anti-dumping provisions 
and their consistency with the thresholds for special treatment in the WTO anti-
dumping rules. This research agrees with the viewpoint that the EU “country-neutral” 
approach may not conform to the WTO regulations.92 It further, in chapter 6, contends 
that it is crucial to carefully determine the normal value in the anti-dumping 
investigations. This research concludes that when calculating dumping margin of either 
market or non-market economies, the primary choice in determining the normal value 
shall be based on the actual cost of production, even though such a cost is considered 
to be “distorted”. When “non-market economy treatment” is necessary to construct the 
normal value, all factors related to the cost in that country, including “price distortions”, 
should be considered ‘as long as they reflect the prevailing conditions in the market of 
exportation’. 
 
1.2.4 Conclusion  
 
Conclusively speaking, when tacking the issue of “double remedies”, the anti-dumping 
and subsidy issues have equal research value, but existing research mainly focuses on 
 
91 See Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A 
Breach of WTO-Law?’ (Social Science Research Network 2018) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3175742 13 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3175742> accessed 9 July 2020. 
92 See for example, Tietje and Sacher (n55); Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market 
Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 
887; Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
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the anti-dumping dimension. The significance of the subsidy determination should not 
be neglected but to be regarded as an integral part to analyse.  
 
Concerning research from the subsidy determination, one major concern is there lack 
of clarified criteria in identifying a “public body”. The Appellate Body’s report in the 
United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, Case is not sufficient to interpret a “public body”, because the 
“government authority” standard does not clarify what is necessary to demonstrate such 
authority.93 And in this regard, other cases are also relevant in identifying a “public 
body”. Moreover, the assessment of SOEs in China in the context of “public body” 
issue is necessary. Existing research on China’s SOEs can be further explored in the 
context of “public body” issue. Besides, the recent emerging negotiations of FTAs also 
shed light on the explanation of “public body”, which has not been discussed by experts. 
 
Regarding the anti-dumping dimension, calculating the “pass-through” rate and reduce 
the duplication of duties is theoretically possible, but it is in practice difficult to 
calculate the influence of subsidy on relevant prices and separate it from anti-dumping 
duty. The “pass-through” method belongs to a remedy behaviour, which means it aims 
to eliminate the injury of unfair trade remedy measures. Comparatively, a preventative 
method is preferential as it predicts the risk and prevents the existence of future injury 
by providing transparent regulations through the interpretation of law. And for this 
research, a proposed approach is to clarify the “non-market economy treatment” under 
the WTO agreements, such as the CAP, the ADA, and the GATT 1994, thereby 
preventing the “double remedy” issue. 
 
1.3 Research question and objectives 
 
 
93 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
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The central research question which underpins this research is: how to deal with the 
issue of “double remedies” through re-interpretation of the WTO trade remedies 
agreements? In order to answer this question, this thesis examines five subsidiary 
questions:  
 
(a) What are the origins and rationale of the “double remedy” issue, and why does this 
issue relate to “non-market economies”? 
(b) Why is the subsidy determination an integral part of the “double remedy” issue? 
(c) What are appropriate interpretations of a “public body”, and how do they relate to 
SOEs in China? 
(d) What can be interpreted from the China’s Accession Protocol as regards the “non-
market economy treatment”? 
(e) What can be interpreted from the ADA and GATT 1994 relating to the “non-market 
economy treatment”? 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
This research is mainly underpinned by the doctrinal analysis. This traditional legal 
methodology see law as ‘a self-contained system which is politically neutral and 
independent of other academic disciplines’.94 It is the methodology that systematises 
the law and uses to analyse whether the vague or inconsistent law leads to the 
uncertainty of the applications. As the issue of “double remedies” requires appropriate 
interpretation on countervailing law and anti-dumping law, the central work of the 
research hinges on the analysis of WTO agreements and principles. In this regard, 
doctrinal methodology well fitted in analysing provisions, especially when relying on 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty (VCLT). Recalling the United States - 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Case, the Appellate Body 
highlighted WTO law can be interpreted by the VCLT and recalled Article 31 of the 
 
94 See Caroline Morris and Cian C Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (01 Edition, Hart Publishing 1943) 31. 
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VCLT that ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose’. 95  Relying on the VCLT, doctrinal methodology can provide 
comprehensive analysis on WTO agreements, i.e. interpretation of the “non-market 
economy treatment” in the CAP based on textual and contextual connections between 
sentences of Article 15, and interpretation of the “non-market economy treatment” in 
the ADA and the GATT 1994 based on ordinary meanings of the provisions. 
 
Notably, the doctrinal analysis is not only applied to WTO agreements. It is also 
preferable in evaluating national regulations and the negotiations of recent FTAs. For 
example, the latest referential treaties, as an embodiment of trade globalization, 
reflected an aggregation of solutions to the latest trade disputes. As emblematic of FTAs, 
the CPTPP regulated SOE-related terminology, which sheds light on the identification 
of “public body”. Therefore, doctrinal analysis of FTAs as well as national legal system 
could support the interpretation of WTO rules. And such an interpretation could, in 
return, guide the implementation of WTO rules in practise. For this research, doctrinal 
analysis is mainly conducted on EU anti-dumping regulations, the CPTPP provisions 
and their consistency with WTO law. 
 
1.4.1 Doctrinal analysis as the backbone of the research 
 
The application of doctrinal methodology is the mainline of this research. The doctrinal 
analysis of the WTO regulations 96  and cases 97  demonstrates that the “non-market 
economy treatment” from the anti-dumping dimension is not the only origin of “double 
 
95  See Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, at para. 17. 
96 WTO regulations, for example, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994); Agreements on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 
(Anti-dumping Agreement, ADA)  
97 For example, Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014. Panel Report, United States - 
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/ R, adopted 14 July 2014. Appellate 
Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, 
adopted 16 July 2019. 
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remedy” issue, the ambiguous provisions of subsidy determination from the 
countervailing dimension also “contributes” to the result of trade disputes. 
 
The ambiguous trade remedy provisions require appropriate interpretations. 
Concerning the subsidy determination, WTO countervailing agreements, in specific, 
the ASCM, serves as the main target of the doctrinal analysis. Article 1.1 (a)(1) of the 
ASCM has raised potential controversary on determination of an entity established by 
a government to serve as a “pass-through” vehicle for subsidies. 98  The vague 
expression of the ASCM could result in a confusion determining the subject of a subsidy 
behaviour (“public body”), thus causing a potential countervailing measure. Around the 
“public body” issue, analysis is based on the case law where WTO tribunals addressed 
the factors of a “public body”.99  
 
Moreover, treaties are of significant value for the doctrinal analysis. Provisions in FTAs, 
especially the CPTPP, have a referential function in compliance of the WTO provisions.  
For example, Article 6.8 of the agreement clearly addresses that trade disputes between 
parties are governed by WTO rules, such as the ADA and the ASCM. Evaluations on 
the CPTPP provisions in a doctrinal way could refer to the latest and practical 
understanding of concepts and trade rules by contracting parties under the WTO 
framework, which points out a way to interpret provisions consisting with WTO 
regulations. 
 
The classification and assessment of an SOE is a specific problem of the “public body” 
issue where a doctrinal method is also necessary. The SOEs, especially the SOEs in 
China, have complicated relationship with the government, which are frequently 
analysed from a political or social perspective.100 However, the assessment of SOEs can 
 
98 See ibid. 
99 See ibid. 
100 For example, Li-Wen Lin provided an anatomy of Chinese SOE. The research addressed that Chinese SOEs are 
embedded in a network composed of dense and complex links with the state, and such network may confront 
problems in the future. See Li-Wen Lin, ‘A Network Anatomy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (2017) 16 
World Trade Review 583. See also Li-Wen Lin, ‘Reforming China’s State-Owned Enterprises: From Structure to 
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also be conducted from the legal aspect. For example, the relationship between the state 
and SOEs is indicated in national law where state plays a role as an investor.101 The 
SOEs in China is also experiencing a reform, which highlights an attempt of 
independent market player role under the instruction of Guiding Opinions of the CPC 
Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned 
Enterprises. 102  A doctrinal analysis based on these regulations will provide legal 
understanding on factors and features of SOE in China.  
 
Concerning the anti-dumping dimension, the CAP, the ADA, and the GATT 1994 serve 
as main targets of the doctrinal analysis. The expiry of relevant provisions in the CAP 
has raised potential controversary over the “non-market economy treatment” and its 
three legal bases. In general, three sources, to different extent, permit WTO Members 
to apply special treatment calculating dumping margins and impose anti-dumping duty. 
The CAP directly and expressly stipulated such discriminatory treatment in its Article 
15. Under the Protocol, WTO Members may calculate dumping margin through a 
method that not based on China’s practical price. Subparagraph (d) of Article 15 
stipulates a deadline for this treatment, it states ‘in any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession’.103 Then what 
should be the appropriate interpretation of the expire of Article 15: (a)(ii) becomes a 
key issue to special treatment discussed by experts. 104  Therefore, an attempt at 
 
People’ (2017) 229 China Quarterly 107; Jianzhi Zhao, ‘Chinese State-Owned Companies, Misallocation and the 
Reform Policy’ (2019) 4 Chinese Political Science Review 28. 
101 For example, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises Company Law of 
the People’s Republic of China.  
102 Instructions of reform see also Recommendations for the Thirteenth Five-Year-Plan for Economic and Social 
Development of the People’s Republic of China, Recommendations on Deepening the Reform of State-Owned 
Enterprises. 
103 According to Article 15: (d):  
“Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market 
economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's 
national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, should China establish, 
pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a 
particular industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply 
to that industry or sector.” 
104 See for example, Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 
Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ 
(2015) 10 Global Trade and Customs Journal 176; Jochem De Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations 
against Imports from China’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 515; Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu and 
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appropriate interpretation of special treatment has conducted by the doctrinal method. 
 
Nonetheless, interpretations of the CAP do not preclude WTO Members from applying 
the general rules set out in Article 2 of ADA and Article VI of GATT 1994. Article VI: 
(b) of GATT1994 and Article 2.2 of ADA provide the general legal basis of the “non-
market economy treatment” among WTO Members. However, to rely on these 
provisions, one of three thresholds should be complied: when there are no sales of the 
like product “in the ordinary course of trade”, “the particular market situation” or “low 
volume of the sales”. Yet WTO law does not provide further instructions in applying 
these standards, then how to interpret and explain them in a coherent way is significant 
to this part of analysis.  
 
The second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 “euphemistically” allows Members to calculate 
dumping margin not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices. However, 
requirements to apply this provision are far stricter than that of other legal bases. Under 
the second Ad Note, the exporting country must have ‘a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the state’. 
Then how to understand the strict line of this note is one of concerns. 
 
1.4.2 Doctrinal analysis with a historical dimension  
 
The function of doctrinal analysis with a historical dimension is mainly embodied in 
three aspects. First, it is an efficient approach to identify the origin of “double remedy” 
issue. Although laws in the past may not represent a backward justice system,105 the 
development of “double remedy” issue through US cases reflects loopholes in the US 
 
Tianzhu Han, ‘China’s Market Economy Dilemma and Its Interplay with EU Anti-Dumping Law’ (2019) 27 Asia 
Pacific Law Review 102; Roberto Soprano, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of the Protocol of 
Accession of China to the World Trade Organization: Market Economy Considerations in Anti-Dumping 
Investigations’ (2019) 46 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29. 
105 DJ Boorstin talked about the method in legal history, the article challenged the view that it is “necessary to adopt 
the categories of the modern ‘developed’ legal system as much of legal history has become a sort of legal embryology 
– a search for rudimentary forms of a ‘full-grown’ legal system”. The article argues that past laws are not always 
rudimentary through citing examples by Pollock and Maitland in their History of English Law before the Time of 
Edward I. See DJ Boorstin, ‘Tradition and Method in Legal History’ (1941) 54 Harvard Law Review 424, 428.  
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trade remedy statutes in the 1980s.106 Analysis in a historical way provides a unique 
perspective to explain why the issue of “double remedies” is a long-lasting and complex 
problem. Based on the analysis, further suggestions could be made to prevent the 
“double remedy” issue at the national level before appealing to the WTO dispute 
settlement body, thus avoiding time and money being consume for both parties at issue.  
 
Second, it is also useful in reviewing the revision of EU basic anti-dumping 
regulation. 107  The advantage of a historical dimension is to present a “dynamic” 
development of EU’s attitudes to the “non-market economy treatment” in response to 
the China’s Accession Protocol and relevant case law.108 Such “dynamic” development 
can provide resources for assessment by doctrinal analysis and serve two purposes. First, 
whether the revision of EU anti-dumping law could prevent the issue of “double 
remedies” or reduce the damage caused by it; and second, if the new law is consistent 
with the WTO trade remedy rules.   
 
Furthermore, a historical perspective is applied in the analysis of preparatory work of 
WTO agreements as a supplement of interpreting WTO provisions stipulated in the 
VCLT. A historical view is helpful to reveal the concerns of signatories during the  
negotiation, and this is especially applicable to the “non-market economy treatment” 
 
106 The first case that can be linked to issue of “double remedies” in the US is the Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United 
States in 1983. The case indicated that a countervailing issue is regulated by an anti-dumping statute and a 
misunderstanding of jurisdiction between anti-dumping and countervailing law. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 801 F.2d 1308,1317 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
107 See Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union [2016] L176/21. Regulation (EU) 
2017/2321 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on amending Regulation (EU) 
2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union [2017] L338/1. 
108 As China’s Accession Protocol stipulated a date for its NME treatment clause, then how to interpret the expiry 
of this clause will have a significant influence on trade activities connected with China. Case law indicates that 
“double remedies” is prohibited by WTO law, so how to bring coherence to the decision of the dispute settlement 
body becomes a topic for discussion among WTO Members. For example, in 2012, the US enacted GPX law, 
introducing the “adjustment of anti-dumping duty” to reduce the damage of “double remedy”. See Public Law 112–
99, 112th Congress, 126 STAT. 265 (MAR. 13, 2012). For examples of case law, see Appellate Body Report, United 
States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, 
adopted 11 March 2011. 
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issue embodied in the China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO. One of the examples 
put forward by the signatories to the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China is the treatment of China’s products in anti-dumping investigation due to China’s 
special market situation. 109  Therefore, reviews of the preparatory work of WTO 
agreements allow a comprehensive evaluation seeking for the interpretation of the 
“non-market economy treatment”. 
 
1.4.3 Doctrinal analysis serving the conformity with WTO law 
 
In order to reach an appropriate interpretation of WTO provisions, doctrinal analysis is 
also applied to assess the consistency between different regulations and WTO law. It 
mainly contains an evaluation of the EU anti-dumping regulation and WTO regulations, 
and an assessment of CPTPP provisions and WTO rules supported by WTO tribunal 
reports.  
 
As a preferential agreement under negotiation, the CPTPP, as well as the EU anti-
dumping regulation, is inherently connected with WTO rules, because they share same 
purpose that relates to the WTO law. The preamble to the GATT 1994 reflects its 
objectives as a result of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, where 
‘expanding the production and exchange of goods’ is one of the concerns. 110  The 
promotion of the “production and exchange of goods” can be explained by WTO 
 
109 Paragraph 150 of Section IV: (13) of the working paper addresses the special situation of determining cost 
and price comparability concerning China, it provides that: 
“Several members of the Working Party noted that China was continuing the process of transition towards 
a full market economy. Those members noted that under those circumstances, in the case of imports of 
Chinese origin into a WTO Member, special difficulties could exist in determining cost and price 
comparability in the context of anti-dumping investigations and countervailing duty investigations. Those 
members stated that in such cases, the importing WTO Member might find it necessary to take into account 
the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic costs and prices in China might not always be 
appropriate.” 
110 According to the preamble to GATT 1994, objectives of the Agreement include: ‘raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume if real income and effective demand, developing 
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods’.  
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fundamental principles. In the context of this research, “non-discrimination”, 
“predictable and transparent” and “more competitive” are three principles mainly 
relating to “double remedy” issue.111 The “non-discrimination” principle refers to an 
attitude of treating products and services from its own territory or trade partners in the 
same manner (fairly and equally).112 Concerning the anti-dumping issue, products from 
non-market economies have the right to receive the same treatment as those from 
market economies.113 The “predictable and transparent” principle means provisions are 
clearly regulated on trade barriers, the standards and thresholds ascertain trade barriers 
will not be applied arbitrarily, choice and lower prices via legal competition is 
preferable.114 This principle is applicable to the explanation of law in both the anti-
dumping and countervailing areas, it emphasizes the necessity of interpretation and 
clarification of ambiguous trade remedy provisions. A predictable and transparent legal 
system can prevent the illegal imposition of trade remedy behaviours, thus reducing the 
occurrence of “double remedy” issue. The “more competitive” principle discourages 
unfair practices such as subsidies and dumping, it contends that the government’s 
response to those practices should be considered, especially those of additional duties, 
such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties.115 This principle clearly addresses the 
imposition of remedy duties being based on a cautious attitude by investigation. 
Therefore, the identification of a subsidy and application of non-market economy 
methodology should be prudently considered by the investigating authority. Based on 
the analysis of the objectives and fundamental principles of WTO agreements (relating 
to the research at issue), the purpose of WTO agreements is to expand the production 
 
111 There are six fundamental principles of WTO agreements, apart from three principles analysed in the main body 
of thesis, the other three are: “more open”, “more beneficial for less developed countries” and “protect the 
environment”. Based on the explanation of the WTO, the “more open” principle encourages trade by lowering trade 
barriers, such as reduced customs duties. “More beneficial for less developed countries” refers to giving flexibility 
and privileges to less developed countries adopting WTO provisions. The “protect the environment” principle 
indicating that environmental protection cannot be a shield for trade protectionism. See official website of the WTO, 
“understanding the WTO”, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm accessed 30 
December 2019. 
112 See ibid.  
113 However, in terms of dumping margin calculation, NME products suffered from different methodology with 
market economies. 
114  See official website of the WTO, “understanding the WTO”, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm accessed 30 December 2019. 
115 See ibid 
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and exchange of goods in a non-discriminatory market through predictable and 
transparent trade remedy provisions and cautious investigation of trade barriers.  
 
The subsidiary agreements under the WTO regime, such as the ADA and the ASCM, 
serve the main purpose of the GATT 1994, with specific objectives in their fields. The 
Anti-dumping Agreement does not state the purpose in its content despite some vague 
expressions.116 Without a declaration of purpose in the ADA’s text, the title of this 
agreement can provide a clue, namely, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. The title expressly indicates that 
the purpose of the ADA relates to the implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994. 
It is further supported by Article 1 of the ADA, where the article emphasizes the status 
of Article VI of the GATT 1994 in guiding anti-dumping measures. 117  Thus it is 
necessary to seek the purpose indicated by Article VI of the GATT 1994. Looking 
through the structure of Article VI, it includes seven paragraphs, paragraphs one and 
two introduce the identification of dumping and a measure to offset dumping behaviour, 
paragraph three provides “instruction” on anti-subsidy measures, and paragraphs four 
to seven further specify the application of trade remedies. The purpose of Article VI is 
indicated by paragraphs one and three, where the provisions stipulate that behaviours 
of dumping and subsidy are not encouraged.118 Besides, Article VI is intended more to 
highlight a cautious attitude in the application of anti-remedy measures, which reflects 
the “more competitive” principle and that the imposition of remedy duties should be 
based on a cautious attitude via investigation. For example, there are three paragraphs 
to introduce the validity of anti-remedy measures, but four paragraphs to address the 
thresholds and conditions for those measures. Moreover, the tone addressing anti-
 
116 For example, first subparagraph of Article 2 begins with “for the purpose of this Agreement”, but it does not 
continue to describe the content of purpose. The Article, rather, tend to explain a dumping behaviour.  
117 Pursuant to Article 1 of ADA, ‘an anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided 
for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement’.  
118 Paragraph one of ADA stipulates an attitude towards to dumping, it states that: ‘dumping, by which products of 
one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to 
be condemned…’ if it causes injury. 
Paragraph three of ADA regulates an anti-subsidy measure, it states: ‘countervailing duty shall be understood to 
mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed…’ 
 50 
remedy measures is clearly tougher.119 In this sense, the ADA and the ASCM serve the 
same purpose. Therefore, the purpose of the ADA and the ASCM is to identify trade 
remedy behaviours injuring national industries through cautious anti-remedy 
investigation, and to offset this behaviour by the prudent application of anti-remedy 
measures as stipulated in Article VI. 
 
The purpose of EU anti-dumping regulation is clearly indicated in its 2016 
publication.120 Identical to the ADA, the title of the regulation provides a clue to its 
purpose, which is to protect domestic industries from dumping behaviour. Besides, its 
preamble has also embodied a cautious attitude in applying anti-remedy measures, for 
example, the usage of “expedient” to construct a normal value for dumping margin.121 
The “features” of EU anti-dumping regulation correspond to the purposes of GATT 
1994 and its subsidiary agreements.  
 
In addition, the preamble to the EU anti-dumping regulation highlights its connection 
with WTO law. Paragraph 2 of the preamble readdresses the function of Article VI of 
GATT 1994. 122  It then ascertains its role in compliance with WTO anti-dumping 
agreements in paragraph 3. 123  According to the preamble, the EU anti-dumping 
 
119 With regard to dumping behaviour, Article VI use “condemn” to express its discouraging attitude. And only if 
such behaviour causes injury to a domestic industry “may” a contracting party levy anti-dumping measure.  
Concerning anti-remedy measures, Article VI clearly stipulates situations where anti-remedy measures are 
prohibited as in paragraphs three to six, for example, ‘no countervailing duty shall be levied on any product …in 
excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy…’.      
120 Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union [2016] L176/2. 
121 Paragraph 5 of the preamble addresses the determination of normal value under Article VI of GATT 1994, it 
stipulates ‘it is expedient to define the circumstances in which domestic sales may be considered to be made at a loss 
and may be disregarded, and in which recourse may be had to remaining sales, or to constructed normal value, or to 
sales to a third country’.  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “expedient” means ‘useful or politic as opposed to just or right’. It is 
more useful to interpret the word pursuant to the Cambridge Dictionary where “expedient” means ‘helpful or useful 
in the situation that now exists, although perhaps not the right thing to do morally or for the future’. Based on these 
explanations, the method recorded in paragraph 5 is only a temporary solution for a special situation, and such a 
method cannot properly be applied in the future. And this indicates a prudent attitude towards to anti-remedy 
investigation. 
122 Paragraph 2 of the preamble states: ‘the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 contains detailed rules, relating in particular to the calculation of dumping, procedures for 
initiating and pursuing an investigation, including the establishment and treatment of the facts, the imposition of 
provisional measures, the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties, the duration and review of anti-dumping 
measures and the public disclosure of information relating to anti-dumping investigations’. 
123 Paragraph 3 of the preamble addresses the role of EU anti-dumping regulation in compliance with WTO law, it 
states: ‘in order to ensure a proper and transparent application of the rules of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
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regulation is an interpretation of the anti-dumping provisions in GATT 1994 and ADA 
to the best extent possible by Union legislation. 
 
The link between the CPTPP and the WTO agreements is embodied through the whole 
structure of its provisions. The preamble to the CPTPP lists 19 objectives serving its 
purposes. The third objective clearly and literally acknowledges rights and obligations 
under the WTO regime,124 while others expressly match the objectives and fundamental 
principles of the WTO agreements. Concerning correspondence with WTO objectives, 
the first objective of the CPTPP relates to WTO law as stipulated in the preamble to the 
GATT 1994 from the perspectives of living standards, full employment and the 
liberalization of trade and investment;125 and the 17th objective corresponds to the 
article mentioning “expanding the production and exchange of goods”.126 With regard 
to fundamental WTO principles, the seventh objective proposes a predictable legal 
framework which fulfils the “predictable and transparent” principle of the WTO law.127 
Except for the preamble, the individual chapters of the CPTPP also reflect connections 
with WTO law. For example, the first article of Chapter 1 addresses the establishment 
of free trade area is based on WTO provisions, specifically, Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994 and Article V of the GATS. Besides, Article 6.8 of the CPTPP stipulates that the 
application of anti-dumping and countervailing measure shall follow WTO trade 
remedy provisions.128 Expressions in the CPTPP provisions prove that the CPTPP is 
based on WTO law and aims to promote WTO objectives in dealing with the latest trade 
disputes via rules specified under the WTO regime.   
 
 
the language of that agreement should be reflected in Union legislation to the best extent possible’. 
124 The third objective of CPTPP states that: ‘build on their respective rights and obligations under Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization’.  
125 The first objective of CPTPP is to ‘establish a comprehensive regional agreement that promotes economic 
integration to liberalise trade and investment, bring economic growth and social benefits, create new opportunities 
for workers and businesses, benefit consumers, reduce poverty and promote sustainable growth’. 
126 The 17th objective is to ‘contribute to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a 
catalyst to broader regional and international cooperation’. 
127  The seventh objective states that: ‘establish a predictable legal and commercial framework for trade and 
investment through mutually advantageous rules’. 
128 Paragraph 1 of Article 6.8 declares that each party retains its rights and obligations under WTO anti-dumping and 
countervailing law. And paragraph 2 further ensure no rights or obligations can be above those under WTO law.  
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Therefore, the EU anti-dumping regulations and the CPTPP reflect WTO rules and can 
be referential to them. As analysed above, the basic purpose and principles of WTO law 
include the promotion of a transparent trade remedy system and cautious investigation 
of trade barriers. Like its subsidiary agreements, the purpose of the ADA and the ASCM 
is to identify trade remedy behaviours injurious to national industries through cautious 
anti-remedy investigation, and offset such behaviours by prudent application of anti-
remedy measures as stipulated in Article VI of the GATT 1994. Therefore, WTO law 
has a clear attitude towards trade remedies and responses. The EU anti-dumping 
regulation and the CPTPP are embodied as expansions of WTO rules at the national and 
regional levels. Regarding the anti-dumping issue, the revision to EU 2017 
regulations129 reflect a response to disputes relating to the legal basis of the “non-market 
economy treatment” under WTO law130 at the national level, which is closely connected 
with anti-dumping provisions. For example, the 2017 regulations replace the concept 
of “non-market economy” by countries whose markets have a “significant distortion”. 
In accordance with the replacement, Article 2: 6a. (a) of the EU 2017 regulations 
provide a new method for calculating dumping margins for countries whose markets 
have “significant distortion”. And the following paragraph from Article 2: 6a. (b) 
defines the concept of “significant distortion” and provides standards for identification.  
 
Concerning the subsidy issue, the CPTPP is an ideal example to analyse the application 
of WTO countervailing law at the regional level. Take the dispute of “public body” in 
the United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products Case as an example,131 whether an SOE belongs to “public body” and how to 
regulate the SOEs under WTO law become an issue under countervailing law. The 
CPTPP, in its preamble, highlights the significant role of SOEs in trade activities and 
 
129 See Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on 
amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the 
European Union. 
130 For example, the debatable interpretation of Article 15 of China’s Accessional Protocol to the WTO. 
131 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
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expresses the objective to regulate SOE behaviour through legal system.132 It then, in 
Chapter 17, provides provisions for SOEs and designated monopolies, where it also 
introduces a concept called “delegated authority”. The provisions stipulating “SOE”, 
“designated monopoly” and “delegated authority” provide a referential view for the 
interpretation of “public body” under the ASCM.   
 
1.5 Research structure 
 
Chapter 1 has introduced the background, research question, methodology, structure, 
and limitations of this research. 
 
Chapter 2 has introduced the issue of “double remedies” as the embodiment of the abuse 
of trade remedies due to the ambiguity of the WTO trade remedies agreements. It 
analysed the rationale of the “double remedy” issue based on the provision regulating 
the “double remedy” issue in the WTO agreements and the two substantive issues that 
constitute the “double remedy” issue. The analysis has manifested that the absent 
provisions regulating the “double remedy” issue arising from the domestic subsidy is 
one rationale of the “double remedy” issue. Accordingly, it should be prohibited as long 
as it leads to duplication of duties, albeit the GATT 1995 only prohibit this issue in the 
case of the export subsidies. Above all, the chapter has further submitted that the 
ambiguous WTO trade remedies agreements require systematic and comprehensive 
countermeasures to the issue of “double remedies” where the interpretations of the legal 
basis of the non-market economy methodology and the “public body” identification 
criteria are major concerns. 
 
Chapter 3 has further explored the rationale of the “double remedy” issue by tracing its 
origin at national level. The analysis of the non-market economy disputes at the US 
 
132 The preamble to CPTPP stipulates: ‘state-owned enterprises can play a legitimate role in the diverse economies 
of the Parties, while recognising that the provision of unfair advantages to state-owned enterprises undermines fair 
and open trade and investment, and resolve to establish rules for state-owned enterprises that promote a level playing 
field with privately owned businesses, transparency and sound business practices’. 
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national court submitted that the “double remedy” issue has evolved from a single 
subsidy case into a compound dispute involving two trade remedy measures. The 
findings have further indicated that the ambiguity of countervailing law, especially the 
subsidy determination, is one rationale of the “double remedy” issue, which requires 
further interpretation. In addition, there is an asymmetric development of US trade 
remedy laws relates to the “non-market economy treatment”, which leads to a dilemma 
that the anti-dumping statute are frequently revised to regulate the countervailing 
disputes. The differences between the US anti-dumping statute and the WTO anti-
dumping agreement have indicated a controversary over the “non-market economy 
treatment” in the future. 
 
Chapter 4 has explored the solution of the “double remedy” issue based on analysing 
the topic of “public body” in countervailing investigations. It aims to prevent the abuse 
of trade remedies by seeking appropriate interpretations of the subsidy determination 
rules to provide predictable and transparent provisions of countervailing law. This 
chapter has conducted doctrinal analysis of the CPTPP regulations as well as the WTO 
countervailing provisions while taking the WTO case law as guidelines.133 This chapter 
concluded by proposing criteria identifying the “public body”, which provides a 
reference for subsidy determination. In addition, this chapter has applied the “public 
body” criteria to assess China’s SOEs. The findings highlighted that SOEs in China, 
especially Chinese central SOEs (Yang Qi), are potentially “public bodies” when 
serving specific responsibility, for example, stabilizing supply and ensuring security of 
relevant industries through strictly following national macro-control measures. 
However, it may be impossible to identify the Yang Qi as a unified “public body” due 
to its diversified functions and responsibilities, further feedback and more evidence 
through questionnaires could help to refine the evaluation during the “public body” 
investigation. 
 
133 For landmark case laws see Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. Appellate Body Report, United 
States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
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Chapter 5 and 6 have explored the solution of the “double remedy” issue based on 
analysing the topic of “non-market economy treatment” in anti-dumping investigations.  
They aim to prevent the abuse of trade remedies by seeking appropriate interpretations 
of the WTO anti-dumping agreements regulating the “non-market economy treatment”. 
In specific, Chapter 5 has explored the interpretation of the first legal basis of the “non-
market economy treatment” – the accession protocol to the WTO – under the WTO law. 
It showed that WTO Members cannot resort to the China’s Accession Protocol to the 
WTO when applying “the non-market economy treatment” for China’s exporters in the 
wake of the expiry of the provisions of Article 15. And especially, such discriminatory 
treatment for China cannot be based on its special market status. However, the 
interpretations of the CAP do not preclude WTO Members from applying the general 
rules set out in Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994.134 As a very 
creative practitioner in this regard, the EU has made revisions to its anti-dumping 
regulations by replacing the non-market economy provisions with a country-neutral 
methodology dealing with market distortions caused by the state intervention. 135 
Therefore, the relevant legal basis of the afore-mentioned issue regarding the EU anti-
dumping regulations and WTO law has been evaluated in the following chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 has explored the appropriate interpretation of another legal basis to the “non-
market economy treatment” – Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994 – 
under the WTO law. In specific, it examined the revisions of the “non-market economy 
treatment” provisions in the EU anti-dumping regulations and their conformity with the 
WTO law. It concluded that, when conducting anti-dumping investigations of either 
market or non-market economies under the WTO legal system, the primary choice in 
determining a normal value shall be based on the actual cost of production “in the 
country of origin”, even though such cost is considered to be “distorted”. When the 
construction of a normal value is necessary, all factors related to the costs in that country, 
 
134 Zhou (n 54). 
135 Vermulst, Sud and Evenett (n 20) 224; Noël and Zhou (n 18). 
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including “price distortions” should be considered ‘as long as they reflect the prevailing 
conditions in the market of exportation’. 
 
Chapter 7, as the concluding chapter, has provided a summary of recommendations to 
prevent the abuse of trade remedies. The chapter classified proposals from both 
countervailing and anti-dumping dimensions based on previous chapters. 
 
1.6 Limitations of the thesis 
 
Since this thesis aims to provide recommendations for dealing with the “double remedy” 
issue through doctrinal analysis, the focus of analysis lies in the legal area. However, it 
does not mean that the “double remedy” issue cannot be analysed through another 
discipline or perspective. 
 
Compared with providing “predictable and transparent” legal interpretations to prevent 
the issue of “double remedies”, such an issue could also be considered from an 
economic perspective. As the issue of “double remedies” refers to overlapping and 
duplicated duties, how to reduce such “duplication” by an appropriate amount is the 
topic of “pass-through” method. In the context of “double remedy” issue, the “pass-
through” rate refers to the extent that a subsidy is passed through to the price and 
reflected in the calculation of dumping margins. Theoretically, a scientifically 
calculated “pass-through” rate could reduce the injury of “double counting” by 
eliminating price discrimination under subsidization. For example, on March 6, 2012, 
US Congress enacted the anti-dumping provisions (GPX Law), which provided the US 
Department of Commerce with a legal basis to apply anti-dumping duties and 
countervailing duties to China’s products; and by making adjustments (calculating pass-
through rates) to anti-dumping duties to avoid the situation of “double remedy” issue.136  
 
 
136 See Public Law 112–99, 112th Congress, 126 STAT. 265 (MAR. 13, 2012). See Public Law 112–99, 112th 
Congress, 126 STAT. 265 (MAR. 13, 2012). 
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However, it is in practice difficult to calculate adjustments by evaluating the influence 
of subsidies on relevant prices. According to the GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States 
Case, the US Department of Commerce expressed that it did not have a method for 
identifying overlapping remedies, the Court also admitted that it is difficult for 
Commerce to decide the degree and extent of potential “double remedy” issue.137In the 
United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China Case, one argument embodied in the US’s and China’s claims is 
whether there is a pass-through of a benefit by subsidy.138 Despite the Appellate Body 
admitted the existence of “pass-through”, it works as evidence to illustrate the “double 
remedy” issue, the Appellate Body did or could not provide a further explanation 
confirming the amount of “pass-through” rate.139 Besides, Prusa and Vermulst, in their 
article, emphasized the view that ‘economists have repeatedly found that pass-through 
will not typically be symmetric across destination markets’, and there are various 
factors that can affect the determination of pass-through.140  
 
Therefore, research on the determination of “pass-through” rate through economic 
analysis or law and economy is possible, but it is overly data-demanding and does not 
correspond to the doctrinal analysis in this research.  
 
Recognizing a non-market economy as a market economy or granting a market 
economy status was one alternative to settle the issue of “double remedies”. For 
example, Ngangjoh-Hodu and Han argue for China’s market economy status in the 
context of the Accession Protocol to the WTO.141 It was an alternative because it is 
 
137 Based on the case, the Commerce explained that “it would not allow a constructed export price (‘CEP’) offset or 
a circumstances of sales (‘COS’) adjustment in this investigation because Commerce ‘cannot accurately determine 
the specific indirect selling expenses incurred on sales reflected in the surrogate financial statements’”. The court, 
in its latter analysis, stated that “it is too difficult for Commerce to determine, using improved methodologies, and 
in the absence of new statutory tools, whether and to what degree double counting is occurring”. See GPX Int'l Tire 
Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1345 (CIT 2010) ("GPX III"). 
138 Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010, at para. 12.7.   
139 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at paras. 261 and 541. 
140 Prusa and Vermulst (n 49) 214; Prusa (n 5) 625; Kelly (n 45) 109. 
141 Ngangjoh-Hodu and Han (n 54). 
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generally considered that discriminatory treatment will not or seldomly be applied to 
market economies. However, following the recent development of “non-market 
economy treatment”, especially when China found non-market conditions exist in the 
US energy and petrochemical sector and accordingly changes its method in calculating 
the dumping margin, the “non-market economy treatment” is potentially available for 
all WTO members. Therefore, it is more like a legal issue rather than an identification 
of economic status in front of the table of negotiations.  
 
The issue of “double remedies” is a topic that may relate to various disciplines. And the 
research is mainly an exploration from the perspective of legal analysis. It is hoped that 
this research will prompt debates in a multi-disciplinary sphere and provide inspiration 
for further research.  
 
1.7 Original contribution of the research and its significance  
 
This research originally contributes to the solution of “double remedy” issue. Those 
proposals also generally forbid the application of trade remedy measures relating to the 
“non-market economy” issues that are inconsistent with the WTO agreements.  
 
1.7.1 This research has provided an original method to prevent the “double 
remedy” issue under the WTO legal system  
 
The first contribution of this research is that it provided an original method to prevent 
the “double remedy” issue under the WTO legal system. As discussed in the Section 
1.2, the general solution of the “double remedy” issue, either according to the WTO 
DSB or the researchers, focuses on damage offsetting.142 It is a consideration to reduce 
the damage by calculating incorrect trade remedy duties. This research, however, 
 
142 See for example, Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. Thomas J Prusa and Edwin Vermulst, 
‘United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China: Passing the 
Buck on Pass-Through’ (2013) 12 World Trade Review 197. 
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emphasises that relevant trade remedy measures should be forbidden to avert the 
“double remedy” issue, because they are potentially inconsistent with the WTO law. 
Accordingly, this research proposes to prevent the “double remedy” issue before the 
abusive trade remedy measures that are potentially being implemented. It provides 
proposals from both anti-dumping and countervailing perspectives to clarify the 
procedure of trade remedy investigations by appropriately re-interpreting the WTO 
trade remedy agreements, which provides a new dimension to solve this problem. 
 
1.7.2 This research has identified the ambiguous provisions of the ASCM as one 
significant rationale of the “double remedy” issue and provided corresponding 
solutions  
 
Identifying the ambiguous provisions of the ASCM as one significant rationale of the 
“double remedy” issue and providing corresponding solutions is also one contribution. 
The existing research discussing the “double remedy” issue are mainly focusing on anti-
dumping dimension. For example, the articles of Dukgeun Ahn and Katarzyna 
Kaszubska lead to the conclusion that the calculating methodology in anti-dumping 
investigation is the major rationale of the “double remedy” issue.143 Comparatively, 
this research, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have demonstrated that the vague 
countervailing law not only lead to countervailing dispute, but also result in the “double 
remedy” issue, which refutes the opinion that the dumping margin calculation is the 
only or major rationale of the “double remedy” issue. This research then in Chapter 4 
discussed how to identify a subsidy in detail and proposed specific criteria to define the 
“public body”, which provides proposals to regulate countervailing measures.  
 
1.7.3 The findings of this research have important implications for a broad range 
of research both within and outside the “double remedy” issue 
 
143 Dukgeun Ahn, ‘United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China.’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 761, 767. Katarzyna Kaszubska, ‘Double Remedy: 
Beyond the Non-market economy status’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies 
in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
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The findings of this research not only apply to the specific “double remedy” issue, but 
also contribute to the solution of general controversary over the trade remedy 
applications. As analysed in Chapter 2, the rationale of the “double remedy” issue 
contains both anti-dumping and countervailing aspects as reflected in the United States 
- Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China 
Case.144 Accordingly, the findings of this research also help to prevent the disputes 
arising from, for example, the issue of determination of subsidies in subsidy 
investigations or the issue of “non-market economy treatment” in anti-dumping 
investigations. 
 
Specifically, to avert the abuse of countervailing measures, this research submits that 
the potential subsidization behaviour, especially by a “public body”, in the anti-subsidy 
investigations should be conscientiously evaluated. Accordingly, this research 
contributes substantially on the clarification of term “public body”. It provides the 
specific criteria to define the “public body” by the doctrinal analysis of WTO tribunal 
reports and international treaties, which provides predictability to identify a subsidy.  
 
To avoid the abuse of anti-dumping measures, this research contends that it is crucial 
to carefully determine the normal value in the anti-dumping investigations. This 
research further demonstrates that when calculating dumping margin of either market 
or non-market economies, the primary choice in determining the normal value shall be 
based on the actual cost of production, even though such a cost is considered to be 
“distorted”. When the “non-market economy treatment” is necessary to construct the 
normal value, all factors related to the cost in that country, including “price distortions”, 




144 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
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In addition, this research does more than only identify the trade remedy issue of China. 
While China is one of the major targets of the “double remedy” issue, the recent 
development has demonstrated all WTO members, such as the US and the EU, are 
potential targets of “non-market economy treatment”.145 Accordingly, this research has 




The main function of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the research, which 
works as a preamble for subsequent chapters. The priority, as discussed in this chapter, 
is to seek solutions preventing the abuse of trade remedies due to the blurry WTO 
provisions. Through re-interpretation of the countervailing and anti-dumping law, it 
responds to the WTO’s dilemma clarifying the controversary over trade remedies 
applications in the context of “non-market economy”. The suggestions it provides could 
shed light on a bigger picture of good international economic governance and 
increasing the predictability and stability of the WTO dispute settlement and the 
remedies. Although the research cannot cover each discipline relating to the issue of 




145 On 17th July 2020, the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (MOFCOM) published its preliminary determination 
on the imposition of antidumping duties on imported propanol from the United States. Accordingly, China found 
that non-market economy conditions exist in the US energy and petrochemical sector. Besides, China has initiated 
another anti-dumping investigation involving NME allegations of Australia’s products. See Henry Gao, ‘The US Is 
Now Officially a Non-Market Economy, According to China’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-officially-a-non-market-economy-according-to-china-.html> 
accessed 10 July 2020; Zhiguo Yu and Sandeep Thomas, ‘The US Is Now a “Non-Market Economy” – Anti-
Dumping Ruling by China’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-a-non-market-economy-anti-dumping-ruling-by-
china.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ielpblog+%28International+
Economic+Law+and+Policy+Blog%29> accessed 10 July 2020; Zhiguo Yu and Jesse Kreier, ‘China and 
Distortions - Bis’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/08/china-
and-distortions-bis.html> accessed 20 August 2020. The ruling is available only on the Chinese webpage of 
MOFCOM. Direct link to the ruling http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/trb/202007/20200717145528534.pdf. 
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Chapter 2: Introduction to the “double remedy” issue 
 
This chapter has introduced the issue of “double remedies” as the embodiment of the 
abuse of trade remedies due to the ambiguity of the WTO trade remedies agreements. 
It analysed the rationale of the “double remedy” issue based on the provision regulating 
the “double remedy” issue in the WTO agreements and the two substantive issues that 
constitute the “double remedy” issue. The analysis has manifested that the absent 
provisions regulating the “double remedy” issue arising from the domestic subsidy is 
one rationale of the “double remedy” issue. Accordingly, it should be prohibited as long 
as it leads to duplication of duties, albeit the GATT 1995 only prohibit this issue in the 
case of the export subsidies. Above all, the chapter has further submitted that the 
ambiguous WTO trade remedies agreements require systematic and comprehensive 
countermeasures to the issue of “double remedies” where the interpretations of the legal 
basis of the non-market economy methodology and the “public body” identification 
criteria are major concerns. 
 
2.1 An issue of “double counting” by the application of anti-dumping duty and 
countervailing duty 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this research, the “double remedy” issue is emblematic of 
controversary over trade remedies applications in the context of “non-market economy” 
and a microcosm of dilemma that the WTO has confronted. It not only reflects the 
controversary over normal value construction in anti-dumping investigation, but also 
embodies the debates on determination of subsidy in countervailing investigations. 
Following the announcement on 17th July 2020 by the Ministry of Commerce of the 
PRC (MOFCOM) in its anti-dumping investigation that non-market conditions exist in 
the US energy and petrochemical sector and ‘accordingly swapped out US exporters’ 
costs in calculating the dumping margin, the “double remedy” issue has been 
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highlighted again. 146  As Jesse Kreier comments on the China’s anti-dumping 
investigations on US n-propanal exporters: 
 
[T]he 145 alleged subsidies include many of the same programs investigated in the 
n-propanal AD case and alleged in the parallel AD investigation. Thus, the issue 
whether government interventions are properly addressed by AD, CVD or both, 
once again presents itself.147 
 
The concept of “double remedy” issue is addressed by the WTO tribunals in the United 
States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China Case where the Appellate Body summarized the issue as a situation where both 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties are applied to the same product, resulting in a 
subsidization being offset twice.148 In essence, the issue of “double remedies” may arise 
when both countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties are imposed on the same 
imported products. Noticeably, the terminology does not simply refer to the fact that 
the two duties are imposed on the same product. Rather, the simultaneous application 
of both duties results in offsetting of the same subsidization twice, which is also referred 
to as “double counting”.149  
 
As will be discussed in detail in the following section, the issue of “double remedies” 
is more likely to occur when the export price is affected by subsidies of “non-market 
economies” in the trade remedies investigations by so called “non-market economy 
methodology” or “non-market economy treatment”.150 When calculating the dumping 
 
146 Henry Gao, ‘The US Is Now Officially a Non-Market Economy, According to China’ (International Economic 
Law and Policy Blog) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-officially-a-non-market-economy-
according-to-china-.html> accessed 10 July 2020; Zhiguo Yu and Sandeep Thomas, ‘The US Is Now a “Non-Market 
Economy” – Anti-Dumping Ruling by China’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-a-non-market-economy-anti-dumping-ruling-by-
china.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ielpblog+%28International+
Economic+Law+and+Policy+Blog%29> accessed 10 July 2020. The ruling is available only on the Chinese 
webpage of MOFCOM. Direct link to the ruling http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/trb/202007/20200717145528534.pdf.  
147 See Zhiguo Yu and Jesse Kreier, ‘China and Distortions - Bis’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/08/china-and-distortions-bis.html> accessed 20 August 2020. 
148 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, para 541. 
149 See ibid. 
150 See Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 619; Brian D 
Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies’ (2014) 17 Journal of 
International Economic Law 105. 
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margin of “non-market economies”, the investigating authorities of the trade remedies 
are required to compare the product’s normal with its export price. However, the actual 
normal values of the “non-market economies” are replaced by the surrogate data, 
because the actual market data in the “non-market economies” are considered 
unreliable.151 Therefore, the dumping margins are based on comparisons between the 
product's constructed normal value (which does not reflect the influence of subsidies) 
and the product's actual export price (which is presumably lower than it would 
otherwise have been under the influence of subsidy). The result of an asymmetric 
comparison is thus generally higher than would otherwise be the case, which leads to 
the implementation of trade remedies.152 In this sense, although the issue is triggered 
by a subsidy, a dumping behaviour might also be involved because of price 
discrimination.  
 
As the Panel explained, the dumping margin calculated by the “non-market economy 
treatment” ‘reflects not only price discrimination by the investigated producer between 
the domestic and export markets (“dumping”), but also ‘economic distortions that affect 
the producer's costs of production’, including specific subsidies to the investigated 
producer of the relevant product in respect of that product.153 An anti-dumping duty 
calculated based on the “non-market economy treatment” may, therefore, “remedy” or 
“offset” a domestic subsidy, to the extent that such subsidy has contributed to a lowering 
of the export price. 154  Put differently, a countervailing duty levied on a subsidy 
behaviour, at meanwhile, an anti-dumping measure implemented on the same product 
because the subsidization lowered the export price and lead to price discrimination. 
Accordingly, the concurrent imposition of anti-dumping duty and countervailing duty 
may result in a subsidy being offset twice.155  
 
151 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010, at para. 14.68. 
152 See ibid. at paras 14.69 and 14.72. 
153 See ibid at para. 14.69. 
154 See ibid at para. 14.70. 
155 Double remedies may also arise in the context of domestic subsidies granted within market economies when anti-
dumping and countervailing duties are concurrently imposed on the same products and a constructed, or third-
country normal value is used in the anti-dumping investigation. 
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2.2 Regulation and rationale of “double remedy” issue within the WTO 
framework 
 
Article VI of the GATT 1994, the ASCM (Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures), the ADA (Anti-dumping Agreements) and the AP (Accession Protocols to 
WTO), to different extent, regulate the trade remedies. However, the regulations on 
“double remedy” issue are ambiguous. Although the “double remedy” issue raised by 
the export subsidies are clearly prohibited by the WTO law, no further guidance is 
provided relating to the prevention of this issue, nor an elimination of its injuries, which 
leaves loopholes in this regard. Besides, the WTO law regulating the issue of “double 
remedies” arising from domestic subsidy is absent, but, as analysed by the Appellate 
Body, this does not mean “double remedy” issue arising by domestic subsidy is allowed 
under WTO law.156 In contrary, the “double remedy” issue shall be prohibited as long 
as it leads to a duplication of duties. 
 
2.2.1 The “double remedy” issue arising from the export subsidies are prohibited 
by the GATT 1994 without further instructions 
 
Table 1 Illustration of the “double remedy” issue under an export subsidy  
Export subsidy  
↓  
Reduction in export price  
↓ 
Export price < Domestic price (normal value) 
↓ 
Injury to domestic industry of importing country  
↓ 
 
156 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 567. 
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Anti-dumping duty (damage caused by price discrimination) 
+ 
Countervailing duty (injury caused by subsidy) 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates that the “double remedy” issue may occur under the export subsidies. 
For the dumping margins calculation, the investigating authorities are required to 
compare the product’s normal value with its export price. In general, the normal value 
is the domestic price that does not affected by the export subsidies. In contrast, the 
export price is presumably lower than it would otherwise have been under the influence 
of the subsidy. The result is thus based on an asymmetric comparison and is generally 
higher than would otherwise be the case. Therefore, an anti-dumping duty may be 
applied according to the enlarged dumping margin. Meanwhile, an anti-subsidy duty 
might be implemented based on the link between the injury and the subsidy. Both of 
the remedy remedies thus offset the same injury caused originally by the export subsidy. 
 
The issue of “double remedies” in the case of the export subsidies is prohibited by 
Article VI: 5 of GATT 1994 as follows: 
 
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export 
subsidization. 
 
Two requirements are addressed by this provision. First, both the anti-dumping duty 
and the countervailing duty are implemented on one product due to the adverse effects 
caused by the export subsidization. Second, both the trade remedies compensate the 
same case of dumping or subsidization. The two points together constitute a situation 
of “double counting”. In this sense, the concurrent application of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to the same product may not lead to “double remedy” issue, 
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“double counting” only exists when the same situation is compensated for twice.157 
Accordingly, Article VI: 5 of the GATT 1994 clearly prohibits “double counting” due 
to the export subsidization.  
 
However, Article VI does not provide further instructions on regulating this issue. 
Specifically, the provision neither addresses how to prevent the “double counting” from 
the trade remedies investigations, nor mentions what is an appropriate way to reduce 
the damages caused by the “double remedy” issue. The provision indicates the law has 
noticed that a potential risk may arise when both anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures are applied to the same product resulting in a duplication of duties under the 
export subsidy; however, it does not provide any substantial references on this matter.  
 
2.2.2 WTO law regulating the “double remedy” issue arising from the domestic 
subsidy should not be left lacking 
 
Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 prohibits the issue of “double remedies” due to 
application of the export subsidies, but it keeps silent on domestic subsidies. Why did 
Uruguay Round negotiators “skip” the “double remedy” issue by the domestic subsidy? 
One of the concerns is that domestic subsidies are generally not increasing the dumping 
margin, thus not leading to the related anti-dumping measures.158 
 
Table 2 Illustration of the domestic subsidy under a general situation 
(General situation)  
Domestic subsidy  
↓  
Reduction in export price and domestic price 
↓ 
Export price = Domestic price  
 
157 See ibid, at para. 541. 
158 Kelly (n 45). 
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↓ 
Injury to domestic industry of importing country  
↓ 
Countervailing duty (injury caused by subsidy) 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 2, in general, a domestic subsidy will not lead to the duplication 
of duties. When the investigating authorities calculate the dumping margin by 
comparing the normal value with the export price, both the normal value (usually the 
domestic price) and the export price will be affected by the domestic subsidy in the 
same way and to the same extent. Since any lowering of prices attributable to the 
subsidy will be reflected on both sides of the dumping margin calculation, the overall 
dumpling margin will not be affected by the subsidization. As a result, a countervailing 
measure might be applied based on the domestic subsidy and its injury to the domestic 
industry of the importing country, but the dumping margin will not lead to an anti-
dumping measure. In this sense, only the countervailing duty offsets the subsidization. 
This is the general case of the domestic subsidy of most market economies in the trade 
remedies investigations. 
 
Table 3 Illustration of the “double remedy” issue under the domestic subsidy 
Domestic subsidy 
↓  
Reduction in export price, surrogate price (third market economy country or 
constructed normal value) 
↓ 
Export price < Domestic price (surrogate price not being affected by domestic 
subsidy of exporting country) 
↓ 
Injury to domestic industry of importing country  
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↓ 
Anti-dumping duty (injury caused by price discrimination) 
+ 
Countervailing duty (injury caused by subsidy) 
 
 
However, the situation changes when confronting “non-market economies”. For 
dumping margin calculation, the investigating authorities compare the product’s normal 
value with the product’s export price. The normal value is replaced by the domestic 
price from a third market economy or constructed by the investigating authorities, thus 
could not reflect the influence of the domestic subsidy. Meanwhile, the export price is 
presumably lower than it would otherwise have been under the influence of subsidy. 
The result, thus, coms from a comparison between an unsubsidized price and a 
subsidized price. Therefore, the dumping margin is based on an asymmetric comparison 
and is generally higher than would otherwise be the case. In this sense, a situation of 
“double counting” as illustrated by Table 1 occurs.  
 
In contrast with the regulation of the export subsidies, the WTO law does not provide 
rules for the domestic subsidies. In the United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, the Panel relied on Article 
VI: 5 of the GATT 1994 as contextual support for its finding that Article 19.3 and 19.4 
of the ASCM do not address the issue of “double remedies”. The Panel considered that 
‘these terms are self-explanatory in their intention to limit the scope of the prohibition 
in Article VI: 5 to situations involving export subsidy’.159 The Panel considered that, 
because the explicit prohibition in Article VI:5 is limited to potential “double remedy” 
issue in respect of export subsidies, Members could not have intended to prohibit the 
issue of “double remedies” in respect of domestic subsidies in Articles 19.3 or 19.4 of 
 
159 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 




However, the issue of “double remedies” under domestic subsidy shall not be left blank 
and interpreted as absent based on WTO law. According to the Appellate Body, when 
interpreting Article VI of the GATT 1994, ‘omissions in different contexts may have 
different meanings’161 and the phrase ‘same situation: is central to an understanding of 
the rationale underpinning the prohibition contained in Article VI:5’.162 The “same 
situation” is explained by the Appellate Body as being where an export subsidy result 
in a pro-rata reduction in the export price of a product, but does not affect the price of 
domestic sales of that product, thus the situation of subsidization and the situation of 
dumping are the “same situation”.163 The “same situation” here, then, refers to the 
determination of subsidization and dumping by investigation relying simply on export 
subsidy.  
 
What’s more, the “same situation” may have a further interpretation based on the 
rationale of “double remedy” issue. Since the export subsidy leads to the 
implementation of an anti-dumping measure and a countervailing measure, which leads 
to a duplication of duties, then the “same situation” could also refer to any situation that 
has the same effect as “double counting”. In other words, it is not the “export” or 
“import” subsidy that violates the law, but rather the “double remedy” issue itself is 
inconsistent with Article VI: 5 of the GATT 1994. In any case, the issue of “double 
remedies” under domestic subsidy should be under the guidance of WTO law.  
 
The Appellate Body further reaffirmed the illegality of “double remedy” issue by 
contending that it violated requirements in Article 19.3 of the ASCM.164 Article 19.3 of 
the ASCM requires that the countervailing duty shall be levied ‘in the appropriate 
 
160 See ibid at para. 14.118. 
161 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 567. 
162 See ibid. 
163 See ibid. at para. 568. 
164 See ibid. at para. 582. 
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amounts in each case’. According to the Panel, “the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
calculated under an NME methodology has no impact on whether the amount of the 
concurrent countervailing duty collected is 'appropriate' or not”. 165  However, the 
Appellate Body disagrees with the Panel’s analysis that Article 19.3 of the ASCM does 
not address the issue of “double remedies”. In contrast, the Appellate Body contends 
that the evaluation of the amount of the countervailing duty cannot ignore anti-dumping 
duty imposed on the same product to offset the same subsidization.166 Therefore, the 
amount of the countervailing duty cannot be “appropriate” without having regard to 
anti-dumping duty connected with the same subsidization. In this regard, the Appellate 
Body finds that the imposition of “double remedies” based on “non-market economy 
treatment” is inconsistent with Article 19.3 of the ASCM.167 
 
2.3 Two elements reflected by the “double remedy” issue 
 
The “double remedy” issue in the context of “non-market economy treatment” is 
represented by two subsidiary issues: the non-market economy methodology in the anti-
dumping investigation and the subsidy determination in the countervailing 
investigation. Regarding the non-market economy methodology, WTO Members can 
resort to three legal bases for special treatment, which calls for interpretation on 
applying of such treatment. Concerning the subsidy determination, a more precise 
interpretation of the “public body” is required to provide criteria in assessing entities 
such as the SOEs in China. 
 
2.3.1 The non-market economy methodology  
 
The “non-market economy treatment” in the anti-dumping investigation, also called the 
non-market economy methodology, relates to the discriminatory determination of the 
 
165 See ibid. at para. 583. 
166 See ibid. at para. 582. 
167 See ibid. at para. 583 
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dumping margins, albeit the term “non-market economy” is nowhere defined in any 
GATT or WTO agreements.168 In general, the determination of dumping margins is 
based on a comparison between the export price and the normal value (normally 
domestic price in investigated country). The discriminatory use of surrogate method in 
anti-dumping investigation based on the market economy conditions is generally 
considered ‘a violation of the non-discrimination obligation’ and is a ‘derogation from 
the WTO obligations’.169 However, discriminatory treatment is allowed but may not for 
a sustained position due to the specific circumstances of the investigated country, which 
generally targets on non-market economies.170 
 
2.3.1.1 The general method of dumping margin calculation 
 
Article VI: 1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the ADA stipulate a general 
method for dumping margin calculation. Pertaining to Article VI: 1(a) of the GATT 
1994: 
 
For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced 
into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price 
of the product exported from one country to another 
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like 
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country… 
 
Article 2.1 of the ADA has a similar expression. It provides:  
 
For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped, 
i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, 
if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than 
the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when 
destined for consumption in the exporting country. 
 
168 See James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An 
Analysis of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou 
(eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
169 See ibid. 
170 See ibid. 
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Accordingly, a dumping margin should be calculated based on a comparison between 
the normal value and the export price. Recalling the rationale constituting the issue of 
“double remedies”, this calculation method will not lead to “double counting”, because 
a subsidy will affect the price of the products of domestic and export markets in the 
same way and to the same extent. Any lowering of prices attributable to the subsidy 
will be reflected on both sides of the dumping margin calculation, so the overall 
dumping margin will not be affected by the subsidization.  
 
2.3.1.2 Legal basis of the non-market economy methodology 
 
Three sources, to different extents, permit WTO Members to apply special treatment 
when calculating dumping margins and impose anti-dumping duty. The Accessional 
Protocol to the WTO, especially for China (the CAP), directly and expressly stipulated 
such discriminatory treatment in Article 15: 
 
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese 
prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not 
based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the 
following rules: 
… 
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a 
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under 
investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the 
industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, production and 
sale of that product. 
 
The Accession Protocol to the WTO stipulates specific obligations for contracting 
parties when joining the WTO. For China, the CAP provides WTO members with the 
possibility to derogate from the requirements in Article VI: 1(a) of the GATT 1994 and 
Article 2.1 of the ADA, thus calculating dumping margins in a discriminatory manner, 
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which has frequently been cited in international disputes.171  
 
Notably, subparagraph (d) of Article 15 stipulates a deadline for this treatment, it states 
‘in any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date 
of accession’.172 Some experts believe such expiry indicates a continuance of the non-
market economy methodology and China has to meet the market economy requirements 
regulated by WTO Members to forbid the use of such treatment.173 And some insist 
China may not be ‘subjected to the special/analogue country methodology which 
deviates from the normal value calculation in Article 2 ADA’.174 Thus what should be 
the appropriate interpretation of the expiry of Article 15: (a)(ii) becomes a key issue for 
special treatment, which is analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
171 See for example, Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 
15 July 2011. Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
172 According to Article 15: (d):  
“Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market 
economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's 
national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, should China establish, 
pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a 
particular industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply 
to that industry or sector.” 
173 See for example, Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 
Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ 
(2015) 10 Global Trade and Customs Journal 176; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why 
the Use of a Special Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs 
Journal 272; Laurent Ruessmann and Jochen Beck, ‘2016 and the Application of an NME Methodology to Chinese 
Producers in Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 457. 
174 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212,215. 
  
Jochem De Kok analysed China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO and concluded WTO Members may ‘no longer 
have resources to an NME methodology’ based on the Protocol. See Jochem De Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade 
Defence Investigations against Imports from China’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 515; Yenkong 
Ngangjoh-Hodu and Tianzhu Han, ‘China’s Market Economy Dilemma and Its Interplay with EU Anti-Dumping 
Law’ (2019) 27 Asia Pacific Law Review 102; Roberto Soprano, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation 
of the Protocol of Accession of China to the World Trade Organization: Market Economy Considerations in Anti-
Dumping Investigations’ (2019) 46 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29. Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - 
Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market Economy Methodology in Light of the 
Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
 
Some researchers, such as Weihuan Zhou, insist WTO members may continue to label China as an NME but 
whatever this label may entail, it no longer justifies the application of the NME methodology. See Weihuan Zhou, 
‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese 
Journal of Comparative Law 345. Minyou Yu and Jian Guan, ‘The Non-Market Economy Methodology Shall Be 
Terminated After 2016’ (2017) 12 Global Trade and Customs Journal 16. 
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Another legal basis with rigorous thresholds is the second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 of 
the GATT 1994, it provides that: 
 
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are 
fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability 
for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties 
may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison 
with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate. 
 
The requirements to apply this provision are far stricter than those of other legal bases. 
The Appellate Body in the Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China Case pointed out that the second Ad Note 
stipulates a strict rule when identifying an exporting country under its context. 
Specifically, the non-market economy methodology is applicable to a country when it 
reflects a ‘complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade’ and the ‘fixing of all 
prices by the State’, and it is not ‘applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that do not fulfil 
both conditions’.175 Although WTO provisions do not provide a list of countries which 
fulfils the standards of the second Ad Note, it is difficult to find a country which could 
satisfy such strict requirements.176 As concluded by commentators, ‘no country today 
would fall within this narrowly defined category’.177 
 
Comparatively, Article VI: (b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.2 of the ADA provide 
 
175 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011, at para. 290.  
The Report interprets the rules when applying the Second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 as follows:  
We observe that the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to a "country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade" and "where all domestic prices are fixed by the State". This 
appears to describe a certain type of NME, where the State monopolizes trade and sets all domestic prices. 
The second Ad Note to Article VI:1 would thus not on its face be applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that 
do not fulfil both conditions, that is, the complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade and the fixing 
of all prices by the State. 
176 Prusa (n 5) 623. 
177 See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-
Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 889; Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao and 
Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 
68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977, 1008; Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market 
Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
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general legal basis for the alternative treatments among WTO Members. Based on 
Article VI of the GATT 1994: 
 
[A] product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an 
importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported 
from one country to another  
 
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like 
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, 
 
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either  
 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country 
in the ordinary course of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable 
addition for selling cost and profit. 
 
Article VI: 1(b) of the GATT 1994 stipulates two alternatives for dumping margin 
calculation “in the absence of domestic price”. One is to take the highest comparable 
price to any third country, and the other is to construct a normal value by cost of 
production and reasonable additions.  
 
Article 2.2 of the ADA provides a similar method: 
 
When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the 
domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market 
situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting 
country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall 
be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like product when 
exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative, 
or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for 
administrative, selling and general costs and for profits. 
 
Compared with Article VI: 1(b) of the GATT 1994, the ADA provides an explanation 
of a situation “absence of such domestic price”. Pursuant to Article 2.2, “absence of 
such domestic price” refers to (1) when there are no sales of the like product “in the 
ordinary course of trade”, (2) “the particular market situation” or (3) “low volume of 
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the sales”.  
 
Accordingly, if the CAP and the second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 of GATT 1994 could 
not continue to justify the “non-market economy treatment” to China. Then the last 
choice for proponents of special treatment relies on Article VI: 1(b) of the GATT 1994 
and Article 2.2 of the ADA. A potential controversary may raise here due to ambiguous 
stipulation of three thresholds on the situation “absence of such domestic price”. An 
emblematic example is the EU’s practise in revising its basic anti-dumping regulation.178 
Further interpretations of these thresholds are explored in Chapter 5 and 6 of this 
research. 
 
2.3.2 The subsidy determination  
 
The subsidy determination is embodied by the “public body” issue where an entity is 
established by the government to serve as a “pass-through” vehicle for subsidies. In 
general, the implementation of countervailing duty is based on subsidized behaviour, 
and the subject of the subsidization is the government. However, Article 1.1 of the 
ASCM (Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measure) stipulates another 
possible subject which is the “public body”. The relevant texts read as follows: 
 
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within 
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”) … 
 
The description of Article 1.1 indicates that the “public body” is jointly referred to as a 
government that qualifies to provide a subsidy. Therefore, if an entity is considered as 
a “public body”, then its commercial behaviour is potentially regarded as subsidization, 
thus suffering from countervailing measures, which is a starting point of the “double 
remedy” issue. However, the necessary details and instructions are absent on 
 
178 EU 2017 Anti-dumping Regulation is enacted to deal with a dilemma that NME provisions of 2016 Regulation 
may not be efficient in the wake of Article 15(a)(ii) CAP’s expiration in December 2016. 
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identifying a “public body” based on the ASCM, which leaves loopholes in 
determination of subsidy.  
 
In the United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China Case, one major debate is whether China’s SOEs and SOCBs 
belong to “public bodies” and whether their behaviours comply with countervailing 
law.179 In other words, does an entity with link to state qualifies to provide a subsidy 
under WTO rules? China filed a complaint at the WTO rebutting US’s affirmative 
determination of China’s state-owned banks and SOEs being “public bodies”, which 
were qualified to conduct subsidization under ASCM. The Panel sided with the US, but 
the Appellate Body held the opposite view (in respect of SOE), it declared that ‘the 
precise contours and characteristics of a “public body” are bound to differ from entity 
to entity, State to State, and case to case’.180  
 
The WTO tribunal’s decision clarifies only limited Chinese firms that may belong to 
“public bodies”. And even for those confirmed “public bodies”, such as the SOCBs, 
there still has the controversary. According to the tribunal, the BOC is a “public body” 
based on several factors such as state ownership; relevant Chinese commercial banking 
law; and risk management and analytical skill of the SOCBs. For example, Article 34 
of China’s Commercial Banking Law stipulates that banks must ‘carry out their loan 
business upon the needs of the national economy and the social development and under 
the guidance of State industrial policies’.181 According to the tribunal, the BOC is a 
“public body” because its governmental factor is formally acknowledged by Chinese 
law. Nonetheless, commentators remain sceptical of the tribunal’s arguments noting 
that ‘a lack of business flair, as illustrated by inadequate risk management and analytical 
 
179 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
180 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 317. 
181 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. 
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skills and poor loan-making practices, has little to do with whether the SOCBs are 
exercising government authority’ and also ‘Article 34 of the Commercial Banking Law 
is a very general statement and its implications to the SOCBs’ loan business are not 
clear’.182 
 
Compared with the SOCBs, many Chinese firms, especially the SOEs, may not have 
formal links with the state like the BOC. Potential controversary may arise, for example, 
would SASAC's ability to remove the firm’s top management suffice to render the firm 
a “public body”? For now, the Appellate Body is relying on a standard of “government 
authority” to evaluate a “public body” but without clarifying what is necessary to 
demonstrate such authority.183 Nevertheless, the WTO cannot avoid these questions. 
Since the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China Case, the “public body” issue has raised three disputes.184 
Even without China as a party at issue, there is still a high percentage that occurs. For 
example, in the United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from India Case, the tribunal rejected the US argument that one can 
identify whether a firm is a “public body” on account of whether the government can 
employ the resources of an entity that it controls as its own.185 
 
Therefore, WTO provisions on identifying the “public body” is still blurry, and more 
precise methodologies thus have to be developed through further interpretation of WTO 
agreements, which is explored in Chapter 4 of this research.186 This is significantly 
 
182  Ming Du, ‘China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law’ (2014) 63 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 409, 439. 
183 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
184 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014. P Panel Report, United States - Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/ R, adopted 14 July 2014. Appellate Body Report, 
United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 
July 2019. 
185 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014. At paras. 4.27 – 4.29. 
186 See ibid.  
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urgent because the “public body” issue not only results in disputes relating to 
countervailing measures for the SOEs, but may also jointly lead to the issue of “double 
remedies” in the United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China Case.187 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
The rationale of the “double remedy” issue includes both overall and subsidiary 
dimensions. From the overall dimension, the WTO regulations on the “double remedy” 
issue are ambiguous. Although the “double remedy” issue raised by export subsidies 
are clearly prohibited by WTO law, no further guidance is provided relating to 
prevention of this issue, nor an elimination of its injuries, which leaves loopholes in 
this regard. Besides, the WTO law regulating the “double remedy” issue arising from 
the domestic subsidy is absent, but, as analysed by the Appellate Body, this does not 
mean “double remedy” issue arising by domestic subsidies are allowed under WTO 
law.188 In contrary, “double remedy” issue shall be prohibited as long as it leads to a 
duplication of duties. 
 
From the subsidiary dimension, the “double remedy” issue in the context of “non-
market economy treatment” is represented by two subsidiary issues: the non-market 
economy methodology in the anti-dumping investigation and the subsidy determination 
in the countervailing investigation. Regarding non-market economy methodology, 
WTO Members can resort to three legal bases for special treatment, which calls for 
interpretation on applying of such treatment. Concerning the subsidy determination, a 
more precise interpretation of the “public body” is required to provide criteria in 
assessing entities such as the SOEs in China. 
 
 
187 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
188 See ibid, at para. 567. 
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Conclusively, the findings of this chapter submit that the ambiguous WTO trade 
remedies agreements have raised the issue of “double remedies”. This is further 
demonstrated by the analysis of the US national statutes and cases in the next Chapter. 
Accordingly, systematic and comprehensive countermeasures to the “double remedy” 
issue are required where the interpretations of the legal basis of the non-market 





































Chapter 3: “From nothing to something” – the evolution of the “double remedy” 
issue reflected in the US 
 
This chapter has explored the rationale of the “double remedy” issue by tracing its 
origin at the national level. The analysis of the non-market economy disputes at the US 
national court submitted that the “double remedy” issue has evolved from a single 
subsidy case into a compound dispute involving two trade remedy measures. The 
findings have further indicated that the ambiguity of countervailing law, especially the 
subsidy determination, is one rationale of the “double remedy” issue, which requires 
further interpretation. In addition, there is an asymmetric development of US trade 
remedy laws relates to the “non-market economy treatment”, which leads to a dilemma 
that the anti-dumping statute are frequently revised to regulate the countervailing 
disputes. The differences between the US anti-dumping statute and the WTO anti-
dumping agreement have indicated a controversary over the “non-market economy 
treatment” in the future. 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this research, the “double remedy” issue is one major 
dispute confronted by the WTO dispute settlement body in the United States-Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case.189 In 
fact, before appealing to the WTO dispute settlement body, a series of cases have 
already been raised between China and US around the “double remedy” issue in front 
of the domestic courts of the US since 2007.190 However, the decisions of the courts 
provide neither consensus between the US and China nor substantial references to 
resolve the “double remedy” issue. Therefore, the two parties are seeking for settlement 
by the WTO.  
 
 
189 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
190 See for example the GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231 (CIT 2009). 
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Nevertheless, the discussion of the trade remedies cases and law in the US scenario 
serves two significant purposes. First, it directly answers two subsidiary questions as 
has been listed in Section 1.3 of this research: what are the origins of the “double 
remedy” issue; and why is the subsidy determination an integral part of the “double 
remedy” issue. It reinforces the arguments in Chapter 2 of this research that the 
ambiguity of countervailing law is one origin of the “double remedy” issue. In addition, 
it specifically submits and demonstrates that one breakthrough to resolve such issue 
relates to the determination of a subsidy in the context of “non-market economies”. 
That is distinguished with a common “breakthrough” from anti-dumping perspective as 
discussed in Section 1.2 of this research.  
 
Second, the discussion in the US scenario reflects the problem of domestic regulations 
of individual WTO members when the WTO law is ambiguous on regulating trade 
remedies investigations of “non-market economies”. And those problems have set the 
directions for digging solutions in the following chapters. For example, the analysis of 
the Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States Case has indicated the lack of clear criteria 
of subsidy determination, which requires interpretation of the WTO countervailing 
rules (that is the subject of Chapter 4 of this research).191 Correspondingly, the analysis 
of US anti-dumping statue has manifested the trade remedies regulation of US may not 
comply with WTO anti-dumping agreements, which requires further interpretation of 
the WTO anti-dumping rules to provide references to WTO members (that is the subject 
of Chapter 6 of this research). 
 
Therefore, the discussion of the trade remedies cases and law in the US scenario is 
requisite and significant. It traces the origin of the “double remedy” issue and clarifies 
the direction to resolve it. 
 
3.2 The US anti-dumping statute 
 
191 See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308,1311 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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The US anti-dumping statute has a long history of development, and so as its non-
market economy provisions. Two major approaches have been established to deal with 
non-market economy related issues during development of the US anti-dumping statute. 
However, the “non-market economy treatment” reflects a potential risk that raises anti-
dumping measures, which may not comply with the ADA and the purpose of US anti-
dumping rules. First, it focuses more on economy status than fair price comparability, 
which ‘usually results in a higher dumping margin for NME products than would exist 
if any of the standard methodologies were applied’ and has been ‘severely criticized 
due to the seemingly unpredictable and arbitrary dumping margins’.192 Second, the 
authority may have excessive discretion in investigation, especially, for the 
determination of the non-market economy status, which may lead to uncertainty in the 
anti-dumping investigation. Besides, an increase of anti-dumping measures may 
potentially lead to the “double remedy” issue when compound with countervailing 
measures. 
 
3.2.1 Purpose of the US anti-dumping statute 
 
Dumping is the sale of foreign merchandise in the United States at less than fair value 
or below the cost of production.193 The US anti-dumping law provides for the rules of 
dumping determination and the imposition of anti-dumping duties. If the investigating 
authority determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to 
be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value; and if, by reason of the imports 
or sales of that merchandise, the establishment of an industry in the United States is 
 
192 See Robert H Lantz, ‘The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in Transition Under 
United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws’ (1995) 10 American University International Law 
Review 993, 1006; Jane M Smith, ‘U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies: A Legal Overview’ 
(Congressional Research Service 2013) RL33976 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33976.pdf> accessed 10 July 
2020.  
193 See ibid. 
 85 
materially retarded, then an anti-dumping measure might be implemented.194 Generally, 
an anti-dumping duty shall be equal to the amount by which the normal value of the 
merchandise exceeds the export price of the merchandise.195 Anti-dumping duty here 
aims to prevent unfair dumping behaviour rather than punish the foreign company.196 
 
In this sense, the purpose of the US anti-dumping statute is to ensure the ‘fair pricing 
of imports from abroad, thereby levelling the playing field between foreign and US 
manufacturers’.197 The focus of the law is to allow fair competition between foreign 
firms and US national manufactures. Therefore, the calculation of dumping margins 
requires the investigating authority to seek factual prices of the dumped product, which 
could precisely offset dumping behaviour. This is also indicated in Article 2.2 of ADA, 
where the Agreement requires the a “proper comparison” shall be determined for the 
margin of dumping. 
 
3.2.2 Development of the “non-market economy treatment” in the US anti-
dumping statute 
 
The US anti-dumping statute has a long history, and so as its special provisions targeting 
countries with special economic structure (in general the non-market economy 
provisions). Since the end of the Second World War, many countries have attempted to 
promote international trade and eliminate non-tariff barriers. Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), adopted in 1947, condemns dumping as an 
unfair trade practice and permits GATT members to enact AD duties. As a signatory to 
GATT and the Anti-Dumping Code, the United States has implemented AD statutes 
 
194 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S. Code § 1673; also see Joseph AJr Laroski, ‘NMES: A Love Story - Nonmarket 
and Market Economy Status under U.S. Antidumping Law’ (1999) 30 Law and Policy in International Business 369, 
371. 
195 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S. Code § 1673e. 
196 Robert H Lantz, ‘The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in Transition Under United 
States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws’ (1995) 10 American University International Law Review 993, 
996. 
197 Joseph AJr Laroski, ‘NMES: A Love Story - Nonmarket and Market Economy Status under U.S. Antidumping 
Law’ (1999) 30 Law and Policy in International Business 369, 372. 
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consistent with these agreements.198 
 
The United States Congress first promulgated AD statutes as part of the Revenue Act 
of 1916.199 Section 801 of the Act provides for the assessment of dumping behaviour: 
(1) articles at a price substantially less than actual market value or whole-sale price of 
such articles, and (2) such action be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an 
industry in the United States.200 Congress replaced almost all of the 1916 Act when it 
enacted the Antidumping Act of 1921,201 where concepts such as “injury determinations, 
purchase price, foreign market value” and the structure of two agency administrations 
were introduced.202 Comparatively, regulating anti-dumping issues related to NMEs is 
difficult because normally markets in NMEs do not follow the market rules of supply 
and demand, thus both the Revenue Act of 1916 and the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 do 
not provide provisions especially for the calculation of normal value for NMEs, making 
determinations of fair market value uncertain.203 
 
The first non-market economy clause appeared in the 1974 Trade Act, triggered by the 
Bicycles from Czechoslovakia Case where a “surrogate country” approach was 
introduced by the Department of Treasury. 204  According to the Bicycles from 
Czechoslovakia Case, the home market price in Czechoslovakia could not be 
considered a normal value because of its non-market economy status. Therefore, under 
the “surrogate country” approach, the home market value was substituted by a third 
“non-state-controlled economy country.”205 This approach is adopted and codified by 
 
198 See Lantz (n 190) 999；also see 19 U.S. Code § 1673 notes, “Effective Date of 1994 Amendment”, which provides 
that: ‘Amendment by Pub. L. 103–465 effective, except as otherwise provided, on the date on which the WTO 
Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States [Jan. 1, 1995], and applicable with respect to 
investigations, reviews, and inquiries initiated and petitions filed under specified provisions of this chapter after such 
date, see section 291 of Pub. L. 103–465, set out as a note under section 1671 of this title.’ 
199 See Revenue Act of 1916, Ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 756, 798 (1916), 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994). 
200 See ibid. 
201 See Antidumping Act of 1921, Ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11-15, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (repealed 1979) (current version at 
19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994)). 
202 Laroski (n 191) 372. 
203 Lantz (n 190) 999. 
204 See Department of Commerce, Bicycles From Czechoslovakia, 25 FED.REG. 6,657 (1960). 
205 See Bicycles From Czechoslovakia, supra note 11. 
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Congress in the Trade of Act of 1974.206 While it solved the application problem of the 
anti-dumping statute, other problems can arise, for example, the “surrogate” 
methodology may confront difficulties when there is no appropriate surrogate 
country.207  
 
To deal with this problem, another methodology was introduced when the Department 
of Treasury was confronted with a dumping investigation involving electric Golf cars 
from Poland.208 The new approach, namely, “factors of production” approach, enabled 
the investigating authority to consider the amount of each factor input of the 
manufacturer at issue taken from a market economy country at a comparable stage of 
economic development.209 In the 1979 Trade Act, Congress included this approach in 
the Act as an alternative for when a “surrogate country” approach is unavailable.210 And 
in the 1988 Act, the “factors of production” approach replaced the “surrogate country” 
approach as the preferred method when the investigating authority finds that a 
discriminatory treatment is required for NMEs.211 
 
The “surrogate” methodology and “factors of production” approach have similar 
expressions to Article 2.2 of the ADA, but they are, to some extent, differentiated from 
the regulations of ADA and the purpose of US anti-dumping statute. Article 2.2 of the 
ADA provides two methods to determine normal value under special circumstances. 
Normal value, under the first method, shall be determined by a ‘comparable price of 
the like product when exported to an appropriate third country’. Compared with the 
“surrogate” methodology, the ADA does not address the nature of the analogous country, 
rather, it focuses on whether the substitute can permit a “proper comparison” (or a “fair 
 
206 See Trade Act of 1974, P.L. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2047 (1975). 
207 Lantz (n 190) 1002. 
208 See Department of Commerce, Electric Golf Cars From Poland, 40 FED. REG. 25,497 (1975). 
209 See ibid. 
210 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, P.L. 96-39, § 773, 93 Stat. 144, 186 (1979) (codified and amended at 19 
U.S.C. § 1677e). 
211 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). 19 U.S.C. § 1677b 
(c). 
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comparison”),212 which shares the same purpose of the US anti-dumping statute, as 
mentioned in Section 3.1.1. Article 2.2 of the ADA further provided three situations 
explaining when “a proper comparison” is not available: no sales of the like product “in 
the ordinary course of trade”, “the particular market situation” or “low volume of the 
sales”. The three situations have illustrated three main problems that the authority may 
confront in anti-dumping investigation. The attitude of WTO rules is thus more 
problem-based and relates to specific situation where a proper comparison is not 
permitted. In this regard, the “surrogate” methodology may not be able to precisely 
reflect the factual price in the exporting country, because the focus seems to be on 
evaluating the country’s economic status rather than ascertaining the normal value that 
is closest to the real situation. It thus no doubt that the approach has been ‘severely 
criticized due to the seemingly unpredictable and arbitrary dumping margins’.213  
 
The second method of the ADA proposes the construction of normal value by 
considering different factors, such as the cost of production, which share similar 
expressions to the US “factors of production” approach. However, the “factors of 
production” approach insists that those factors are collected from a market economy 
country. Similarly, this approach is intended to focus more on economic status rather 
than reflected real data for dumping margin calculation. In other words, if the ADA 
indicates that the factors collected can enable a “proper comparison”, then the economic 
status of the country does not constitute a problem. However, the “factors of production” 
approach tends to express that factors from a market economy country are mandatory 
no matter whether those factors can reflect the real situation of the exporting country. 
Therefore, the results of the dumping margin may differ based on the different foci of 
 
212 According to Article 2.4 of ADA, the dumping margin shall be calculated by a fair comparison. See also Thomas 
J Prusa and Edwin A Vermulst, ‘United States - Certain Methodologies and Their Application to Anti-Dumping 
Proceedings Involving China: Nails in the Coffin of Unfair Dumping Margin Calculation Methodologies’ (2019) 18 
World Trade Review 287. 
213 See Lantz (n 190) 1003; also see Moushami Joshi, ‘Shifting Sands: The Evolution and Future Course of U.S. 
Anti-dumping Law and Practise Against China and Vietnam’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-
Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
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those methods.   
 
In fact, the differences between the ADA and the US anti-dumping statute indicates a 
controversary over the “non-market economy treatment” in the future and requires 
further interpretation of the WTO anti-dumping agreements, which is analysed in detail 
in Chapter 6 of this research. As analysed in Chapter 6, when conducting anti-dumping 
investigation on a country with special market situation by “the non-market economy 
treatment” under WTO legal system, the first choice determining normal value shall 
base on actual costs of production “in the country of origin”, even though such cost is 
considered to be “distorted” in an non-market economy. When a construction of normal 
value is necessary, “price distortions” should be considered ‘as long as they reflect the 
prevailing conditions in the market of exportation’. As one commentator said, ‘factors 
of production approach usually results in a higher dumping margin for NME products 
than would exist if any of the standard methodologies were applied’.214 
 
Notably, the US non-market economy provisions also provide the DOC with significant 
discretion in determining whether a foreign country is a non-market economy, thus 
applying a special treatment. The definition of a non-market economy was first included 
in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.215 The definition of non-
market economy comes with a set of standards that the DOC can take into consideration 
when determining whether a specific country is a non-market economy. Pursuant to the 
1988 Act, a non-market economy under the US anti-dumping law means any foreign 
country where ‘the administering authority determines does not operate on market 
principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such a country 
do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.’ 216  According to the statute, the 
 
214 Lantz (n 190) 1006; Jane M Smith, ‘U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies: A Legal Overview’ 
(Congressional Research Service 2013) RL33976 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33976.pdf> accessed 10 July 
2020. 
215 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). 
216 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (A), definition of NME and its determination standards are codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18). 
To determine an NME, the investigating authority needs to evaluate: 
(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the currency of other 
 90 
determination of non-market economy status may be made “with respect to any foreign 
country at any time”, and remains effective until expressly revoked by the DOC.217 
Moreover, DOC’s determinations are not subject to judicial review in any antidumping 
investigation.218 Therefore, there are no efficient restrictions on DOC decisions, nor an 
appeal procedure to challenge a determination, thus leaving problems with the 
transparency of assessment.  
 
3.3 The US countervailing statute  
 
There is an asymmetric development of US trade remedy laws relates to the “non-
market economy treatment”, which leads to a dilemma that the anti-dumping statute are 
frequently revised to regulate the countervailing disputes. Analysis of the non-market 
economy disputes at the US national court submits that the “double remedy” issue has 
evolved from a single subsidy case into a compound dispute involving two trade remedy 
measures. The findings further indicate that the ambiguity of countervailing law is one 
rationale of the “double remedy” issue, which requires further interpretation.  
 




(ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining between 
labour and management; 
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign countries are 
permitted in the foreign country; 
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production; 
(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output 
decisions of enterprises; and 
(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers appropriate. 
217 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (C). See also Jane M Smith, ‘U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies: 
A Legal Overview’ (Congressional Research Service 2013) RL33976 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33976.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2020.  
218 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (D). See also Jane M Smith, ‘U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies: 
A Legal Overview’ (Congressional Research Service 2013) RL33976 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33976.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2020.  
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A subsidy is defined as ‘a payment by the government (or possibly some individuals) 
which forms a wedge between the price consumers pay and the cost incurred by 
producers, such that price is less than marginal cost’.219 If the investigating authority 
determines that the government of a country is providing a countervailable subsidy with 
respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise 
imported, or sold for importation, into the United States, which results in a material 
injury to US industry, then a comparable countervailing duty shall be levied.220 
 
The countervailing duty statute is established to regulate subsidization behaviour. As a 
trade remedy statute, it shares the same purpose of the anti-dumping statute that 
counteract unfair trade behaviours and focuses on levelling the playing field between 
foreign and US manufacturers. Specifically, US countervailing law seeks: (1) to protect 
(the establishment of) domestic industry; (2) to prevent subsidized imports into the US; 
and (3) to avoid unfair policies from foreign countries against US exporters.221 
 
3.3.2 Dilemma of the US countervailing statute and cases of non-market economy 
 
Analysis of the Georgetown Case and the GPX Case have proved that subsidization 
behaviour is one origin of the “double remedy” issue. Subsidy-related cases embodied 
common problems including ambiguity of countervailing law, abusive application of 
anti-dumping law and excessive discretion of investigating authority. Compared with 
proliferated development of anti-dumping statute, the US countervailing statute is 
seemingly being neglected. The asymmetric development of US trade remedy law on 
non-market economy disputes leads to a dilemma that the anti-dumping statute is 
frequently revised to regulate the countervailing issue. As a result, when the issue of 
“double remedies” first occurred, there is no efficient method to deal with it. 
 
 
219 David W Pearce (ed), The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics (4th Revised edition, MIT Press 1992) 115. 
220 See 19 U.S. Code § 1671. 
221 The US trade remedy statutes shall share similar function and purpose in protecting its domestic industry and 
maintain fair competition in the domestic market. See Laroski (n 191) 371. 
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3.3.2.1 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States Case 
 
The Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States Case is a landmark case dealing with the 
applicability of the countervailing statute to an non-market economy in a US national 
court.222 This case reflects problems at the national level, including the ambiguity of 
countervailing provisions, the potential risk of excessive discretion, and the abusive 
application of the anti-dumping statute, which calls for interpretation of subsidy 
provisions.  
 
In November 1983, two US steel companies223 filed CVD petitions with the DOC 
alleging that carbon steel wire rod imported into the United States from Czechoslovakia 
and Poland was “subsidized”, and therefore subject to countervailing duties under 
Section 303. 224  The DOC determined the section 303 was inapplicable to 
Czechoslovakia and Poland due to their NME status. On appeal, the CIT (Court of 
International Trade) reversed the DOC’s ruling and held that ‘the only purpose of the 
countervailing duty law [was] to extract the subsidies contained in merchandise 
entering the commerce of the United States in order to protect domestic industry from 
their effect ... [and that] its effectiveness [was] clearly intended to be complete and 
without exception’.225 While the carbon steel wire rod case was pending, three chemical 
companies filed petitions to the DOC that the Soviet Union and the German Democratic 
Republic had provided “subsidies” for potash imported into the United States. The DOC 
dismissed these complaints based on its decision in the Polish wire rod investigation, 
i.e. that Section 303 was inapplicable to these countries. 226  The CAFC (Court of 
 
222 The first attempt to apply countervailing measures to an NME was in 1983. However, the petition was withdrawn 
before the case was established. See Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations; Textiles, Apparel, and Related 
Products from the People’s Republic of China, 48 US Federal Register 46600 (Department of Commerce, 13 October 
1983), as cited in Dukgeun Ahn and Jieun Lee, ‘Countervailing Duty against China: Opening a Pandora’s Box in 
the WTO System?’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 329. 
223  Georgetown Steel Corporation, Raritan River Steel Company, and Atlantic Steel Company (collectively, 
Georgetown Steel), and Continental Steel Corporation (Continental Steel). See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United 
States, 801 F.2d 1308,1311 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
224 See Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). 
225 See Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F.Supp. 548, 553 (1985), as cited in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 801 F.2d 1308,1311 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
226 See ibid. 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit) consolidated the two cases aforementioned and 
addressed the levying of countervailing duties on non-market economies. 
3.3.2.1.1 Lack of necessary interpretation of subsidy determination  
 
At the beginning of the case, the court’s analysis was impeded by ambiguous subsidy 
provisions. In addressing the levying of countervailing duties, the court began by 
identifying a subsidized behaviour. Pertaining to the content of Section 303 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, the court was required to answer whether the term “bounty” and “grant” 
could be applied to a non-market economy, but found out that this could not be 
answered by the statute’s plain language. The court then attempted to find answers from 
three correlative aspects: the purpose of the countervailing statute; the nature of a non-
market economy; and the actions in Congress’s choice of dealing with non-market 
economy affairs through the anti-dumping law or the countervailing law (the last aspect 
is mainly analysed in the next section).  
 
According to the court, the purpose of countervailing law is to regulate “unfair 
competition” between market economies, as the special market of non-market 
economies is distinguished from market economies, thus the countervailing measure 
could not apply to non-market economies. Concerning the purpose of the countervailing 
statute, the court referred to the statement of the Supreme Court on the 1897 Act 
in Zenith: ‘the countervailing duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive 
advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by 
their governments’.227 As the court analysed, the US firms compete with foreign sellers 
under the same market pressures and constraints, resources flow to the most profitable 
and efficient uses by the principle of market forces of supply and demand. A 
government subsidy on sales to the US could provide a foreign producer with 
advantages it otherwise it could not achieve by itself. Therefore, such behaviour will 
distort market competition, result in the misallocation of resources, and affect the 
 
227 See ibid, 801 F.2d 1308,1316. 
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market forces of supply and demand. Accordingly, it is the “unfair competition” 
resulting from foreign subsidies that the countervailing statute aims to regulate. 
 
However, the court believed that domestic market of a non-market economy does not 
permit an environment for “competition”, thus economic incentives and benefits only 
take effect within the domestic market of the non-market economy.228 Although for 
market economy countries, the purpose of a countervailing duty law is to eliminate 
unfair competition, it is a different situation in the context of non-market economies. 
The court agreed with the DOC’s decision in the potash case and wire rod case that in 
a non-market economy, resources are not allocated by the market but by a central plan 
through various layers of distribution, thus not reflecting the market value of the 
merchandise.229 Since central planners control the prices, investment decisions, money 
and credit, the running of the non-market environment is distorted. Therefore, there is 
no “unfair competition” as defined in the countervailing duty law. A producer in a non-
market economy can be regarded as a government instrument. The economic incentives 
the state provides are more like an instrument to promote central plan objectives than 
unfair competition factor in a market economy. As the Court stated: ‘even if one were 
to label these incentives as a “subsidy”, in the loosest sense of the term, the governments 
of those nonmarket economies would in effect be subsidizing themselves’.230Therefore, 
as discussed by the Court, the special characteristics of a non-market economy, which 
is unhealthy demand and supply links under the guidance of a central plan, distort the 
market. However, the purpose of countervailing law revealed by Section 303 is to 
standardize economic activities based on a healthy market, thus it may not apply to a 
non-market economy. 
 
One point that should be highlighted here is that the ambiguity of subsidy determination 
constitutes a loophole in this case. If there were clear regulations to identify a subsidized 
 
228 See ibid, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316. 
229 See ibid, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315. 
230 See ibid, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317. 
 95 
behaviour in this case, with explanations of “bounty” and “grant” under Section 303 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, then the court would not be trapped in discussions of other 
aspects. Notably, the discussions only served as an attempt to interpret the subsidy 
determination, because they did not directly answer the question at issue, which was 
whether behaviours of defendants belong to the term “bounty” and “grant”, thus could 
justify a countervailing measure to a non-market economy. In other words, the 
ambiguity of countervailing law may potentially have misled the analysis of the court 
on the non-market economy issue. Therefore, as the case arose from a subsidization 
behaviour, it corresponded to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of countervailing 
law’s purpose, which it is to ‘offset the unfair competitive advantage that enjoys from 
export subsidies paid by their governments’.231 In this regard, countervailing law is 
inevitable to regulate this issue and interpretations of the subsidy determination 
provisions is required.  
 
It is also important to notice that the blurry provisions in countervailing statute and the 
explanation by the court may lead to excessive discretion. In addressing the issue that 
there are no clear provisions to reference, the court referred to the statement of the DOC 
in Polish wire road case, in which the DOC stated that both the administrative agency 
and the court should seek to ‘discern dispositive legislative intent by “projecting as well 
as it could how the legislature would have dealt with the concrete situation if it had 
spoken”’. 232  Based on the statement, not only the Court, but also the DOC, may 
“interpret” the legislative intent of Congress. Besides, there do not have any specific 
standards to interpret such intention, the only guideline is ‘how the legislature would 
have dealt with the concrete situation if it had spoken’. Therefore, the DOC may 
interpret the terms of provision if the interpretation fulfils the DOC’s “imagination” of 
Congress’s legislative intention, which seems to give the DOC judicial power. The 
excessive discretion raised by ambiguous countervailing statute, jointly with discretion 
 
231 See ibid, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316. 
232 See Asahi Chemical Industry Co. Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.Supp. 1261, 4 CIT 120, 124 (1982) (quoting 
from District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C.Cir.1968))." 49 Fed.Reg. 19377 (1984), as cited in 
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308,1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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of NME determination in anti-dumping statute, may lead to uncertainty on 
implementation of countervailing and anti-dumping measures, thus bring risk of 
“double remedy” issue. In this regard, interpretation of countervailing law is also 
necessary. 
 
3.3.2.1.2 The abusive application of the anti-dumping statute  
 
As a case of subsidy issue, the court confusingly tried to regulate it within the anti-
dumping framework. The rationale that subsidization behaviour is under the 
governance of anti-dumping law is indicated by the court’s analysis in interpreting 
Congress’s intention. First, the Court asserted that Congress intended to tackle the non-
market economy issues within the framework of antidumping law, because Congress is 
continually amending the old anti-dumping provisions and enacting new anti-dumping 
law on the non-market economies.233 The Court believed that through the development 
and improvement of antidumping provisions, the problem could be measured 
comprehensively. For example, according to the Court, Congress amended the Trade 
Act of 1974234, enacting a special “surrogate country” method to determine whether 
imports from a non-market economy were being dumped in the United States. In the 
Trade Agreements of 1979235, like the Trade Act of 1974, Congress re-enacted the 
special antidumping provisions applicable to state-controlled economies, which 
targeted at new issue.  
 
However, the revisions and new provisions in the Trade Act 1974 and Trade Act 1979 
regulate the calculation of normal value, which belongs to anti-dumping treatment. 
Even though they were created and drafted to deal for specific issues connected with a 
 
233 See ibid, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316. 
234 See Pub.L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), Congress amended the antidumping law, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 
(1976) (repealed 1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i (1982)) (which was first enacted in 1921, 
Antidumping Act, 1921, ch. 14, §§ 201-212, 42 Stat. 11-15), as cited in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 
801 F.2d 1308,1317 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
235  Congress re-enacted the special surrogate country antidumping provisions applicable to State-controlled 
economies that it had previously authorized in the 1974 Act. Pub.L. No. 96-39, title I, § 101, 93 Stat. 182, as cited 
in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308,1317 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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non-market economy, they were originally a methodology to deal with price 
discrimination in dumping. An issue that relates to the unfair advantage brought about 
by subsidy comes under the scope of countervailing law, which cannot be mixed with 
the anti-dumping law. 
 
Second, the court believed Congress did not intend to regulate the subsidy issue relating 
to a non-market economy because countervailing provisions have been revised many 
times, and there is no indication of a problem with non-market economies.236 The court 
pointed out that after revising the Section 303 six times, there were no significant 
changes on the issue of the non-market economies, the countervailing statute merely 
prescribe the method for determining the existence of a subsidy, and leaves it to each 
country to determine the particular method it uses to deal with the problem, which 
indicates the Congress had no intention to change the meaning or scope of the provision.  
 
However, it is unpersuasive that there is a causal link between the application of law 
and the revision of law by Congress. The application of law refers to picking the right 
rules to deal with a corresponding issue. Comparatively, the revision of law shall 
improve the predictability and transparency of law. In this regard, revision of laws 
should facilitate the application of law rather than impede it. Regarding this case, the 
revision of law shall promote explanations of the “bounty” and “grant” under Section 
303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as noticed by the Court. Congress’s neglect on the revision 
of the countervailing statute does not necessarily mean such an issue should be 
governed by an anti-dumping statute. It could rather imply that Congress did not notice 
the necessity of revision. Overall, an interpretation of subsidy determination provisions 
is required to regulate subsidy behaviour. As countervailing and anti-dumping statutes 




236 See ibid, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316. 
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3.3.2.2 GPX Intern. Tire Corp. v. U.S. Case 
 
In the GPX Cases, the DOC has first time applied the countervailing measures to the so 
called non-market economies like China, and for the first time “double counting” was 
raised in a trade remedy dispute. The GPX Cases reflect same problems with that of the 
Georgetown Case including the ambiguity of countervailing law, the abusive 
application of anti-dumping law and the excessive discretion of investigating authority, 
which calls for interpretation of the subsidy provisions.237 
 
On June 18, 2007, 24 years after the Georgetown Case, Titan238 filed petitions seeking 
the implementation of anti-dumping and countervailing measures on certain pneumatic 
OTR tyres from China. DOC selected three Chinese producers/ exporters of OTR tyres 
as mandatory respondents239 under investigation.240 On September 5, 2008, the ITC 
published an affirmative injury determination based on investigations by the DOC. As 
a response, on September 9, GPX241 filed three complains with the CIT, contesting the 
determination of countervailing and anti-dumping duty. This was the first GPX case 
(GPX I),242 which started series of GPX cases on the issue of “double counting”. 
 
237 The countervailing law in the Georgetown Case was subject to 19 USC. §1303, based on Section 303 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930. And it was then revised and governed by 19 USC. §1677, which is more consistent with ASCM. See 
Dukgeun Ahn and Jieun Lee, ‘Countervailing Duty against China: Opening a Pandora’s Box in the WTO System?’ 
(2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 329. 
238 Manufacture of OTR tyres in the United States. 
239 Starbright, TUTRIC, and Guizhou Tire Co., Ltd. 
240 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231,1236 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
241 A domestic importer of OTR tires and wholly owns Chinese producer Starbright. 
242 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1291-92 (CIT 2008), reh'g denied, 593 F.Supp.2d 
1389 (CIT 2008). 
GPX cases have experienced several appeals, in order to identify different decisions in cases, the Court of 
International Trade followed the naming conventions used by the parties in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United 
States, 893 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1304-06 (CIT 2013) as follows:  
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231 (CIT 2009) ("GPX II"); 
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337 (CIT 2010) ("GPX III"); 
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, Slip Op. 10-112, 2010 WL 3835022 (CIT Oct. 1, 2010) ("GPX IV"); 
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed.Cir.2011) ("GPX V"); 
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed.Cir.2012) ("GPX VI"); 
GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States, 893 F.Supp.2d 1296 (CIT 2013) ("GPX VII"), aff'd, 780 F.3d 1136 
(Fed. Cir.2015); 
GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States, 942 F.Supp.2d 1343 (CIT 2013) ("GPX VIII"). 
However, the Court of Appeal, Federal Circuit follows another system as follows: 
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed.Cir.2011) ("GPX I"); 
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed.Cir.2012) ("GPX II"); 
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 780 F.3d 1136 (Fed.Cir.2015) ("GPX III").  
Here, in order to clarify the various appeals, this article applies the naming system of CIT. 
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3.3.2.2.1 The potential risk of “double counting”  
 
The GPX Case (GPX I) was the first case to deal with the imposition of both anti-
dumping and countervailing duties at the US national level. Despite GPX I mainly dealt 
with calculation of injuries by dumping and subsidization, it did reflect two points. One 
point can be extracted in GPX I is the court admitted simultaneous implementation of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties may lead to “double counting” and China’s 
specific economic structure is one trigger. Although the court seemed to believe that the 
law concerning CVD measures have not changed since the Georgetown Case,243 the 
DOC took steps to apply countervailing duty to China because the conclusion of the 
Georgetown Case was flawed, and the economic situation in China is neither a Soviet-
union central plan type nor a completely market economy. Here, China’s special 
economic structure was beginning to bring challenges on ambiguous provisions of 
countervailing law.  
 
Another point embodied here is two trade remedy measures contribute to “double 
remedy” issue, which may contrary with trade remedy law and calls for appropriate 
interpretations. In the case, the Court noticed that there was a potential risk of “double 
counting”. According to the Court, the DOC may apply the non-market economy  
methodology for the levying of anti-dumping duty with “fine-tuned” adjustment, and 
at the same time impose countervailing duty to the same industry in China. And such 
behaviour in the future may raise further issues or disputes, for example, it may ‘directly 
conflict with the statute’ or it being ‘fundamentally unfair and thus an unreasonable 
interpretation or abusive application of the statute’.244  
 
 
243 According to the court: “in any way relevant to this issue and, from 1986 to 2007, apparently Commerce accepted 
that the NME procedures specified in the AD laws were intended by Congress to cover the ground of the unfair trade 
remedies for NMEs”. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1677(5), GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F.Supp.2d 1278, 
1291-92 (CIT 2008) at 1290. 
244 See ibid. 
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Notably, the Court admitted simultaneously implementation of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties may lead to “double counting”. However, the court did not 
provide any analysis or discussion of this issue, neither did it make suggestions to 
improve or adjust this method after the case. The court reasoned that ‘success on these 
issues will not prevent the irreparable harm alleged by the plaintiffs’.245 One debatable 
point here is that the Court, as a judicial organ, is obliged to supervise and review 
whether the behaviour of DOC has complied with national provisions. In a situation 
where the Court was obviously aware of the potential risk on violation of a statute, but 
it neglected it and did not provide any suggestion or caution, which may lead to a 
dispute in the future. This may indicate an inefficiency of the supervisory mechanism.   
 
3.3.2.2.2 The “double remedy” issue: the ambiguity of countervailing law and the 
abusive application of anti-dumping law 
 
Compared with GPX I, GPX II formally addressed the issue of “double remedies”. 
Three points can be extracted by GPX II relating to the “double remedy” issue. First, 
subsidization behaviour is one origin of the “double remedy” issue. The Court agreed 
with GPX that the dual imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties has high 
potential for the issue of “double remedies”.246 As GPX argued, “double counting” 
possibly occurred when the DOC imposed a countervailing remedy to offset a 
government subsidy, but then compared a subsidy-free constructed normal value247 
with the original subsidized export price to calculate the dumping margin.248 As noted 
by Commerce, domestic subsidies may presumably lower the price of relevant goods 
in both the home and US markets, thus having no influence on dumping margin. 
However, when a subsidy affected export price is being compared with a subsidy-free 
 
245 See ibid. 
246 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231,1241 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
247 The domestic prices in NME countries may be regarded as unreliable for the laws of some countries because the 
market in NME countries are disordered and confused. Thus, while calculate dumping margins, the authorities in 
some ME countries will compare a constructed domestic price with an export price. See 19 U.S. CFR § 351.405, 19 
U.S. Code § 1677b (c) (1) (a), 19 U.S. Code § 1677 (18). 
248 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231,1241 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
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constructed normal value, this will very well result in the issue of “double remedies”.249  
 
Second, there is abusive application of anti-dumping law on subsidy-related dispute 
duo to ambiguous countervailing statute. The court held that, as the Georgetown Case 
recognized, the ambiguous statute provided the DOC with discretion in whether to 
apply countervailing measures simultaneously with anti-dumping measures. As a result, 
the subsidization behaviour of a non-market economy was addressed through an anti-
dumping methodology. It should be admitted that regulating all non-market economy 
issues by anti-dumping law would helpful to deal with “double remedy” issue. 
According to the Georgetown Case, the ‘AD laws were intended by Congress to cover 
the ground of the unfair trade remedies for NMEs’,250 thus a subsidy issue will only 
trigger anti-dumping measures, so a situation of implementation by anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty will not occur. However, this may contradict the purpose of 
countervailing law. As analysed in Section 3.2.1, countervailing law is established not 
only for subsidy identification, but also to counteract unfair trade behaviour and level 
the playing field between foreign and US manufacturers. A subsidy-related trade 
dispute should fall within the scope of countervailing law and be offset by 
countervailing measures. There is no need to enact countervailing law if a subsidy 
dispute can be regulated within anti-dumping law. Therefore, appropriate interpretation 
of countervailing statute is required to identify a subsidization behaviour and prevent 
abusive application of anti-dumping law. The issue of “double remedies”, in this sense, 
results from a subsidy dispute due to the ambiguous countervailing law where anti-
dumping law “compulsorily” involved in. As commented by Xuewei Feng, ‘the right 
route and the applicable tool to offset such subsidization’ is the application of subsidy 
regulations, and not the anti-dumping regulations.251 
 
249 See ibid. 
250 See what the Court cited in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1291-92 (CIT 2008) at 
1290. 
251 See Xuewei Feng, ‘The Termination of the Grandfather Clause in China’s Accession Protocol and the Normal 
Value Construction After Fifteen Years of Accession’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market 
Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
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A call for the interpretation of countervailing law can be further supported by the 
difficulty in dealing with the issue of “double remedies” through anti-dumping rules in 
practice. In GPX II, the Court stated that : ‘if there is a substantial potential for double 
counting, and it is too difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what degree 
double counting is occurring, Commerce should refrain from imposing CVDs on NME 
goods until it is prepared to address this problem through improved methodologies or 
new statutory tools’. 252  The decision of the Court indicated there may not exist a 
reasonable method to deal with the problem of “double counting” by calculation. Upon 
remand, Commerce expressed that it did not have a method for identifying overlapping 
remedies, as the Court stated, as ‘it is too difficult for Commerce to determine, using 
improved methodologies and in the absence of new statutory tools, whether and to what 
degree double counting is occurring’. 253  The court again, in GPX III, required 
Commerce to forgo the bestowing of both duties, for the reason that such behaviour 
was contrary to law and rendered the countervailing investigation and resulting duties 
meaningless.254 In GPX IV, under protest from Commerce, the Court issued a final 
judgement sustaining the determination in GPX III.255 
 
Notably, the ambiguity of countervailing statute may lead to excessive discretion of the 
investigating authority. In GPX II, when addressing whether imposing countervailing 
duties on products from China is legally permitted, or if Congress intends to interpret 
countervailing provisions available to NMEs, the court made clear that if the statutory 
language of countervailing law was ambiguous, the Court only need to determine 
whether the interpretation of relevant provisions by the DOC is reasonable. Because the 
Court ‘is looking at Commerce’s new interpretation … , it does not matter whether 
Commerce’s new interpretation of the statutes conflicts with its old interpretation’.256 
 
252 The new methodology refers to offset of countervailing duty by adjustment of anti-dumping duty. See GPX Int'l 
Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231,1243 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
253 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337,1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010). 
254 See ibid, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1354. 
255 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, Slip Op. 10-112, 2010 WL 3835022 (CIT Oct. 1, 2010) ("GPX IV"). 
256 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231,1238 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
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However, the Court should not rely on the interpretation of countervailing provisions 
by Commerce when no statute provides references to this issue, because the Court is 
responsible to interpret the law when its provisions are blurry and supervise the 
behaviour of the investigating authority applying the law. Moreover, it is suspicious that 
the Court regarded the Congress’s silence as an indication that it never ‘anticipated the 
countervailing law would be applied’ to a non-market economy. As the first case which 
“officially” included the application of anti-dumping and countervailing measures, the 
silence of Congress is more likely to indicate it did not notice the issue. In GPX I, 
though the Court already noticed a potential risk might arise with the implementation 
of both duties, it chose to keep silent on this issue because of the “irrelevance” to the 
case itself. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Congress had not realized the 
importance of this issue when, In GPX II, the legal issue of “double counting” for the 
first time arose. In this situation, it is the Court’s responsibility, as a judicial organ, to 
decide whether relevant law applies to the problem based on references in GPX I.  
 
3.3.2.3 Subsequent legislation after the GPX case: an old method with a new 
appearance 
 
The US enacted new legislation to regulate the issue of “double remedies” following 
the GPX Case, but it reflected same issues in that Case: the ambiguity of countervailing 
law and abusive application of anti-dumping law. As a response to disputes raised in 
the GPX Case, on March 6, 2012, US Congress enacted GPX legislation regulating the 
imposition of countervailing duties on NMEs and the issue of “double counting”.257 The 
GPX legislation has two sections, the first section provides the US DOC with a legal 
basis to apply countervailing duties to non-market economies; the second section 




257 See Public Law 112–99, 112th Congress, 126 STAT. 265 (MAR. 13, 2012).  
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Two points can be extracted from the GPX legislation. First, although the new 
legislation authorises countervailing measures for non-market economies, it does not 
address the interpretation of provisions, especially subsidy determination. It is 
undeniable that the GPX legislation is a step forward in US trade remedy law, because 
it is an attempt to deal with the issue of “double remedies” through national legislation. 
In particular, the authorization to apply countervailing duty to non-market economies 
directly confronts the subsidy-related issue as an origin of the “double remedy” issue. 
However, it is the ambiguous statute on subsidy determination which provides 
excessive discretion to authority and results in a potential risk of the “double remedy” 
issue as discussed by the Court in GPX II.258 Both the Georgetown Case and the GPX 
Case prove that transparent countervailing law with appropriate interpretation is 
required to identify subsidization behaviour and prevent abusive application of anti-
dumping law. In this regard, the interpretation of countervailing provisions is not 
embodied in new legislation. 
 
Second, the new legislation is still trying to regulate “double remedy” issue within the 
anti-dumping law. The second section of GPX legislation encourages eliminating the 
issue of “double remedies” through adjustments of anti-dumping methodology. 
However, dealing with “double counting” through adjustment by anti-dumping 
methodology has been proved difficult to implement in practices. As discussed in last 
section, the Court, in GPX II, indicated there did not exist a reasonable method to deal 
with the problem of “double counting” through adjustments. 259  The following 
judgements also proved adjustments by anti-dumping methodology is difficult to 
conduct in practise. As the Court stated, in GPX III, ‘it is too difficult for Commerce to 
determine, using improved methodologies and in the absence of new statutory tools, 
whether and to what degree double counting is occurring’.260 In practise, as described 
by Katarzyna Kaszubska, ‘the investigating authority continues to focus the pass-
 
258 See the court cited in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1290 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008 2008). 
259 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1241 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
260 See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010). 
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through analysis primarily on NME input subsidies that affect variable costs. The 
adjustments to the dumping margin are made mainly for the value of raw materials or 
additional input provided by the state, rather than other types of government 
assistance’.261 Therefore, the new legislation still reflect abusive application of anti-
dumping law and may not be an efficient reference for solving the “double remedy” 
issue.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
The US anti-dumping statute has a long history of development, and so as its non-
market economy provisions. Two major approaches were established to deal with the 
non-market economy related issues during development of the US anti-dumping statute. 
However, the non-market economy treatment reflects a potential risk that raises the 
anti-dumping measures, which may not comply with the ADA and the purpose of US 
anti-dumping rules. In fact, the differences between the ADA and the US anti-dumping 
statute indicates a controversary over the “non-market economy treatment” in the future 
and requires further interpretation of the WTO anti-dumping agreements, which is 
analysed in detail in Chapter 6 of this research. 
 
Comparatively, there is an asymmetric development of US trade remedy laws relates to 
the “non-market economy treatment”, which leads to a dilemma that the anti-dumping 
statute are frequently revised to regulate the countervailing disputes. Analysis of the 
non-market economy disputes at the US national court submits that the “double remedy” 
issue has evolved from a single subsidy case into a compound dispute involving two 
trade remedy measures. The findings further indicate that the ambiguity of 
countervailing law, especially the subsidy determination, is one rationale of the “double 
remedy” issue, which requires further interpretation, which is discussed in next chapter 
 
261 Katarzyna Kaszubska, ‘Double Remedy: Beyond the Non-market economy status’ in James J Nedumpara and 
Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer 
Singapore 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
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Chapter 4: The “public body” issue: the approaches and China case 
 
This chapter has explored the solution of the “double remedy” issue based on analysing 
the topic of “public body” in countervailing investigations. It aims to prevent the abuse 
of trade remedies by seeking appropriate interpretations of the subsidy determination 
rules to provide predictable and transparent provisions of countervailing law. This 
chapter has conducted doctrinal analysis of the CPTPP regulations as well as the WTO 
countervailing provisions while taking the WTO case law as guidelines.262 This chapter 
concluded by proposing criteria identifying the “public body”, which provides a 
reference for subsidy determination.  
 
In addition, this chapter has applied the “public body” criteria to assess China’s SOEs. 
The findings highlighted that SOEs in China, especially Chinese central SOEs (Yang 
Qi), are potentially “public bodies” when serving specific responsibility, for example, 
stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant industries through strictly following 
national macro-control measures. However, it may be impossible to identify the Yang 
Qi as a unified “public body” due to its diversified functions and responsibilities, further 
feedback and more evidence through questionnaires could help to refine the evaluation 
during the “public body” investigation. 
 
4.1 A call for resolution to the “public body” issue 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this research, the ambiguity of WTO 
countervailing regulation is one major origin of the “double remedy” issue. Chapter 3 
has further indicated that the lack of clear standards of subsidy determination requires 
interpretation of the WTO countervailing rules. Therefore, in order to prevent the abuse 
of trade remedies from countervailing perspective, it is requisite to clarify the criteria 
 
262 For landmark case laws see Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. Appellate Body Report, United 
States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
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of subsidy determination through interpretation of WTO countervailing rules. And that 
requisition is the third subsidiary question of this research as has been listed in Section 
1.3 and the subject of this chapter.  
 
The determination of subsidy is concretized by the “public body” issue in the United 
States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China Case.263 In general, the implementation of countervailing measure is based on 
subsidized behaviour, and the subject of subsidization is the government. However, 
Article 1.1 of the ASCM (Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measure) 
stipulates another possible subject which is the “public body”. The relevant text reads 
as follows: 
 
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within 
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”) … 
 
According to the ASCM, a “public body” is jointly referred to as government that 
qualifies to make a subsidy. Therefore, if an entity is considered as a “public body”, 
then its commercial behaviour is potentially regarded as subsidization, thus suffering 
from countervailing measures, which is a rationale of the potential “double remedy” 
issue. However, the necessary details and instructions are absent for identifying “public 
body” based on the ASCM, which leaves loopholes in the determination of subsidy.  
 
In the United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China Case, one major debate is whether China’s SOEs and SOCBs 
belongs to “public bodies” and whether their behaviours comply with countervailing 
law.264 In other words, does an entity with link to state qualifies to provide a subsidy 
under WTO rules? China filed a complaint at the WTO rebutting US’s affirmative 
 
263 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
264 See ibid. 
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determination of China’s state-owned banks and SOEs being “public bodies”, which 
were qualified to conduct subsidization under the ASCM. The Panel sided with the US, 
but the Appellate Body held the opposite view (in respect of SOE), it declared that ‘the 
precise contours and characteristics of a “public body” are bound to differ from entity 
to entity, State to State, and case to case’.265  
 
The WTO tribunals’ decision clarifies only limited Chinese firms may belong to “public 
bodies”. And even for those identified “public bodies”, such as the SOCBs, there still 
has the controversary. According to the tribunal, the BOC is a “public body” based on 
several factors such as state ownership; relevant Chinese commercial banking law; and 
risk management and analytical skill of SOCBs. For example, Article 34 of China’s 
Commercial Banking Law stipulates that banks must ‘carry out their loan business upon 
the needs of the national economy and the social development and under the guidance 
of State industrial policies’.266 According to the tribunal, the BOC is a “public body” 
because its governmental factor is formally acknowledged by Chinese law. Nonetheless, 
commentators remain sceptical of the tribunal’s arguments noting that ‘a lack of 
business flair, as illustrated by inadequate risk management and analytical skills and 
poor loan-making practices, has little to do with whether SOCBs are exercising 
government authority’ and that ‘Article 34 of the Commercial Banking Law is a very 
general statement and its implications to the SOCBs’ loan business are not clear’.267 
 
Compared with the SOCBs, many Chinese firms, especially SOEs, may not have formal 
links with the state like the BOC. Potential controversary may arise, for example, would 
SASAC's ability to remove the firm’s top management suffice to render the firm a 
“public body”? For now, the Appellate Body is relying on the standard of “government 
 
265 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 317. 
266 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. 
267 See Ming Du, ‘China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law’ (2014) 63 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 409, 439; Jochem De Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations against Imports from China’ 
(2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 515. 
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authority” to evaluate a “public body” but does not clarify what is necessary to 
demonstrate such authority.268 Nevertheless, the WTO cannot avoid these questions. 
Since the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China Case Case, the “public body” issue has raised three 
disputes.269 Even without China as party at issue, there still a high percentage that 
occurs. For example, in the United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-
rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India Case, the tribunal rejected the US’ 
argument that one can identify whether a firm is a “public body” on account of whether 
the government can employ the resources of an entity that it controls as its own.270 
 
Therefore, WTO provisions on identifying the “public body” is still blurry, and more 
precise methodologies thus have to be developed through further interpretation of WTO 
agreements.271 This is significantly urgent because the “public body” issue not only 
results in disputes relating to countervailing measures for the SOEs, but may also jointly 
lead to the issue of “double remedies” in the United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case.272 
 
4.2 Potential approaches to define the “public body” raised in WTO cases 
 
There are three main cases that discussing the “public body” within the WTO dispute 
settlement system. First is the Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels 
Case where “control of government” is recognised as one crucial factor of a “public 
 
268 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
269 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014. Panel Report United t, States - Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/ R, adopted 14 July 2014. Appellate Body Report, 
United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 
July 2019. 
270 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014, at paras 4.27 – 4.29. 
271 See ibid. 
272 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
 111 
body”.273 In addition, commercial principle and public policy objective may not qualify 
as factors to determine the “public body”. Then, in the United States - Definitive Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, the “public 
body” is defined as an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental 
authority.274 “Control of government” as proposed in the Korea - Measures Affecting 
Trade in Commercial Vessels Case may be of relevance but relies on certain 
circumstances. Despite the “governmental authority” provides a clue for identifying a 
“public body”, the Appellate Body did not clarify what is necessary to demonstrate such 
authority, thus more criteria shall be provided to prevent excessive discretion by 
appropriate interpretations. The determination of a “public body” is further improved 
in the United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China 
Case, where it focuses on ‘whether the entity itself possesses the core characteristics 
and functions’ that constitute a “public body”, and follows a principle to ‘avoid focusing 
exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic without affording due consideration 
to others that may be relevant’.275 In this regard, state intervention, as well as ‘the scope 
and content of government policies relating to the sector in which the investigated entity 
operates’, could also be regarded as evidence to determine “public body”. 
 
4.2.1 The Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels Case 
 
One crucial factor of a “public body”, as analysed by the Panel in Korea – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels Case, is the control of government.276 To prove 
government control in that Case, as mentioned by the Panel, evidence might include: 
state ownership (primary evidence); the role of President of the corporation at issue as 
 
273 See P Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
274 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
275 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
276 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
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a government appointee, and a description of the corporation at issue as an “agent”.277   
 
The criteria for “public body” identification as summarised by the Panel may be of 
limited reference. One fundamental reason is that such criteria are mainly based on a 
specific case. As KEIM, the entity under investigation, is a SOCB in Korea, the criteria 
are based on an analysis of this financial entity, so they may not able to represent SOEs 
at the international level. Regarding the “agent” standard, in this case, Korea described 
KEIM as an “agent”, while in another case, such a phrase may be changed, for example, 
“authority”. So, should the description of “authority” be regarded as one criterion? In 
addition, the criteria are blurry to some extent. For example, in this case, KEXIM is 
100 per cent owned by GOK or other bodies in Korea, while in another case the 
ownership might be 80 per cent. Therefore, as primary evidence of governmental 
control, how should the percentage of ownership as a threshold of government control 
be evaluated?  
 
Notably, two factors may not qualify as factors to determine a “public body” in two 
arguments of Korea. First, according to Korea, ‘an entity will not constitute a ‘public 
body’ if it engages in market activities on commercial terms’,278 which is based on a 
“benefit test”.279 The Panel disagreed with Korea, because such an approach would lead 
to the conclusion that an entity can be both a public and a private body based on ‘how 
that entity was conducting itself in the market’.280 The Panel asserted that ‘the question 
whether an entity is “public body” should not depend on an examination of whether 
that entity acts pursuant to commercial principles’ because of the ‘uncertainty 
surrounding such issues’.281 It explained this “uncertainty” with examples: ‘how one 
would determine whether or not an entity was engaging in a “general practice of lending 
on a commercial basis”. Would this only be the case if 100 per cent of total lending was 
 
277 See ibid, at paras 7.50-7.54. 
278 See ibid. at para. 7.44. 
279 A” benefit test” assess a “‘financial contribution’ only confers a ‘benefit’ if it was made available on terms more 
favourable than the recipient could have obtained on the market”. See ibid. 
280 See ibid. at para. 7.45. 
281 See ibid at paras 7.44-7.46. 
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on a commercial basis, or would 80 per cent suffice? And how would one determine 
that the lending is on a “commercial basis” without looking at the sort of factors 
envisaged in a ‘benefit’ analysis?’.282 It concluded that ‘Korea's approach would blur 
the clear distinction between public and private bodies, and introduce complex 
considerations of benefit into the initial filtering process’.283  
 
Second, the Panel disagreed with Korea’s claim that “public body” is associated with 
an entity that acts in an “official capacity”. The reason lies in the identification of such 
“official capacity” and the entity’s obligation to pursue a public policy objective, for 
example ‘a police officer patrolling a football match as part of his/her police work does 
not cease to act in an official capacity simply because the home football club is required 
to pay a market rate for that service’.284  
 
4.2.2 The United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China Case 
 
The factors of a “public body” are further discussed by the United States - Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case.285 
According to the Appellate Body, a “public body” is generally an entity that possesses, 
exercises or is vested with governmental authority.286 “Control of government” as 
proposed in the Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels Case may of 
relevance but rely on certain circumstances. Despite “governmental authority” provides 
a clue for identifying a “public body”, the Appellate Body did not clarify what is 
necessary to demonstrate such authority, thus more criteria shall be provided to prevent 
excessive discretion through appropriate interpretations. 
 
 
282 See ibid. 
283 See ibid at para 7.49. 
284 See ibid at para 7.48. 
285 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
286 See ibid. 
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The table below illustrates three approaches that describe a “public body” argued by 
each party.287 
 


















Entity exercises authority vested in it 
by the government for the purpose of 





(proposed by AB) 
Entity that possesses, 
exercises or is vested 
with governmental 
authority 
1. A state or other legal instrument 
expressly vests authority in the 
entity concerned;  
2. Entity is exercising governmental 
functions may serve as evidence, 
particularly where such evidence 
points to a sustained and 
systematic practice; 
3. A government exercises 
meaningful control over an entity 
in certain circumstances. (Formal 
indicia of government control are 
manifold, and there is evidence 
that such control has been 
exercised in a meaningful way.) 
 
4.2.2.1 The government ownership approach 
 
The government ownership approach is proposed by the US and maintains that a 
“public body” is an entity that government controls through an ownership interest or 
majority -state-share of that entity.288 The Panel endorsed this approach by concluding 
 
287 The three approaches are also analysed by Ru Ding. See Ru Ding, ‘“Public Body” or Not: Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprise’ (2014) 48 Journal of World Trade 167, 173. 
288 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010, at para. 8.40. 
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that a “public body” is an entity controlled by a government, thus government 
ownership is highly relevant evidence of government control.289  
 
One problem with this approach is that the government’s ownership is not persuasive 
to distinguish a “public body” from a “private body”. Based on the dictionary definition, 
“private”, under Article 1.1 of the ASCM, refer to an individual rather than a state or 
public body, thus an SOE with a majority state share belongs to a public body.290 
However, the Appellate Body stated ‘actions of state-owned corporate entities are prima 
facie private, and thus presumptively not attributable to a Member under Article 1.1 of 
the SCM Agreement’.291 As a result, a “public body” can be both public and private, 
thus government ownership to identify a “public body” is questionable. 
 
Another problem with this approach relates to the purpose of the ASCM. It is 
recognized by at least one expert that the goal of the ASCM is to ‘balance the disciplines 
over both subsidies and countervailing measures’.292 And the government ownership 
approach may lead to more countervailing measures due to its vague regulation of 
ownership, which is contrary to the goal of the ASCM. Specifically, whether a level or 
proportion of state ownership meets the standard of a “public body” depends on the 
determination of the investigating authority, and relevant criteria are blurry. Thus, it 
potentially allows all SOEs with majority -government-ownership to be classified 
“public bodies”, resulting in protectionism through imposing countervailing measures 
on the products of all competing foreign SOEs.293 The Appellate Body in its report 
clearly stated that ‘the mere fact that a government is the majority shareholder of an 
entity does not demonstrate that the government exercises meaningful control over the 
conduct of that entity’.294 Accordingly, the Appellate Body noticed that government 
 
289 See ibid. at para. 8.134. 
290 Ding (n 74) 174. 
291 See ibid. 
292 See ibid. 
293 See ibid. 
294 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 318.  
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ownership is not persuasive to define a “public body”, and this method may lead to an 
abusive application of countervailing measures for SOEs. Therefore, the government 
ownership approach may not qualify as a standard to identify a “public body”.  
 
4.2.2.2 The governmental function approach 
 
The governmental function approach is proposed by China and maintains that a “public 
body” is an ‘entity which exercises powers vested in it by a government for the purpose 
of performing functions of a governmental character’. 295  Compared with the 
government ownership approach, an SOE with a majority -state -share is a “public body” 
under the government ownership approach, but may not be under the governmental 
function approach if it does not perform a governmental function. 296  The higher 
threshold limits the abusive use of countervailing measures against SOE-related 
transaction.297 
 
One issue of this approach is to define government function, and it is difficult to 
distinguish a behaviour exercising a governmental function from the private behaviour 
of a company. Article 1.1 of the ASCM provides four examples of financial 
contributions by a government or “public body”, which can be determined as subsidy. 
One may argue that, under the governmental function approach, the four examples can 
also be regarded as behaviours with a governmental function. 298  However, those 
examples are applied to determine a subsidy rather than a “public body”. If they serve 
to identify a “public body”, then the third example ‘provides goods or services other 
than general infrastructure, or purchases goods’ potentially ‘classifies all company 
transactions as functions with a governmental character’.299 As commented by one 
expert, ‘it is almost impossible and impractical to distinguish governmental from 
 
295 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010, at para. 8.50. 
296 Ding (n 74) 174. 
297 See ibid. 
298 See ibid. 
299 See ibid. 
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private only through the functions or the activities of a certain entity’.300 
 
4.2.2.3 The governmental authority approach 
 
The governmental authority approach considers a “public body” is an entity that 
possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.301 The governmental 
function approach and governmental authority approach are very similar, they both 
consider the close relationship between the entity and government behaviour. However, 
the delegation of governmental authority cannot be simply regarded as conduct 
equating to a governmental function. To explain governmental authority, the Appellate 
Body gave the example of where ‘a statute or other legal instrument expressly vests 
authority in the entity’.302 Thus, one possible delegation of governmental authority can 
be illustrated that an entity is granted governmental authority by law. Moreover, the 
Appellate Body expressly provided two scenarios to illustrate the delegation of 
governmental authority, one is an entity exercising governmental functions, where such 
evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice. This scenario also indicates the 
difference between governmental function and the delegation of governmental authority. 
An entity behaviour may have a government function on one occasion, but this may not 
equate to delegation of governmental authority. Only when such behaviour indicates a 
long-term process and systematic practice, can it be proven to be governmental 
authority. Another scenario is related to meaningful control by the government. When 
there is evidence that “formal indicia of government control are manifold”, and that 
such control has been exercised in a meaningful way, then the entity may exercise 
governmental authority.303 
 
Despite governmental authority provides a clue for identifying a “public body”, the 
 
300 See ibid. 
301 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 317. 
302 See ibid, at para 318. 
303 See ibid. 
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Appellate Body did not clarify what is necessary to demonstrate such authority. As the 
standard to determine the delegation of governmental authority is not specific, “public 
body” identification may vary from case to case, ‘just as no two governments are 
exactly alike, the precise contours and characteristics of a public body are bound to 
differ from entity to entity, State to State, and case to case’.304 And ‘the same entity may 
possess certain features suggesting it is a public body, and others that suggest that it is 
a private body’.305 Therefore, features of the entity are not able to constitute evidence 
to identify a “public body”, further information is also necessary relating to the status 
or behaviour of the entity.  
 
However, the ambiguous conclusion of WTO tribunal in determining “public body” 
may lead to excessive discretion as analysed in Chapter 3, which further result in an 
abusive implementation of countervailing measures. For example, as mentioned by 
Ding, one issue of this approach is that it leaves some SOEs as non-public and non-
private bodies. 306  The Appellate Body in its report referred to the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s definition of “private” as a business owned by an individual rather than 
the state or a public body.307 Thus, SOE’s do not fall within such a definition of “private” 
because the state is always their shareholder. Meanwhile, SOEs may not be public 
bodies if there is no evidence showing they exercise or are vested with governmental 
authority. Therefore, “vacuum” is established and SOEs in such a “vacuum” belongs to 
neither public nor private bodies. Therefore, even though identification of “public body” 
is conducted on a case-by-case basis, more criteria shall be provided to prevent 
excessive discretion through appropriate interpretations. 
 
4.2.3 A complement of the “public body” determination by the United States – 
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China Case 
 
304 See ibid, at para. 317. 
305 See ibid, at para. 318. 
306 Ding (n 74) 174. 
307 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 292. 
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WTO tribunals, in the United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China Case, as a supplement of the United States - Definitive Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case,308 recalled 
and further addressed the determination of “public body” under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
ASCM.309 Accordingly, the determination of the “public body” shall focus on ‘whether 
the entity itself possesses the core characteristics and functions’ that constitute a “public 
body”, and follow a principle to ‘avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single 
characteristic without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant’. In 
this regard, state intervention, as well as ‘the scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates’, can also be regarded as 
evidence of “public body” determination. 
 
WTO tribunal, in the United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from Chin Case, did not provide specific factor of a “public body”, its analysis 
is rather based on the “governmental authority”, in particular, with its two scenarios. 
Recalling the two scenarios discussed in the last Section: (1) An entity exercising 
governmental functions may serve as evidence, particularly where such evidence points 
to a sustained and systematic practice; (2) A government exercise meaningful control 
over an entity in certain circumstances. (Formal indicia of government control are 
manifold, and there is evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful 
way.) The first argument clarified by the Panel is that the legal standard for “public 
body” determinations does not ‘require a particular degree or nature of connection in 
all cases between an identified government function and the particular financial 
contribution at issue’.310 It then reinforced the importance of a “case-by-case approach” 
in the investigation, based on the view that the situation of Members varies. Therefore, 
there may not be a unified legal standard to evaluate the nature of a behaviour 
 
308 See ibid. 
309 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
310 See ibid, at para. 5.56. 
 120 
performing as a governmental function.  
 
The Appellate Body, agreeing with the Panel, pointed out that the “public body” 
identification shall base on ‘whether the entity itself possesses the core characteristics 
and functions’ that constitute a “public body”, and the conduct of the entity only serves 
as subsidiary evidence to answer that question.311 According to the Appellate Body, the 
authority may not need to focus on every instance of conduct in which the entity 
engages. Assessment of the entity’s conduct might be only one piece of evidence that 
the authority needs to seek, other evidence, such as the ‘entity’s relationship with the 
government’, and ‘the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in 
which the investigated entity operates’ are also of relevance.312 
 
Another issue analysed by the Panel concerns China’s claim that ‘an entity must 
necessarily be found to have been “meaningful controlled” by the government in the 
specific conduct at issue’ under Article 1.1 (a)(1) of the ASCM. A “case-by-case” 
approach is also applicable here, pursuant to the analysis of the Panel, as the existence 
of “meaningful control” is “inherently specific to particular circumstances”.313 And in 
this particular case related to China, quoting Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel 
(India), the assessment of “meaningful control” shall be based on ‘the core 
characteristics and functions of the relevant entity, its relationship with the government, 
and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the 
investigated entity operates’.314 Besides, state intervention, which is a key factor to 
evaluate an entity’s behaviour in the Public Bodies Memorandum, 315  was also 
 
311 See ibid, at para. 5.101. 
312 See ibid, at para. 5.96. 
313 See ibid, at para. 5.66. 
314 See ibid, at para. 5.66. 
315  USDOC Memorandum dated 18 May 2012 for Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe; Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube; Laminated 
Woven Sacks; and Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of Public Bodies in the 
People's Republic of China in Accordance with the WTO Appellate Body's Findings in WTO DS379; and USDOC 
Memorandum dated 18 May 2012 on the relevance of the Chinese Communist Party for the limited purpose of 
determining whether particular enterprises should be considered to be "public bodies" within the context of a 
countervailing duty investigation. See ibid at p. 4. 
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addressed by the Panel as potential evidence ‘relevant to establishing that an entity 
possesses, exercises, or is vested with governmental authority’.316 
 
The Appellate Body shared the same opinion as the Panel but analysed more in depth. 
According to the Appellate Body, an investigation of specific conduct is only required  
to assess the second clause of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the ASCM, where a private body 
is carrying out a function that has been “entrusted” to it or “directed” by the government 
when engaging in one of the conducts under subparagraphs (i)-(iii).317 The second 
clause of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of ASCM is applied here to evaluate whether a conduct 
belongs to entrustment or direction by a government. And the clause itself is not used 
to identify a “public body”.318 In other words, a conduct under subparagraphs (i)-(iii) 
by a “public body” may constitute a subsidy. A conduct under subparagraphs (i)-(iii) by 
a private body may not constitute a subsidy unless it is entrusted or directed by a 
government. And the investigation of a specific conduct is to prove such entrustment 
or direction. Therefore, the investigation of an entity’s conduct is of limited value in 
evaluating “public body”.  
 
The Appellate Body further highlighted one principle when determining a “public 
body”: ‘avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic without 
affording due consideration to others that may be relevant’.319 For example, reasoned 
 
316 The Panel observed that “the Public Bodies Memorandum focuses on the GOC's interventions in firm behaviour 
and market outcomes, with particular emphasis on governmental influence over SIEs through commercial incentives 
and benefits, industrial policies, and supervisory control.” See ibid at para 5.67. 
317 Relevant provisions of ASCM: 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member 
(referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where: 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), 
potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax 
credits)1; 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry 
out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in 
the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; 
318 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019, at para 5.103. 
319 See ibid, at para. 5.97. 
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the Appellate Body, the state’s “meaningful control” and “government ownership” may 
be relevant evidence of “public body” determination, but if solely based on a single 
characteristic without due consideration, this may potentially ‘conflate the evidentiary 
elements for public body determination and the definition of a public body’.320 
 
In addition, when addressing the diverse circumstances identifying a “public body”, the 
Appellate Body mentioned one piece of evidence, quoting Appellate Body Report, in 
the US – Carbon Steel (India) Case, which is distinguished with the circumstances 
provided in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China Case.321 ‘The scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates’ could also be regarded 
as evidence of “public body” determination. And this could complement the 
“governmental authority” approach. 
 
4.3 Interpretations of the “public body” based on the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership  
 
The CPTPP, as a recent free trade agreement, is closely linked to the WTO system, 
especially from the dispute settlement dimension under the ADA and the ASCM. Its 
regulations are of referential value in evaluating compliance with the WTO law at the 
international level. Article 17.3 of the CPTPP stipulates a new term, “delegated 
authority”, which is not mentioned in the GATT 1994 and the ASCM but relates to the 
“public body”. The analysis proposes that the criterion of “delegated authority” as 
stipulated in Article 17.3 serves the same purpose as explanations by WTO tribunals in 
terms of the “public body”, thus, providing references for the interpretation of “public 
body”. 
 
4.3.1 Introduction of the CPTPP 
 
320 See ibid. 
321 See ibid, at para. 5.96. 
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The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
aiming to be a free trade agreement, now involves 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region, including New Zealand, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Its predecessor is the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP), a free trade agreement to liberalize trade and investment 
between 12 Pacific-rim countries. The CPTPP includes many of the elements that were 
negotiated as part of the TPP, but with some significant differences. The economies 
included in the CPTPP account for 13.3 per cent of the world’s GDP-worth a total of 
US$ 10.6 trillion, which would have significant influence in the Pacific region.322  
 
The CPTPP is linked with WTO rules. Article 6.8 of the agreement stipulates that trade 
disputes between parties in the CPTPP are under the guidance of WTO rules, such as 
the ADA (Anti-dumping Agreement) and the ASCM (Agreement on Subsidy and 
Countervailing Measure). Furthermore, Chapter 17 of the CPTPP provides regulations 
specifically on entities link with state, such as the SOE. In this regard, it provides 
references consider factors of the “public body” and attribution of the SOEs.  
 
Specifically, two assessments will be explored through provisions in the CPTPP. First, 
it can assess the SOE provisions in the CPTPP supported by the “public body” criteria 
in WTO cases. According to WTO tribunals, identifying a “public body” shall focus on 
‘whether the entity itself possesses the core characteristics and functions’ that constitute 
a “public body”. Accordingly, if the SOE defined in the CPTPP corresponds to the 
criteria for the “public bodies” by definition, then all SOEs are potentially “public 
body”, and there may no need to further investigate the entity’s specific conduct in 
subsidy investigation. However, it could also be contrary to the WTO tribunals’ 
viewpoint that a “case-by-case” approach to investigation is recommended, based on 
the view that the situation of Members varies, thus there may not be a unified legal 
 
322 According to New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/cptpp-overview/ accessed on 7, January 2020.  
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standard to evaluate the nature of a behaviour as public body.323 It may also cause a 
situation that each behaviour of SOE is potentially countervailable, thus increasing the 
volume of subsidy-related disputes. Second, potential factors of “public body” might 
be discovered to improve “governmental authority” approach. Chapter 17 of the CPTPP 
provides several terminologies that is differentiated with SOE but linked with state. 
These terminologies such as “designated monopoly” and “delegated authority” could 
provide references for interpretation of “public body”.  
 
4.3.2 The definition of “State-owned Enterprises” not directly classified as “public 
bodies” 
 
Article 17.1 of the CPTPP stipulates definitions of terminology as applied in Chapter 
17. Accordingly, an SOE under the CPTPP refers to: 
 
[A]n enterprise that is principally engaged in commercial activities in which a Party: 
(a) Directly owns more than 50 percent of the share capital; 
(b) Controls, through ownership interests, the exercise of more than 50 percent 
of the voting rights; or 
(c) Holds the power to appoint a majority of members of the board of directors 
or any other equivalent management body. 
 
The definition first addresses an SOE being an enterprise engaged in commercial 
activities that a Party is involved in. It then explains whether an enterprise can be 
identified as an SOE based on the extent that a Party is involved. Subparagraph (a) 
stipulates an SOE is an enterprise where a Party owns more than 50 per cent of the share 
capital. And subparagraph (b) stipulates that an SOE is an enterprise where a Party 
controls more than 50 per cent of the voting rights. Thus, both (a) and (b) address the 
fact that in an SOE, a Party participates in the business of an entity through majority 
share capital or voting rights.  
 
 
323 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
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Ownership is the most direct way to identify an SOE by the CPTPP. This leaves a 
problem as whether the “ownership” qualifies to demonstrate state control over a SOE. 
In the Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels Case, the primary 
evidence to demonstrate the control of government is state ownership.324 For example, 
KEIM, a SOCB of Korea, is 100 per cent owned by the GOK or other bodies in Korea, 
which is considered under the control of the GOK. One presumption about the purpose 
of state ownership is to obtain the management or control of the entity on behalf of the 
state. However, the SOEs, where the state has major ownership, can still reflect features 
of a private firm through “private control”, for example, by employing market-oriented 
managers to operate business in a private way. 325  Therefore, the SOEs are not 
necessarily “state-owned and state-controlled”, but could also be “state-owned and 
private-controlled”. In this regard, a SOE is following market forces and state is one 
shareholder of it. As analysed by the Appellate Body, in the United States - Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, ‘mere 
fact that a government is the majority shareholder of an entity does not demonstrate that 
the government exercise meaningful control over the conduct of that entity’. 326 
Therefore, ownership standards as listed in subparagraphs (a) and (b) may not result in 
an attribution between the SOEs and the “public bodies”. 
 
Subparagraph (c) stipulates an SOE is an enterprise where a Party holds the power to 
appoint a management body. Appointment of a management body is one evidence of 
state control in the Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels Case.327 In 
 
324 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
325 The blurry boundaries, especially in the case of ownership boundaries, between private firm and SOE has been 
compared and analyzed by Mike W Peng and others. One of their views is that the ownership boundaries are not 
fixed, for example, “SOEs can be privatized and private firms can be nationalized to become SOEs”. For SOEs 
where state has major ownership can still reflect private firm characteristic through “private control”, such as 
employing market-oriented managers to operate business in a private way. Therefore, SOEs are not necessarily 
“state-owned and state-controlled”, but could also be “state-owned and private-controlled”. See Mike W Peng and 
others, ‘Theories of the (State-Owned) Firm’ (2016) 33 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 293. 
326 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 541. 
327 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
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this Case, the government of Korea had the right to appoint the president of KEIM, 
which was regarded as evidence that KEIM is under state control and thus a “public 
body”.328 However, in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China Case, the Appellate Body highlighted ‘the 
control of an entity by a government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity 
is a public body’. 329  The WTO tribunal further complemented that state having 
“meaningful” control with evidential elements might demonstrate a “public body”, it 
provides that: 
 
 [E]vidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and its 
conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant entity 
possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the performance 
of governmental functions. 330 
 
The tribunal, in the United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products 
from China Case, added that the investigation of “meaningful control” of specific 
conduct is unnecessary compared with investigation of the entity itself.331  
 
Notably, the WTO tribunal did not explain how to demonstrate state control to be 
“meaningful”. Thus, it is not clear whether appointing “a majority of members of the 
board of directors” is equivalent to state “meaningful” control. In other words, although 
the appointment of directors provides the government with the power to control the 
entity, it still does not qualify as solid evidence of governmental authority. It therefore 
cannot confirm that the definition of SOE, especially subparagraph (c), will lead to an 
SOE directly belonging to a “public body”.  
 
4.3.3 The “Designated Monopoly” does not qualify as a factor of “public body” 
 
328 See ibid. 
329 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
330 See ibid. 
331 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
 127 
 
According to Article 17.1 of the CPTPP, designated monopoly refers to ‘a privately-
owned monopoly that is designated after the date of entry into force of this Agreement 
and any government monopoly 332  that a Party designates or has designated’. 
Theoretically, it can be further divided into three types based on the definitions of 
“designate” and “monopoly” 333: privately-owned monopoly, state-owned monopoly, 
and government/government agency monopoly. 
 
Privately-owned monopoly refers to a privately-owned entity that is designated or 
authorized as the sole provider or purchaser of a good or service to expand the scope of 
that good or service to cover additional ones. Compared with the scenarios of 
“governmental authority” approach, this monopoly may not correspond to the second 
one. The second scenario explains the exercising of governmental authority as 
exercising governmental functions and such behaviour points to a sustained and 
systematic practice.334 However, designation as the sole provider or purchaser of a good 
or service does not necessarily imply that entity is exercising governmental functions. 
Although such a link may be proven, further evidence pointing to “sustained and 
systematic” practice is still necessary. The monopoly also does not accord with the third 
scenario. According to the third scenario, “governmental authority” can be embodied 
through government’s meaningful control over an entity. 335  However, it is unclear 
whether the designation by government belongs to meaningful control. Pursuant to the 
CPTPP, “designate” means ‘to establish, designate or authorize a monopoly, or to 
expand the scope of monopoly to cover an additional good or service’.336 Such an 
expression seems to correspond to a subsidy behaviour in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the 
 
332  According to Article 17.1, government monopoly means a monopoly that is owned, or controlled through 
ownership interests, by a Party or by another government monopoly. 
333 According to Article 17.1, designate means “to establish, designate or authorize a monopoly, or to expand the 
scope of monopoly to cover an additional good or service.” Monopoly means “an entity including a consortium or 
government agency that in any relevant market of a Party is designated as the sole provider or purchaser of a good 
or service”. 
334 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
335 See ibid. 
336 See Chapter 17 of CPTPP, footnote 312. 
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ASCM. According to Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), a subsidy behaviour may exist when ‘a 
government… entrusts or directs a private body to provide goods or services … .337 
Therefore, such a monopoly is more likely to describe a subsidization behaviour as 
stipulated in Article 1.1 of the ASCM rather than the factor of a “public body”.  
 
It is debatable whether a privately-owned monopoly corresponds to the first scenario of 
the “governmental authority” approach. The first standard explains the evidence for 
governmental authority thus: ‘a state or other legal instrument expressly vests authority 
in the entity concerned’. It includes two parts, one is the entity is vested in the authority, 
the other is that authorization is stipulated by legal instrument. The CPTPP has legal 
validity among its signatories. However, it is debatable whether the designation of sole 
provider or purchaser of a good or service legally belongs to a governmental 
authorization. As analysed before, such an expression is more like a description of 
subsidy conduct. It may show that the entity has a link with the government. However, 
the WTO tribunal addressed this point in its report, stating ‘the existence of mere formal 
links between an entity and government in the narrow sense is unlikely to suffice to 
establish the necessary possession of governmental authority’. 338  Thus, the link 
between a privately-owned entity and the government may not be sufficient to establish 
the necessary threshold of governmental authority. Therefore, it cannot confirm that a 
privately-owned monopoly is a factor of “public body”. 
 
State-owned monopoly refers to an entity that is owned or controlled by the government 
through ownership interests and designated or authorized as the sole provider or 
purchaser of a good or service or can expand the scope of that good or service to cover 
additional ones. Similar to a privately-owned monopoly, this designation behaviour 
does not qualify as an indication of the exercise of governmental function or 
authorization in the governmental authority. Yet it may be confused with the third 
 
337 See Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of ASCM. 
338 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 318. 
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standard that ‘a government exercises meaningful control over an entity in certain 
circumstances’, because the entity is “controlled” by the government through 
ownership interest. However, control through an “ownership interest” is not a decisive 
element as a type of meaningful control. According to the WTO tribunal, ‘control of an 
entity by a government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public 
body’.339 Besides, government ownership is ‘not evidence of meaningful control of an 
entity by government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis for establishing that 
the entity is vested with the authority to perform a governmental function’.340 Rather, 
control through ownership is one feature of an SOE as defined in Article 17.1 of the 
CPTPP, in this case, the state-owned monopoly is functionally equivalent to an SOE 
and may be one type of SOE based on its definition, which is also one reason why this 
monopoly cannot be regarded as a reference to “public body”. 
 
Government agency monopoly refers to a government agency that is designated or 
authorized as the sole provider or purchaser of a good or service, or can expand the 
scope of that good or service to cover additional ones. Since the subject of this 
monopoly is government agency, it shall perform a governmental function and possess 
governmental authority. Though there is no definition for government agency under this 
term, as an extension of government, a government agency monopoly is to a large extent 
naturally a “public body”.  
 
4.3.4 The “Delegated Authority” as a reference to interpret the “public body” 
 
Apart from designated monopoly, another concept recorded in Article 17.3 of the 
CPTPP is “delegated authority”, which cannot be found in the GATT 1994 and the 
ASCM but relates to “public body”. Pursuant to Article 17.3: 
 
Each Party shall ensure that when its state-owned enterprises, state enterprises and 
 
339 See ibid. at para. 320. 
340 See ibid. at para. 346. 
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designated monopolies exercise any regulatory, administrative or other 
governmental authority that the Party has directed or delegated to such entities to 
carry out, those entities act in a manner that is not inconsistent with that Party’s 
obligations under this Agreement. 
 
Although Article 17.3 does not state the definition of delegated authority directly, it is 
possible to analyse that one interpretation of delegated authority is ‘SOE, state 
enterprises or designated monopolies that exercise any regulatory, administrative or 
other governmental authority’. The term “delegated authority” is then potentially a 
factor of a “public body” or the authority that a “public body” has.  
 
The description of delegated authority corresponds to the basic rule interpreted by the 
Appellate Body that the “public body” must be an entity that ‘possesses, exercises or is 
vested with governmental authority’.341 In detail, it corresponds to standards in the 
“governmental authority” approach. First, the delegated authority has regulatory, 
administrative, or governmental authority, which is a legal announcement of the right 
of authority. In addition, the delegated authority explains what could be examples of 
regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority, for example, the ‘power to 
expropriate, grant licenses, approve commercial transactions, or impose quotas, fees or 
other charges’.342 And those are clear governmental functions, normally with a specific 
system and period to operate.343 It may not satisfy the third standard directly, because 
meaningful control is a blurry concept, thus it is difficult to embody either by ownership 
interest or the behaviour itself. However, as delegated authority reflects the first two 
standards, it is solid enough to prove such a definition belongs to at least one form of 
“public body”. 
 
Moreover, the concept of the delegated authority can further distinguish the term SOE 
from the “public body”, which avoids the risk that every SOE is potentially a “public 
 
341 See ibid.at para. 317. 
342 See footnote 12 of Article 17.4 at CPTPP 
343 For example, according to China’s departmental regulation Measures for Transfer of Rights and Interests of Toll 
Roads, the maximum period of payment should not surpass 30 years. See the Chinese government website 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-09/02/content_1085631.htm accessed 26 April 2020.  
 131 
body” by a general definition. Pursuant to Article 17.3, when an SOE exercises 
regulatory or other governmental authority directed by the government, such SOE can 
be recognized as a delegated authority. Hence, neither government ownership nor 
governmental function is the central criterion of judgement as regards delegated 
authority. An entity where a state is the majority shareholder of that enterprise or holds 
the power to appoint a management body can be identified as an SOE, but not a 
delegated authority if the entity does not exercise governmental authority. As an SOE 
is one subject of delegated authority, it may be identified as a “public body” under 
authorization in one case, but not without governmental authority in another. This 
reflects WTO tribunals’ analysis that the standard to determine the delegation of 
governmental authority is not specific and does not depend on one decisive element, 
the “public body” identification may vary from case to case, ‘the same entity may 
possess certain features suggesting it is a public body, and other that suggest that it is a 
private body’.344 Accordingly, the regulations of delegated authority as stipulated in 
Article 17.3 serves the same purposes as the explanation of WTO tribunals, thus, the 
provisions of delegated authority can be interpreted to improve the concept of “public 
body”. 
 
4.4 Factors for “public body” identification 
 
Based on the analysis of “public body” by WTO cases and provisions of the CPTPP, a 
“public body” can refer to the following: 
 
An entity that exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental authority 
that the Party has directed or delegated to such entity.  
 
Footnote 1: Examples of ‘exercising any regulatory, administrative or other 
governmental authority’ include: the power to expropriate, grant licenses, approve 
 
344 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 318. 
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commercial transactions, or impose quotas, fees, or other charges. 
 
Footnote 2: The determination of a “public body” shall focus on ‘whether the entity 
itself possesses the core characteristics and functions’ that constitutes a “public body”, 
and follow the principle to ‘avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single 
characteristic without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant’. In 
this regard, state intervention, as well as the scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates can serve as evidence of 
“public body” determination. 
 
Footnote 3: Approaches to demonstrate “public body” may include, but not be 
exhausted by: 
 
(a) A state or other legal instrument expressly vests authority in the entity 
concerned; 
(b) An entity exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence, particularly 
where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice; 
(c) A government exercises meaningful control over an entity in certain 
circumstances; (Formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there 
is evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way.) 
 
4.5 The “public body” issue in the case of China 
 
Although there is an intention to reduce the state intervention and promote the SOEs as 
independent market players reflected by national law and reform of SOEs, the SOEs in 
China are not clearly distinguished from the “public bodies”. The separation of state 
intervention stipulated in SOAE law is an appropriate starting point for state and SOE 
to pursue. However, despite the Guiding Opinions have specific regulations reducing 
the state intervention and pursuing for independent market players, it still needs 
feedback in practice and evidence in the future. 
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The findings also highlighted that SOEs in China, especially Chinese central SOEs 
(Yang Qi), are potentially “public bodies” when serving specific responsibility, for 
example, stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant industries through strictly 
following national macro-control measures. However, it may be impossible to identify 
the Yang Qi as a whole “public body” due to its diversified functions and 
responsibilities, further feedback and more evidence through questionnaires could help 
to refine the evaluation during the “public body” investigation. 
 
4.5.1 The Common features of the SOEs from different sources 
 
In order to analyse the special case of the SOEs in China, it is useful to have a general 
understanding on the common features of the SOEs. Although the concept of the SOE 
is absent in the WTO agreements, the definition of the SOEs has been reflected in 
different jurisdictions and context, such as the free trade agreements and working 
reports. The analysis of those sources provides a preliminary evaluation of the SOEs in 
the context of the “public body” issue. 
 
As will be discussed in the following sections, there are two common features of the 
SOE definition: the state control through the ownership and appointment of a 
management body. Two points in this situation are worth of notice. Although, according 
to the WTO tribunal, ‘the control of an entity by a government, in itself, is not sufficient 
to establish that an entity is a public body’,345 it does not indicate such control cannot 
be evidence with further elements. The tribunal further mentioned that ‘a government 
exercises meaningful control’ might be an embodiment of governmental authority, 
especially when ‘formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there is 
evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way’.346 Therefore, state 
 
345 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 318. 
346 See ibid. 
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control is still potentially a standard for a “public body”, albeit the WTO tribunal did 
not explain how to demonstrate the state control to be “meaningful”.  
 
Second, compared with the blurry expression of the state control, the objective of the 
SOE may of help to identify a “public body”. For example, the third objective of the 
SOEs recorded in the EU working paper indicates the purpose of the SOE is to conduct 
a governmental function as a long-term practice, which corresponds to the second 
scenario of the “governmental authority approach” that ‘entity is exercising 
governmental functions may serve as evidence, particularly where such evidence points 
to a sustained and systematic practice’.347 In this sense, the objective of the SOE can 
clarify the link between the government and entity, which provides references when 
identifying a “public body”. 
 
4.5.1.1 The SOEs and selected free-trade agreements (FTAs)  
 
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
has a separate chapter defining and regulating SOEs. Pursuant to Article 17.1 of the 
agreement, SOE refers to an enterprise that is principally engaged in commercial 
activities in which a Party: 
 
(a) directly owns more than 50 per cent of the share capital; 
(b) controls, through ownership interests, the exercise of more than 50 per cent of 
the voting rights; or 
(c) holds the power to appoint a majority of members of the board of directors or 
any other equivalent management body. 
 
Under the CPTPP, the SOEs can be defined either by ownership or influence on 
appointment of management body. As analysed in Section 4.3.2, ownership is the most 
direct way to identify an SOE by the CPTPP. This leaves a problem as whether 
 
347 European Commission and Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, ‘State-Owned Enterprises 
in the EU: Lessons Learnt and Ways Forward in a Post-Crisis Context.’ 
<http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:KCBC16031:EN:HTML> accessed 10 July 2020. 
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“ownership” qualifies to demonstrate state control over an SOE. In the Korea - 
Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels Case, the primary evidence to 
demonstrate the control of government is state ownership.348 For example, KEIM, a 
SOCB of Korea, is 100 per cent owned by GOK or other bodies in Korea, which is 
considered under the control of GOK. One presumption about the purpose of state 
ownership is to obtain the management or control of the entity on behalf of the state. 
However, SOEs, where the state has major ownership, can still reflect features of a 
private firm through “private control”, for example, by employing market-oriented 
managers to operate the business in a private way.349 Therefore, the SOEs are not 
necessarily “state-owned and state-controlled”, they can also be “state-owned and 
private-controlled”. In this regard, an SOE is following market forces and state is one 
shareholder of it. As analysed by the Appellate Body, in the United States - Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, ‘mere 
fact that a government is the majority shareholder of an entity does not demonstrate that 
the government exercise meaningful control over the conduct of that entity’.350  
 
The appointment of a management body is one evidence of state control in the Korea - 
Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels Case.351 In this Case, government of 
Korea has the right to appoint the president of KEIM, which is regarded as an evidence 
that KEIM is under state control and thus a “public body”.352  This conclusion is 
rebutted by the Appellate Body, in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, that ‘the control of an 
 
348 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
349 The blurry boundaries, especially in the case of ownership boundaries, between private firm and SOE has been 
compared and analyzed by Mike W Peng and others. One of their views is that the ownership boundaries are not 
fixed, for example, “SOEs can be privatized and private firms can be nationalized to become SOEs”. For SOEs 
where state has major ownership can still reflect private firm characteristic through “private control”, such as 
employing market-oriented managers to operate business in a private way. Therefore, SOEs are not necessarily 
“state-owned and state-controlled”, but could also be “state-owned and private-controlled”. See Mike W Peng and 
others, ‘Theories of the (State-Owned) Firm’ (2016) 33 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 293. 
350 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 541. 
351 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
352 See ibid. 
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entity by a government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public 
body’.353 The WTO tribunal further complemented that state “meaningful” control with 
evidential elements might demonstrate a “public body”.  
 
However, the WTO tribunal did not explain how to demonstrate state control to be 
“meaningful”. Thus, it is not clear whether appointing ‘a majority of members of the 
board of directors’ equates with state “meaningful” control. In other words, although 
the appointment of directors provides the government with the power to control the 
entity, it is still not qualified as solid evidence of governmental authority. It thus could 
not confirm that definition of a SOE, especially subparagraph (c), will lead a SOE 
directly belong to a “public body”. 
 
The US-Australia FTA and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) share 
similar definitions of an SOE, they briefly define “state enterprise” as “an enterprise 
owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by any level of government of a 
Party”. 354  The USA-Singapore FTA provides a more detailed definition based on 
Singapore’s situation. It generally defines an SOE as a “government enterprise” where 
‘an enterprise owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by that Party’. 355 
However, the judgement of enterprises owned by Singapore relies on “effective 
influence”. The agreement explains “effective influence” as the state “owns more than 
50 per cent of the voting rights of entity” or exercises substantial influence over the 
board of directors or managing body of an entity.356  
 
The US-Australia FTA, NAFTA and USA-Singapore FTA expressly indicated state 
control through ownership when defining a SOE, which is distinguished with that in 
CPTPP. Nonetheless, such definition is differentiated with “public body” relying on 
 
353 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
354 See Free Trade Agreement Australia 2005 (USA-Australia FTA), Art. 14.12(9). NAFTA, Art. 1505.  
355 See Free Trade Agreement Singapore 2004 (USA- Singapore FTA), Art. 12.8 (6). 
356 See ibid. Art. 12.8 (5). 
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WTO tribunal’s analysis that ‘the control of an entity by a government, in itself, is not 
sufficient to establish that an entity is a public body’.357 However, it still should be 
noticed that state “meaningful” control with evidential elements might demonstrate a 
“public body”, albeit the WTO tribunal did not explain how to demonstrate state control 
to be “meaningful”. 
 
4.5.1.2 The SOEs and the EU 
 
The European Commission to the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament published a report in 2016, aiming to analyse recent development of SOEs 
in the EU and identify best practices with reform efforts.358 Comparing with definitions 
in FTAs, this EC report conducts a discussion on role and objective as well as a 
classification of SOEs.  
 
Based on the fact that there is no common definition of an SOE, the report refers to a 
definition of “public non-financial corporations” in ESA 2010 (European System of 
Accounts) 359  as ‘non-financial corporations, quasi-corporations and non-profit 
institutions, recognized as independent legal entities, that are market producers and are 
subject to control by government units’.360 According to the above expression, an SOE 
is defined as a corporation where the state exercises control, ‘regardless of the size of 
ownership’.361 The report then classifies SOE into four categories: ‘companies fully 
owned by public authorities’; ‘companies where public authorities have a majority 
share’; ‘companies where public authorities retain a minority share but have special 
statutory powers’; ‘companies where public authorities have a minority share and no 
special powers, these are generally not considered as SOEs however they may be of 
 
357 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
358 European Commission and Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (n 341). 
359 Statistical Office of the European Communities and European Commission (eds), European System of Accounts: 
ESA 2010 (Publications Office of the European Union 2013). 
360 European Commission and Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (n 341). 
361 See ibid. 
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relevance in order to obtain a fuller picture of governments’ stake in the economy’.362  
 
One point reflected in this report is that “ownership” may not be a requisite element to 
define SOEs, but rather “control by government units”. Noticeably, reinforcing the 
influence of control may blur the boundary between SOE and “public body”. Since 
meaningful control by government is one of the clear standards that determine whether 
an entity belongs to “public body”, solely relying on state control to define SOE may 
conflate definitions of SOE and “public body”.  
 
In addition, the report also addresses the role and objectives of SOEs in socio-economic, 
political, and historical perspectives. The report provides three objectives of SOEs, first, 
SOEs tackle the dilemma where there is only one supplier (natural monopoly) or 
competition is imperfect. Second, SOEs carry out ‘nationally strategic but risky or long-
term investments where private sector investors were not available’. The third situation 
calls for SOEs to benefit other industries or pursue social objectives. The third objective, 
according to the report, can be explained as government - operated SOEs exploiting the 
externalities of SOEs to conduct a governmental function. For example, providing 
subsidized or non-profit services to particularly vulnerable consumers or remote areas 
as a minimum level of access to services which are considered as essential and basic 
goods; saving private companies from bankruptcy or taking advantage of the flexibility 
offered by company law through forming companies via administrative units of the 
state.  
 
As the Appellate Body defined “public body” as an entity that ‘possesses, exercises or 
is vested with governmental authority’,363 thus an SOE with both commercial and non-
commercial objectives could potentially be identified as a “public body”. The first and 
second objectives of SOEs embody the salient feature of conducting business which 
 
362 See ibid. 
363 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
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does not originally satisfy “public body” conditions. However, the third objective 
indicates that the purpose of SOE is to conduct a governmental function. And as an 
objective, it is not difficult to understand that such a programme refers to a long-term 
practice. As analysed by the Appellate Body, an entity exercising governmental 
functions may be considered a “public body”, especially when such practice is 
sustainable and systematic.364 Accordingly, an SOE serving the third objective is tend 
to be a “public body”. 
 
Notably, compared with the blurry expression of state control, the regulation of 
objectives may be a more efficient way to identify the features of an SOE. It clarifies 
the link between government and the entity, which provides references when 
identifying “public body”. 
 
4.5.1.3 The SOEs and the OECD 
 
The OECD published guidelines on the corporate governance of state-owned 
enterprises in 2015 (the Guidelines), they are recommendations for governments to 
ensure SOEs operate efficiently, transparently and in an accountable manner.365  
 
The Guidelines’ purposes are to ensure that SOEs share the same aims of private 
enterprise, despite the government being the owner. Specifically, they guarantee that 
SOEs operate as good practice private enterprises, and ensure they can compete on a 
level playing field.366 In this sense, there is no difference between an SOE and a private 




364 See ibid. 
365  OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2015 Edition’ 11 
<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-guidelines-on-corporate-governance-of-state-owned-enterprises-
2015_9789264244160-en> accessed 10 July 2020. 
366 See ibid. 
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The Guidelines define an SOE as ‘any corporate entity recognized by national law as 
an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership’.367 It further addresses that 
the definition applies to enterprises under the control of the state and explains “control” 
as the state being the ‘ultimate beneficiary owner of the majority of voting shares’ or 
otherwise exercising an “equivalent degree of control”. 368 The first explanation of 
“control” describes the state as a shareholder of an SOE exercising shareholder rights, 
which recognizes an SOE as a general enterprise without governmental interference. 
Noticeably, the Guidelines then provide an example of “equivalent degree of control”, 
whereby ‘legal stipulations or corporate articles of association ensure continued state 
control over an enterprise or its board of directors in which it holds a minority stake’.369 
As a ‘legal instrument expressly vests authority in the entity’ is interpreted as a 
condition to be a public body,370 above description is to large extent corresponds to 
“public body”.  
 
4.5.1.4 The SOEs and the World Bank Group 
 
On 20 December 2018, the World Bank Group (WBG) published an Approach Paper 
supporting the reform of state-owned enterprises. Regarding the definition of SOE, the 
paper used two types of SOEs: either the ‘government has significant control through 
full, majority, or substantial minority ownership’,371 or the three criteria offered by 
Raballand et al. As analysed by Raballand et al., an SOE is characterized by: ‘(1) control 
by the state; (2) legal and financial autonomy from the state (characterized by a legal 
personality, specific rules of operation defined under a legal regime, and budge 
autonomy); and (3) participation in the productive sector’.372 
 
367 See ibid at page 14. 
368 See ibid. 
369 See ibid. 
370 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
371 World Bank Group, ‘Approach Paper World Bank Group Support for the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, 
2007-2018: An IEG Evaluation’ 3 <http://ieg.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_soereform.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2020. 
372 See ibid. 
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As a common feature of SOEs, state control is no doubt indicated in WBG’s report as 
a core criterion to identify an SOE, either by its own identification or through Raballand 
et al.’s analysis. Besides, the second characteristic emphasizes that an SOE has ‘legal 
and financial autonomy from the state’. However, the second characteristic also adds 
that there are ‘specific rules of operation defined under a legal regime’, which may 
leave space for state intervention. And this may, to some extent, correspond to the 
Appellate Body’s interpretation that a ‘legal instrument expressly vests authority in the 
entity’.373  
 
4.5.1.5 Conclusion  
 
State control through ownership and appointment of a management body are common 
features of SOE’s definition. Although, according to the WTO tribunal, ‘the control of 
an entity by a government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public 
body’,374 it does not indicate such control cannot be an evidence with further elements. 
The tribunal further mentioned that ‘government exercises meaningful control’ might 
be an embodiment of governmental authority, especially when ‘formal indicia of 
government control are manifold, and there is evidence that such control has been 
exercised in a meaningful way’.375 Therefore, state control is still potentially a standard 
for a “public body”, albeit the WTO tribunal did not explain how to demonstrate state 
control to be “meaningful”.  
 
Second, compared with the blurry expression of state control, the objectives of an SOE 
may of help to identify a “public body”. For example, the third objective of an SOE 
recorded in the EU working paper indicates that the purpose of an SOE is to conduct a 
governmental function in long-term practice, which corresponds to the second scenario 
 
373 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at paras 310 and 321. 
374 See ibid, at para 318. 
375 See ibid. 
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of “governmental authority approach” that ‘entity is exercising governmental functions 
may serve as evidence, particularly where such evidence points to a sustained and 
systematic practice’. 376  It clarifies the link between government and entity, which 
provides references when identifying “public body”. 
 
4.5.2 The SOEs in China as reflected in regulations and reform 
 
State intervention or state control over SOEs in China is more consolidated compared 
with common features of SOEs. However, China’s ultimate control over SOEs is not 
simply emblematic of meaningful control or “governmental authority”. Although the 
SOEs are controlled by the state or state agency, such as SASAC (State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), market forces still 
prevail among the SOEs. In other words, the state intervention and the entity’s 
behaviour under market forces coexist in an SOE, which lead to controversary in 
subsidy determination. The analysis based on the national law and reform of SOEs 
reflected state’s attitude to reduce the state intervention and promote the SOEs as 
independent market players. 
 
4.5.2.1 The “public body” criteria relate to China: the state intervention and 
market forces 
 
As Jesse Kreier comments on the China’s anti-dumping investigations on US n-
propanal exporters and its non-market conditions existing in the US energy and 
petrochemical sector in July 2020: 
 
[T]he 145 alleged subsidies include many of the same programs investigated in the 
n-propanal AD case and alleged in the parallel AD investigation. Thus, the issue 
whether government interventions are properly addressed by AD, CVD or both, 
once again presents itself.377 
 
376 European Commission and Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (n 341). 
377 See Zhiguo Yu and Jesse Kreier, ‘China and Distortions - Bis’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/08/china-and-distortions-bis.html> accessed 20 August 2020. 
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The state intervention is an important factor in trade remedy investigations. It is also 
appeared in Section 4.4 of this research as a factor for the “public body” identification 
and addressed by the WTO tribunal. In the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case378 and United States - 
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China Case379, the Appellate 
Body suggested to analyse determination of “public body” by a “case-by-case approach” 
in the countervailing investigation, nonetheless it also pointed out that the state 
intervention as well as ‘the scope and content of government policies relating to the 
sector in which the investigated entity operates’, can also be regarded as evidence of 
“public body” determination.380  
 
The state intervention is also a significant concern for China’s exporters in trade remedy 
investigations. As highlighted by Mark Wu, China’s economic structure is featured by 
a mixture of state intervention and market forces, it is state-dominated with market 
forces working domestically where ‘private enterprises drive much of China’s dynamic 
growth’, which brings challenges to the subsidy determination.381 As analysed by Wu, 
China’s “uniqueness” is reflected in six aspects. First, SASAC, as a government agency, 
has centralised control over SOEs (state-owned enterprises), which is differentiated 
with government control fragmented among various ministries or agencies. Second, 
Central Huijin, another government agency, is the largest shareholder of the biggest 
four commercial banks of China, which demonstrates the state’s influence over 
financial institutions. Third, the NDRC, as an economic coordination agency, has a 
broader range of powers to implement economic development plans. Fourth, the 
 
378 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
379 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
380 See ibid. 
381 See Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law 
Journal 261, 264. Jorge Miranda, ‘How China Did not Transform into a Market Economy’ in James J Nedumpara 
and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China 
(Springer Singapore 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. Jochem De 
Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations against Imports from China’ (2016) 19 Journal of International 
Economic Law 515. 
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‘Chinese economy [comprises] nested corporate group structures’ within which 
‘control mechanisms [are] put in place by the state to temper its undesired effects’. Fifth, 
the CPC is actively involved running Chinese economy, but its role is distinguished 
from the state. Sixth, although the Party-state may possess centralised mechanisms of 
formal control, it allows firms in most sectors to be subject to market forces, which 
plays a key role in driving growth. 
 
Indicated by above “uniqueness”, state intervention or state control over SOEs in China 
is consolidated compared with common features of SOEs. However, China’s ultimate 
control over SOE is not simply emblematic of meaningful control or “governmental 
authority” as described in Section 4.4 of this research or by the Appellate Body in the 
United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China Case. If simply relying on China’s control over an SOE can 
determine a “public body”, then there won’t be controversary on the subsidy 
determination in the United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China Case.382 What makes the issue complicated is 
the state ‘allows market forces to play out in huge swaths of the economy’.383 Although 
SOEs are controlled by state or state agency, such as SASAC (State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), market forces still 
prevail among the SOEs. For example, SASAC controls more than half of Chinese 
companies on the Fortune Global 500 list of the world’s largest corporations, it still 
ensures its SOEs ‘fight with each other for market share’ and ‘subject to market forces 
and stay competitive’.384  
 
Relying on market forces’ advantage in resource allocation, China has achieved rapid 
economic growth since 1978.385 The state’s willingness to apply market forces and the 
 
382 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
383 See ibid. 
384 See Wu (n 374) 271. 
385 See ibid. 
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achievement of economic growth has attracted many Chinese entrepreneurs seeking to 
forge links with the state. And this, in return, improved the state control over the entity. 
For example, ‘when Alibaba bought back shares from foreign investors, it then sold the 
shared to the China Development Bank’s private investment arm and two investment 
funds run by princelings, and as a payback, Alibaba could embark on a new business in 
the financial sector’.386  
 
Therefore, the analysis of following sections focuses on Chinese regulations and 
documentary guidelines pertinent to the state intervention. It assesses the relationship 
between the state and the SOEs with reference to the factors for “public body” 
identification concluded in Section 4.4 and the WTO case law. 
 
4.5.2.2 Investor role and less state intervention in national law 
 
One national law that reflects the relationship between the state and the SOEs is the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises 
(hereafter SOAE law).387 Article 2 of the SOAE law defines the features and role of the 
state in an SOE, accordingly, ‘the term “state-owned assets of enterprises” (henceforth 
“state-owned assets”) as mentioned in this Law refers to the rights and interests formed 
by the various forms of investment of the state in enterprises’. In such an SOE, the 
government plays a role as an investor, it has rights and interests based on its investment 
in the enterprise. Such an expression is distinguished with definitions that the state is 
exercising control by ownership or appointment of the board of directors.  
 
Article 6 of the SOAE law points out three principles concerning state interference in 
an enterprise’s autonomy. The first principle is the ‘separation of government bodies 
 
386 See ibid. 
387  The law is published by the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.moj.gov.cn/Department/content/2009-01/20/592_201254.html accessed 26 March 2020. See English 
version translated by lawinfochina.com, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=7195&lib=law accessed 26 March 
2020. 
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and enterprises’. The principle literally rejects the view that an SOE is a branch of 
government. The second principle is ‘separation of the administrative functions of 
public affairs and the functions of the state-owned assets contributor’. This principle 
further “isolates” behaviours with governmental features, such as ‘administrative 
functions of public affairs’, from normal business activity. The third principle is ‘non-
intervention in the legitimate and independent business operations of enterprises’. This 
principle ensures the entity has autonomy and is independently governing itself 
regarding business operations. The principles not only define the autonomy of an SOE, 
but also allow the enterprise subject to market forces without state intervention. 
 
Besides, Article 6, on the other hand, defines behaviours with governmental 
characteristics, which helps to interpret a “public body”. According to the first principle, 
a governmental entity is potentially an enterprise combined with a governmental body. 
Based on the second principle, such an entity may possess administrative functions of 
public affairs. Relying on the third principle, in a governmental entity, the government 
may have influence on the legitimate and independent business operations of the 
enterprise. Conclusively, these three features are potential manifestations of 
governmental interference, which may serve as references for “public body” 
identification. 
 
Moreover, Article 7 reflects the government’s responsibility relating to the SOEs. 
Pursuant to Article 7, the state shall: 
 
…take measures to promote the centralization of state-owned capital to important 
industries and key fields that have a bearing on the national economic lifeline and 
state security, optimize the layout and structure of the state-owned economy, 
promote the reform and development of state-owned enterprises, improve the 
overall quality of the state-owned economy, and strengthen the control force and 
influence of the state-owned economy.388 
 
 
388 See Article 7 of SOAE law 
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Article 7 clearly highlights the government’s responsibility in protecting the national 
economic lifeline and state security through scientifically allocating state resources as 
well as improving the overall quality of state-owned assets. Notably, the article points 
out the methods that fulfil the government’s responsibility, ‘allocating state resources 
as well as improving the overall quality of state-owned assets’. The expression of these 
methods, such as “allocating state resources”, again emphasizes the state’s role in SOEs 
as an investor. In other words, the state is obliged to protect the national economic 
lifeline and state security though scientific investment.   
 
However, it is notable that the second half of Article 7 mentions ‘strengthen the control 
force and influence of the state-owned economy’, which may correspond to 
‘meaningful control of government over an SOE’ as a common feature of “public body”. 
Though there is no legal explanation of this expression, “control” in Article 7 may have 
different meanings under the context of SOAE law. As stipulated in Article 2, the 
government/ state is an investor in SOEs, so ‘strengthen the control force’ can be 
interpreted as a method to maximize the benefit to the investor. For example, with the 
same amount of investment, the SOE makes more profit through reform and 
development, which makes the government’s investment appreciate. And as a result, 
the government is, in fact, in “control” of more capital compared with its original 
investment.389 
 
Conclusively, interpreting the role of state as an investor with less state intervention 
may eliminate the dilemma that both the SOE and “public body” share similar features 
of state control. It distinguishes the government’s legal rights as an investor from 
governmental interference, thus preventing an SOE’s behaviour from being regarded as 
governmental behaviour. It suggests that an SOE under the SOAE law is not originally 
a “public body”. However, shareholder right itself may also only prove the state has 
right based on its investment, assessment on implementation of the right may rely on 
 
389 This is one interpretation of “control”, and more economic analysis might be possible here. However, this is not 




4.5.2.3 Attempts to have independent market players in the reform of SOEs 
 
The reform of SOEs reflects an attempt to promote SOEs as independent market players 
through less state intervention. The Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises (henceforth 
Guiding Opinions) stipulated requirement that relate to the current round of reform of 
SOEs.390  
 
One element of the current reform is corporate governance, the regulation of corporate 
governance reform set key goals for legal person management and corporate 
modernisation of SOEs. 391 And one major concern of corporate governance is the 
involvement of state intervention in business decision making. 392  Two regulations 
highlight the Party’s leadership over SOEs. Paragraph 4 of Section 2 in Article 1 of the 
Guiding Opinions has the title ‘the Party’s leadership over SOEs shall be upheld’. 
Section 5 in Article 2 of the corporate governance regulations also stipulates 
maintenance of the Party’s leadership. In practice, as Lin observed: ‘in 53 central 
enterprises, the occupants of top positions, including the board chairman, CEOs, and 
party secretaries, are appointed and evaluated by the Central Organization Department 
of the Chinese Communist Party’. 393  Therefore, under the current reform, 
commentators worries about the role of the Party are exacerbated, and the commercial 
 
390 The Guidelines are published on the official website of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm accessed 26 March 2020. See English version 
translated by lawinfochina.com, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=26c39a43ea095fcebdfb&lib=law# accessed 
26 March 2020. The reform of SOEs has several rounds which can be classified by different periods. For more on 
previous reform see Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao and Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired 
Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977. 
391  Guiding Opinions on Further Improving the Corporate Governance Structure of State-owned Enterprises 
(promulgated by Gen. Off. of the St. Council (Guo Ban Fa [2017] No. 36), 24 April 2017, effective 24 April 2017) 
are regulations that promotes the reform of corporate governance reform and under the spirit of Guiding Opinions 
of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises. 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-05/03/content_5190599.htm accessed 1 April 2020. 
392 Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao and Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired Reform of State-
Owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977, 984. 
393 Lin (n 60) 584. 
 149 
decisions of SOEs will be affected by the Party.394  
 
Guiding Opinions, on other hand, highlight that SOEs as independent market players 
through less state intervention. The expression “independent market player” appears in 
the second principle of Guiding Opinions, where the ‘the direction of socialist market 
economic reform shall be adhered to’. The following paragraph explains “the direction 
of socialist market” as:   
 
… follow the rules and laws of a market economy and enterprise development, 
make unwavering efforts to separate government from business, government from 
capital, and ownership from the right to business operations, uphold the unity of 
rights, obligations and responsibilities, and always combine incentive mechanisms 
and restraint mechanisms so as to promote SOEs to become independent market 
players in the true sense where they engage in autonomous operations, make profits 
and assume losses independently, bear risks on their own, practice self-discipline 
and pursue self-development pursuant to the law. SOEs under the socialist market 
economy shall be role models for conscientiously performing social 
responsibilities.395 
 
Accordingly, an SOE is encouraged to be an independent market player by separation 
between government and the entity. ‘Separate government from business’ and even 
further separation of ‘ownership from the right to business operations’ indicate the state 
does not aim to take over the business management of the SOE. It rather takes advantage 
of the enterprise’s flexibility to market, and eliminates the risk of potential 
countervailing measures as a result of administrative control.396 Under such regulation, 
if properly practised, SOEs in China are assured of an independent legal personality 
whereby they ‘engage in autonomous operations, make profits and assume losses 
independently, bear risks on their own, practice self-discipline and pursue self-
development pursuant to the law’.  
 
 
394 Zhou, Gao and Bai (n 388) 985. 
395 See Part (2) Basic principles of Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on 
Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises. 
396 Che Luyao, ‘Legal Implications of the Deepened Reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises: What Can Be 
Expected from Recent Reforms?’ (2016) 8 Tsinghua China Law Review 171, 175. 
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An SOE’s role as an independent market player is also stipulated in the objectives listed 
in Guiding Opinions. It addresses that, by 2020, the reform shall form a ‘state-owned 
asset management system, a modern enterprise system and a market-oriented business 
operation mechanism that are more in line with China's basic economic system and the 
requirements for the development of the socialist market economy’.397 In particular, the 
‘market-oriented business operation mechanism’ indicates that the operation of an SOE 
shall be based more on market principles, rather than administrative command by the 
state. Moreover, the objectives clearly describe the reform as a “corporate-style reform 
of SOEs” whereby SOEs can engage in “autonomous and flexible business operations” 
without administrative concern. This, again, emphasizes enterprises’ right to handle 
their own affairs. 
 
4.5.3 SOEs in China under the assessment of “public body” criteria 
 
The regulation and reform of SOE in China are not guaranteed those entities are clearly 
distinguished from the “public bodies”. The separation of state intervention stipulated 
in the SOAE law is an appropriate starting point for state and SOEs to pursue. However, 
despite Guiding Opinions have specific regulations reducing state intervention and 
pursuing for independent market players, it still needs feedback in practice and evidence 
in the future. 
 
Recalling the criteria for “public body” identification in Section 4.4, “public body” 
refers to an entity that exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental 
authority that the Party/State has directed or delegated to such entity.  
 
Footnote 1: Examples of ‘exercising any regulatory, administrative or other 
governmental authority’ include: the power to expropriate, grant licenses, approve 
commercial transactions, or impose quotas, fees, or other charges. 
 
397 See Part (3) Main objectives of Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on 
Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises. 
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Footnote 2: The determination of a “public body” shall focus on ‘whether the entity 
itself possesses the core characteristics and functions’ that constitutes a “public body”, 
and follow the principle to ‘avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single 
characteristic without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant’. In 
this regard, state intervention, as well as the scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates can serve as evidence of 
“public body” determination. 
 
Footnote 3: Approaches to demonstrate “public body” may include, but not be 
exhausted by: 
 
(d) A state or other legal instrument expressly vests authority in the entity 
concerned; 
(e) An entity exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence, particularly 
where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice; 
(f) A government exercises meaningful control over an entity in certain 
circumstances; (Formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there 
is evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way.) 
 
The criteria contain one description with three explanatory references. The description 
defines a “public body” and highlights it is exercising governmental authority that is 
vested by the government. Footnote 1 provides specific examples to identify a 
behaviour with “governmental authority”. Footnote 2 suggested principles when 
identifying a “public body”. And footnote 3 complements general approaches to 
determine a “public body”. 
 
As analysed in Section 4.5.1, state control and state ownership are common features of 
SOEs definition in various reports and regulations. Although WTO tribunals hold that 
‘the control of an entity by a government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an 
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entity is a public body’,398 it does not indicate such control cannot be evidence of 
governmental authority along with further reasons. Rather, ‘government exercises 
meaningful control’ might be an embodiment of governmental authority, especially 
when ‘formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there is evidence that 
such control has been exercised in a meaningful way’.399 State ownership has the same 
issue as state control. Despite not being a decisive criterion for “public body” 
identification, it may serve such a purpose in conjunction with other elements.400  
 
State intervention or state control over SOEs in China is more consolidated compared 
with common features of SOEs. One example is that SASAC, as a government agency, 
has a centralised control among SOEs (state-owned enterprises), which is differentiated 
with government control fragmented among various ministries or agencies. Another 
controversial example is the Party’s leadership role in corporate governance as 
stipulated in the SOAE law. Although the dominate political party is synonymous with 
the state in many state capitalist, as analysed by Wu, Party in China functions 
independent from the state. 401  Therefore, the Party’s position is ambiguous when 
identifying a “public body”, albeit, in practice, the Party may have a large influence on 
the occupants of top positions, including the board chairman.402  
 
What is more, the government’s responsibility relating to the SOEs, as stipulated in 
Article 7 of the SOAE law, emphasizes that the state shall ‘strengthen the control force 
and influence of the state-owned economy’. Despite, there are no specific provisions 
explaining the method to strengthen such control, state control or intervention over the 
 
398 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 318. 
399 See ibid. 
400 According to the Appellate Body, “state ownership, while not being a decisive criterion, may serve as evidence 
indicating, in conjunction with other elements, the delegation of governmental authority”. And the “governmental 
authority” is the core element to decide whether an entity belongs to public body. See Appellate Body Report, United 
States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, 
adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 310. 
401 Wu (n 374) 280. 
402 See Li-Wen Lin, ‘A Network Anatomy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 
583. See also Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao and Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired Reform 
of State-Owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977. 
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SOE is enlarged compared with common features of SOE. As recorded in Footnote 2, 
such state intervention may contribute to the determination of a “public body”. 
 
One important role of the state, as stipulated in Article 2 of the SOAE law is that an 
investor in an SOE has rights and interests based on its investment in the enterprise. 
This indicates the government has the right to participate in the enterprise’s decision 
making conferred by its investment. And one issue here is whether the state’s 
shareholder right can justify the state’s behaviour as a normal activity rather than 
“governmental authority”. Che contends that exercising shareholder rights is 
distinguished by the implementation of administrative measures, as Guiding Opinions 
ensure the state’s status as a “contributor of shares of SOEs”.403 However, shareholder 
right itself may only prove the state has right based on its investment, assessment on 
implementation of the right may rely on further practice. It could not originally be 
concluded as a ‘shift in the paradigm of the state-to-market relationship’.404 As analysed 
by Lin, the state actively exercise its rights in ‘executive appointment and evaluation 
rights’, and ‘has been reluctant in exercising its financial rights’, so ‘the ways the state-
owner exercise its shareholder rights suggest that the goal of the state-owner is to 
balance the interests of multiple groups and organs (and their ruling elite) embedded in 
the network, instead of maximization of shareholder wealth at individual firms’.405 
Therefore, it is not the shareholder right itself, but the behaviour of how state conduct 
its shareholder role that relates to the determination of a “public body”. In this regard, 
the shareholder role could not distinguish the state behaviour with “governmental 
authority”. 
 
Nonetheless, the SOAE law and Guiding Opinions reflect the state’s attitude on state 
intervention over the SOEs. The SOAE law clearly points out three principles 
regulating government intervention outside the enterprise’s autonomy. Based on the 
 
403 Luyao (n 392) 179. 
404 See ibid. 
405 See in (n 398) 589. 
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principles of “separation of government bodies and enterprises”, “separation of the 
administrative functions of public affairs and the functions of the state-owned assets 
contributor”, and “non-intervention in the legitimate and independent business 
operations of enterprises”, the SOAE law distinguishes government interference from 
an investor in business operations.406 Besides, the expression “strengthen the control 
force” in Article 7 could have an alternative interpretation, i.e. maximizing the benefit 
to the investor. For example, with the same amount of investment, the SOE makes more 
profit through reform and development, which makes the government’s investment 
appreciate. And as a result, the government does, in fact, “control” more capital 
compared with its original investment. And such “control” is differentiated from the 
“control” of exercising “governmental authority”. 
 
Pursuant to the Guiding Opinions, an independent market player is addressed and 
distinguished from government intervention. The Guiding Opinions clearly ‘separate 
government from business’ and further separate ‘ownership from the right to business 
operations’, which ensured SOEs in China have an independent legal personality 
whereby they ‘engage in autonomous operations, make profits and assume losses 
independently, bear risks on their own, practice self-discipline and pursue self-
development pursuant to the law’. A similar stipulation also corresponds to the 
objectives listed by Guiding Opinions, where there is ‘market-oriented business 
operation mechanism that are more in line with China's basic economic system’.407 In 
particular, the “market-oriented business operation mechanism” indicates that the 
operation of an SOE shall be based on market principles rather than the administrative 
command of the state.408  
 
Moreover, the Guiding Opinions divide SOEs into two categories, the commercial 
SOEs and SOEs in public welfare nature, which have both governmental and private 
 
406 See Article 6 of SOAE law.  
407 See Part (3) Main objectives of Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on 
Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises. 
408 See ibid. 
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features. According to Guiding Opinions, commercial SOEs shall engage in 
‘commercial operations in accordance with market requirements, and independently 
carry out production and business activities pursuant to the law primarily for the 
purposes of enhancing the vitality of the state-owned economic sector, amplifying the 
functions of state-owned capital, and preserving and increasing the value of state-
owned assets, so as to achieve the survival of the fittest and orderly market entry and 
exit’.409 Though commercial SOEs are defined as conducting independent production 
and business activities, they may potentially interweave with state behaviour. The 
Guiding Opinions further classify commercial SOEs as those ‘whose business belongs 
to industries and fields of sufficient competition’ and ‘whose core business belongs to 
major industries and key fields concerning national security or the national economic 
lifeline, or that are mainly responsible for major special project tasks’.410 For the first 
kind, the assessment of SOEs is based on business performance indicators or market 
competitiveness.411 However, for the second kind, the evaluation shall not only consider 
their business performance, but also aspects such as their ‘efforts to serve national 
strategies, safeguard national security and the operation of the national economy, 
develop cutting-edge strategic industries and complete special tasks’.412 The evaluation 
standards indicate that the second kind of commercial SOE may serve national 
strategies by playing a role as government organ, and such behaviour may corresponds 
to features of “public body” in exercising a governmental function.  
 
The SOEs in public welfare nature are considered to have authority designated by the 
Guiding Opinions to protect people’s livelihood, serve the society at large and provide 
public goods and services.413 Nonetheless, ‘cost control, product and service quality, 
operating efficiency and support capabilities’ are emphasised for evaluating their 
performance, while ‘their business performance indicators and the preservation and 
 
409 See Part (4) of Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Reform 
of State-owned Enterprises. 
410 See ibid. 
411 See ibid. 
412 See ibid. 
413 See Zhou, Gao and Bai (n 388) 1019; Luyao (n 392) 184. 
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appreciation of the value of their State-owned assets shall be assessed in a differentiated 
manner according to the different characteristics of such enterprises’. These evaluating 
factors are private and commercial features, and there is a pursue for a market-oriented 
transform. Therefore, it is arguable, in some senses, whether the classification of SOEs 
and the guidance of a market-oriented assessment system as stipulated belong to a 
designation of governmental authority, thus corresponding to a “public body”. 
 
Conclusively, the regulation and reform of SOEs in China are not guaranteed those 
entities are clearly distinguished from the “public bodies”. The separation of state 
intervention stipulated in SOAE law is an appropriate starting point for state and SOEs 
to pursue. However, despite the Guiding Opinions have specific regulations reducing 
state intervention and pursuing for independent market players, it still needs feedback 
in practice and evidence in the future. 
 
4.5.4 A case study of the Chinese central SOEs (Yang Qi) 
 
Yang Qi is potentially a “public body” when serving specific responsibility, for example, 
stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant industries through strictly following 
national macro-control measures. Accordingly, it may be impossible to identify the 
Yang Qi as a unified “public body” due to its diversified functions and responsibilities. 
 
4.5.4.1 The special relationship between the government and Yang Qi is reflected 
in three aspects 
 
Chinese central SOE, also called Yang Qi, represents a group of SOEs that have special 
relationship with the government of China. Although Yang Qi is not literally regulated 
in law, its special relationship with the government is reflected in three aspects. 
 
First, every Yang Qi is recorded in a “directory” being published by the State – owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). 
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The SASAC is an institution directly under the management of the State Council of 
China. 414  According to the Notice on the Institutional Establishment of the State 
Council (hereafter “the Notice”), SASAC is “an ad-hoc ministerial-level organization 
directly subordinated to the State Council”.415 On the official website of the SASAC, 
there is a column called “Directory” showing 96 Yang Qis that the SASAC has 
supervised. The feature of this structure is similar to a list of departments of the 
government, or divisions that performs particular function. Yang Qi in the “directory”, 
to some extent, may distinguish with SOEs that out of the range due to its special 
relationship with the SASAC.   
 
Second, the control of the SASAC over Yang Qi is embodied by the tasks or functions 
of the SASAC that stipulated in the Notice. The Notice contains six tasks regarding the 
SASAC which may affect the evaluation of the SOEs as follows:  
 
(a) Authorized by the State Council, in accordance with the Company Law of the 
People’s Republic of China and other administrative regulations, SASAC performs 
the investor’s responsibilities, supervises and manages the state-owned assets of 
enterprises under the supervision of the Central Government (excluding financial 
enterprises), and enhances the management of state-owned assets. 
 
(b) SASAC shoulders the responsibility of supervising the preservation and 
increment of the value of the state-owned assets of the supervised enterprises: 
establishes and improves the index system of the preservation and increment of the 
value of the state-owned assets, and works out the assessment criteria; supervises 
and administers the preservation and increment of the value of the state-owned 
assets of the supervised enterprises through statistics and auditing; and is 
responsible for the management work of wages and remuneration of the supervised 
enterprises and formulates policies regulating the income distribution of the top 
executives of the supervised enterprises and organizes implementation of the 
policies. 
 
(c) SASAC guides and pushes forward the reform and restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises, advances the establishment of modern enterprise system in SOEs, 
improves corporate governance, and propels strategic adjustment of the layout and 
structure of the state economy. 
 
414 See the official website of SASAC at http://en.sasac.gov.cn/aboutus.html . 
415 See the Notice on the Institutional Establishment of the State Council (No.11 [2008] of the State Council) on the 
official website of SASAC at http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2018/07/17/c_7.htm . 
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(d) SASAC appoints and removes the top executives of the supervised enterprises, 
and evaluates their performances through legal procedures and either grants 
rewards or inflicts punishments based on their performances; establishes a 
corporate executives selection system in accordance with the requirements of the 
socialist market economy system and modern enterprise system, and improves 
incentives and restraints systems for corporate management.  
 
(e) SASAC is responsible for organizing the supervised enterprises to turn the state-
owned capital gains over to the state, participates in formulating management 
system and methods of the state-owned capital operational budget, and is 
responsible for working out the state-owned capital operational budget and final 
account and their implementation in accordance with related regulations. 
 
(f) SASAC is responsible for urging the supervised enterprises to carry out the 
guiding principles, policies, related laws and regulations and standards for safety 
production and inspects the results in accordance with the responsibilities as 
investor.  
 
(g) SASAC is responsible for the fundamental management of the state-owned 
assets of enterprises, works out draft laws and regulations on the management of 
the state-owned assets, establishes related rules and regulations and directs and 
supervises the management work of local state-owned assets according to law. 
 
(h) SASAC undertakes other tasks assigned by the State Council.416 
 
Paragraph (a), (c), (e) and (g) focus on identifying the nature of SASAC as an investor 
of SOEs under the supervision of the Central Government. SASAC is obliged to 
supervise the preservation and increment of the value of the state-owned assets of the 
supervised enterprises, which reflects the investor’s responsibility. These paragraphs 
indicate the impact of SASAC on Yang Qi at a macro-level through i.e., establishing 
related rules and regulations. 
 
Comparatively, paragraph (b), (d) and (f) provide specific rules for SASAC to fulfil its 
supervisory responsibility in practise. Paragraph (b) enables SASAC to “formulate the 
income distribution of the top executives” of the SOEs. And according to paragraph (d), 
the SASAC can appoint and remove the top executives of the SOEs. It is also 
 
416 See ibid. 
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responsible for SASAC to urge “the supervised enterprises to carry out the guiding 
principles, policies, related laws and regulations and standards for safety production”, 
albeit the purpose of safety production is blurry.  
 
Paragraph (h) is an ambiguous article, it leaves space for the Central Government to 
assign tasks to the SASAC to perform the investors’ responsivities, which potentially 
including urging the SOEs to carry out governmental authority. 
 
Therefore, although the Notice mainly talks about the tasks of the SASAC, it also 
illustrates how does the SASAC influence the supervised enterprises from a macro-
level to specific power (such as the appointment of top executives).  
 
Another indicator of SASAC’s control over Yang Qi is manifested by Yang Qi’s own 
description. For example, according to the description of China National 
Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. (Sinopharm), it is “a large healthcare group directly 
under the SASAC”. 417  Sinochem Group, who’s predecessor as China National 
Chemicals Import and Export Corporation, announced that it is under the supervision 
of SASAC in its 2015 Annual Report.418 Such supervisory relationship is also appeared 
in China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd. (“CR” or “China Resources Group”) where it 
announced, “in 2003, under the direct supervision of SASAC”, and became “one of the 
key state-owned enterprises”. Recalling the Notice has regulated the SASAC’s tasks 
especially aiming at “the supervised enterprises”, those Yang Qi are more intended to 
connected with the government.  
 
4.5.4.2 The relationship between SASAC and Yang Qi belongs to evidentiary 
elements to determine a “public body” but not definition of it 
 
As addressed by the Appellate Body in the United States - Countervailing Duty 
 
417 See the official website of the Sinopharm at http://www.sinopharm.com/en/1398.html . 
418 See the official website of the Sinopharm at http://english.sinochem.com/1528.html . 
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Measures on Certain Products from China Case, it is crucial to distinguish the 
evidentiary elements for the “public body” determination and the definition of a “public 
body”. 419  Recalling the criteria for “public body” identification in Section 4.4, a 
“public body” is by definition an entity that exercises any regulatory, administrative or 
other governmental authority that the Party/State has directed or delegated to such entity. 
This definition is the core and the ultimate standard and decisive criterion to determine 
a “public body”. 
 
All three footnotes that described in Section 4.4 belong to elementary elements that 
contributes to the identification of a “public body”. That is to say, each element itself 
does not equal to the definition or the decisive factor to determine a “public body”. As 
the Appellate Body reiterated that, an investigating authority must ‘avoid focusing 
exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic without affording due consideration 
to others that may be relevant’420. For example, in the United States - Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China Case, “state ownership”, “use the 
entities resources as its own”, “nature of an entity’s conduct or practise” may serve, in 
conjunction with other elements, as evidence. 421  Otherwise, those factors are 
unnecessary if they cannot answer the “central question of whether the entity itself 
possesses the core characteristics and functions that would qualify it as a public 
body’.422 
 
This principle is crucial when conducting a “public body” investigation in the context 
of Yang Qi. First, Section 4.5.3 has provided an analysis of the state intervention in 
government policies and regulations relating to SOEs in China through evaluating the 
SOAE law and Guiding Opinions. Unless the law expressly vests authority in the entity 
that corresponds to the definition of “public body”, it serves as one elementary element 
for the “public body” determination. The conclusion of Section 4.5.3 also demonstrates 
 
419 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019, at para. 5.97. 
420 See ibid. 
421 See ibid, at paras. 5.97 and 5.101. 
422 See ibid. 
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that SOEs in China cannot be directly classified as “public bodies”. 
 
Second, the relationship between SASAC and Yang Qi also serve as the evidentiary 
elements for the “public body” determination. To begin with, the “directory” listing 96 
Yang Qi published by SASAC neither indicate Yang Qi is expressly granted with 
authority by a state, nor being a governmental subsidiary. This may only lead to a 
presumption that Yang Qi is, to some extent, distinguished with SOEs that out of the 
range. 
 
In addition, although paragraph (b), (d) and (f) of the Notice stipulate specific functions 
of SASAC, none of them correspond literally and directly to the definition of a “public 
body”. As stated by paragraph (b) and (d), appointing the top executives or formulating 
the income of the top executives do not necessarily define what a “public body” is. It 
rather belongs to an evidence of the state intervention as well as the state ownership, it 
is one expression that the state is conducting its shareholder role.  
 
Paragraph (f) may potentially correspond to the definition of a “public body” due to 
specific conditions. According to paragraph (f), SASAC is obliged to urge ‘the 
supervised enterprises to carry out the guiding principles, policies, related laws and 
regulations and standards for safety production’. As addressed by the Appellate Body 
in the United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China 
Case, ‘depending on the specific circumstances of each case, relevant evidence may 
include: … evidence regarding “the scope and content of government policies relating 
to the sector in which the investigated entity operates”’.423 Paragraph (f) only serve as 
evidentiary element when ‘the guiding principles, policies, related laws and regulations 
and standards’ belong to general and ambiguous government policies. However, the 
nature of the supervised Yang Qi when carrying out the related tasks or policies is the 
main question, because it may relate to the definition of a “public body”. For example, 
 
423 See ibid, at para. 5.96. 
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if Yang Qi exercised any one of the activities as concluded in Footnote 1 of criteria for 
“public body” identification in Section 4.4, i.e., grant licenses, then that Yang Qi is more 
intended to be a “public body” when granting licenses. In that sense, SASAC has 
directed or delegated the governmental authority to the Yang Qi when fulfilling its 
responsibility as stipulated in paragraph (f). 
 
Therefore, it is crucial to identify what tasks are assigned by the SASAC or the State 
Council based on paragraph (f) and (h), and determine whether does it belong to a 
delegation of governmental authority. And if not, whether there have solid evidentiary 
elements to determine that Yang Qi belongs to a “public body”. In this sense, the 
analysis of specific Yang Qi is requisite and will be discussed in the following Section. 
 
4.5.4.3 Yang Qi is potentially a “public body” when serving specific responsibility 
 
The analysis of the specific Yang Qi can be performed from two aspects due to the fact 
that their core business span over multiple areas and serve different responsibilities. 
From one aspect, Yang Qi have business and services that aims to increase the revenue 
and efficiency. Form another aspect, they also, to some extent, shoulder the political 
responsibilities safeguarding the national security. This can be illustrated by an example 
of the Sinochem Group as following.  
 
The Sinochem Group, who’s predecessor as China National Chemicals Import and 
Export Corporation, is one Yang Qi under the supervision of SASA. The 2015 Annual 
Report of the Sinochem (the latest version that can be accessed) embodies two 
responsibilities serving different purpose at a macro-level. One responsibility, as stated 
by the chapter of Management Report in the annal report, is embodied by missions such 
as becoming ‘a role model with “advanced technologies, energy conservation, 
environmental friendliness”’. 424  And Accordingly, as addressed by the report, it 
 
424 See the official website of the Sinopharm at http://english.sinochem.com/1528.html . 
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focuses on ‘utmost devotion to increasing revenue and efficiency’, ‘deepening strategic 
transformation’ and ‘constantly solidifying management foundation’. This 
responsibility indicates one nature of stabilizing growth as a modern enterprise.  
 
Another responsibility is reflected by one mission that is to be ‘a staunch force in 
ensuring energy security, agriculture security, and progress of the chemical industry’, 
425 which is more connected with the government. As explained by the subtitle ‘steadily 
improve social influence’, the Sinochem Group also ‘perform political, economic and 
social responsibilities as prescribed by the Central Government, giving full play to our 
national team role in energy and agriculture sectors’. The “political responsibility” is 
generally understood to participate in activities as part of development strategy of the 
state, which is more likely to conduct governmental functions. For example, in order to 
‘steadily improve social influence’ the Sinochem Group: 
 
 ‘strictly follow national macro-control measures, namely fertilizer procurement 
and storage during the low seasons, strategic crude oil and refined oil reserve 
building, Sino-foreign Potash Fertilizer Negotiations on a united front, which 
greatly contributes to stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant 
industries’.426 
 
Accordingly, the purpose of activities, such as “fertilizer procumbent and storage during 
the low seasons”, is to strictly follow national macro-control measures stabilizing 
supply and ensuring security of relevant industries. This is more of a governmental 
function rather than an enterprise’s social responsibility.427 ‘’ 
 
The chapter of Business Overviews in the annual report has further explained the 
Sinochem Group’ responsibilities. The table below illustrates types of major business 
 
425 See ibid. 
426 See ibid. 
427  According to the European Commission, enterprise’s social responsibility, also called corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), is ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’. See European Commission, 
‘Promoting a European framework’, COM (2001) 366 final. See also Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and 
Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (1st edition, 
Cambridge University Press 2009) 114. 
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Notably, the Sinochem Group may play different roles and serve diverse purposes and 
goals when engaging in multiple businesses and their branches. For example, the energy 
business contains five branches: exploration and production, oil refinery, oil trade 
warehousing and logistics and distribution and retailing. The goal of the “oil trade” 
branch is establishing ‘a stable and extensive sales network’ through ‘long-term 
cooperation relationship with major oil companies and related financial institutions in 
oil trading and risk management, and provide quality crude oil and professional services 
for domestic and foreign clients’.428 This branch literally does not show any factors of 
evidentiary elements for the “public body” determination.  
 
 
428 See the official website of the Sinopharm at http://english.sinochem.com/1528.html . 
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Comparatively, the “warehousing and logistics” branch is more connected with the 
government, especially corresponding to ‘strictly follow national macro-control 
measures stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant industries’ as mentioned 
in the Management Report.429 As explained by the chapter of Business Overviews, the 
Sinochem Group is ‘entrusted by the state to build the national strategic crude oil 
reserve base and refined oil reserve base, contributing our part to China’s energy 
security’. In this sense, the Sinochem Group is responsible, to some extent, to perform 
a governmental function contributing to China’s energy security. And this can be 
regarded as one evidentiary element for the “public body” determination.  
 
Accordingly, the evaluation of the Sinochem Group is preferably based on branch-level 
of its major business. Taking the “warehousing and logistics” branch as example, the 
following analysis illuminates the evaluation of the Sinochem Group in a “public body” 
investigation. 
 
To begin with, the Sincochem Group cannot be literally and directly identified by the 
definition of the “public body” recalling the criteria for “public body” identification in 
Section 4.4. Therefore, the evaluation should consider multiple evidentiary elements to 
‘avoid focusing on exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic without affording 
due consideration to others that may be relevant’.430 
 
First, Article 7 of the SOAE law embodies an intention of state intervention through 
government policies. As analysed in the Section 4.5.3, Article 7 of the SOAE law 
stipulates that the state shall ‘strengthen the control force and influence of the state-
owned economy’.431 Although there are no specific provisions explaining the detailed 
method to strength such control force, it reflects the intention of state intervention 
through government policy at macro-level. This corresponds to Footnote 2 of the 
criteria for “public body” identification that ‘state intervention as well as the scope and 
 
429 See ibid. 
430 See the criteria for “public body” identification in Section 4.4. 
431 See Section 5.5.3 of Chapter 4 of this research.  
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content of government policies relating to the sector in which the investigated entity 
operates, could also be regarded as evidence to determine “public body”’. 
 
Second, the Guiding Opinion potentially indicate Yang Qi serving special business may 
corresponds to features of “public body” in exercising a governmental function. As 
analysed in the Section 4.5.3, the Guiding Opinions divide SOEs into two categories, 
the commercial SOEs and SOEs in public welfare nature, which have both 
governmental and private features. Though commercial SOEs are defined as conducting 
independent production and business activities, they may potentially interweave with 
state behaviour. The Guiding Opinions further classify commercial SOEs as those 
‘whose business belongs to industries and fields of sufficient competition’ and ‘whose 
core business belongs to major industries and key fields concerning national security 
or the national economic lifeline, or that are mainly responsible for major special 
project tasks’.432 For the second kind of SOEs, their evaluation shall not only consider 
business performance, but also aspects such as their ‘efforts to serve national strategies, 
safeguard national security and the operation of the national economy, develop cutting-
edge strategic industries and complete special tasks’.433 The “warehousing and logistics” 
business of the Sinochem Group is more likely belong to the second kind. And the 
evaluation standards indicate that this kind of SOEs may serve national strategies by 
playing same role as subsidiary of government, and such behaviour may correspond to 
features of “public body” in exercising a governmental function. This may correspond 
to second paragraph of Footnote 3 of the criteria for “public body” identification that 
‘an entity exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence’. 
 
Third, the relationship between SASAC and Yang Qi also belongs to one evidentiary 
element. As discussed in Section 4.5.4.2, the Sinochem Group is a Yang Qi listed in the 
“directory” of SASAC, it is also under the supervision of SASAC as announced in its 
 
432 See Part (4) of Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Reform 
of State-owned Enterprises. 
433 See ibid. 
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2015 Annual Report, which indicates the Sinochem Group has been supervised or 
controlled more directly under SASAC compared with general SOEs.  
 
This view of point is further supported by the Notice stipulating the tasks and functions 
of SASAC. According to the Notice, the supervisory relationship between SASAC and 
the Sinochem Group is embodied by three paragraphs. Paragraph (b) and (d) enables 
the SASAC to appoint the top executives and paragraph (f) require SASAC to urge ‘the 
supervised enterprises to carry out the guiding principles, policies, related laws and 
regulations and standards for safety production’. Paragraph (f) leaves a space that 
potentially correspond to the definition of a “public body” due to specific conditions. 
For example, if Yang Qi exercised any one of the activities as concluded in Footnote 1 
of criteria for “public body” identification in Section 4.4, i.e., grant licenses, then that 
Yang Qi is more intended to be a “public body” when granting licenses. However, this 
should be evaluated by further investigation. 
 
Forth, the responsibility of the Sinochem Group as stated in its Annual report is another 
evidentiary element. One responsibility of the Sinochem Group, as stated by the chapter 
of Management Report in the annal report, is embodied by a mission that is to be ‘a 
staunch force in ensuring energy security, agriculture security, and progress of the 
chemical industry’. 434 As explained by the subtitle ‘steadily improve social influence’, 
the Sinochem Group ‘perform political, economic and social responsibilities as 
prescribed by the Central Government, giving full play to our national team role in 
energy and agriculture sectors’. The “political responsibility” is generally understood 
to participate in activities as part of development strategy of the state, which is more 
likely to conduct governmental functions. For example, in order to ‘steadily improve 
social influence’ the Sinochem Group: 
 
 ‘strictly follow national macro-control measures, namely fertilizer procurement 
and storage during the low seasons, strategic crude oil and refined oil reserve 
 
434 See ibid. 
 168 
building, Sino-foreign Potash Fertilizer Negotiations on a united front, which 
greatly contributes to stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant 
industries’.435 
 
Accordingly, the purpose of activities, such as “fertilizer procumbent and storage during 
the low seasons”, is to strictly follow national macro-control measures stabilizing 
supply and ensuring security of relevant industries. This is more of a governmental 
function rather than an enterprise’s social responsibility.  
 
This governmental factor is more specific in the “warehousing and logistics” business 
of the Sinochem Group. As explained by the chapter of Business Overviews in the 
annual report, the Sinochem Group is ‘entrusted by the state to build the national 
strategic crude oil reserve base and refined oil reserve base, contributing our part to 
China’s energy security’. In this sense, the Sinochem Group is responsible, to some 
extent, to perform a governmental function contributing to China’s energy security. 
Recalling paragraph (b) of Footnote 3 of the criteria for “public body” identification in 
Section 4.4 and as addressed by the Appellate Body in the United States - 
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China Case, ‘an entity 
exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence, particularly where such 
evidence points to a sustained and systematic practise’.436 Accordingly, the task to 
‘build the national strategic crude oil reserve base and refined oil reserve base’ entrusted 
by the state is more likely a long-term strategy aiming at state’s energy security, which 
can be regarded as an evidentiary element.  
 
In conclusion, the Sinochem Group is more likely a “public body” when shouldering 
the responsibility of stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant industries 
through strictly following national macro-control measures such as conducting the 
“warehousing and logistics” business. Besides, the evaluation of the Sinochem Group 
 
435 See the official website of the Sinopharm at http://english.sinochem.com/1528.html . 
436 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019, at para. 5.96. 
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is focusing on extraordinarily specific case. The “warehousing and logistics” business 
is only one branch of the Sinichem Group’s energy business. And there are four 
branches within the energy business and four businesses have same level with the 
energy business. Therefore, it may be impossible to identify the Yang Qi as a unified 
“public body” due to its diversified functions and responsibilities. 
 
Notably, due to the limitation of accessible information, more evidence through 
questionnaires could help to refine the evaluation in the “public body” investigation.  
For example, if the Sinochem Group exercised any one of the activities as concluded in 
Footnote 1 of criteria for “public body” identification in Section 4.4, i.e., grant licenses, 
then it is by definition a “public body” when granting licenses. In that sense, SASAC 
may has delegated the governmental authority to the Sinochem Group when fulfilling 




The determination of subsidy is concretized by the “public body” issue. which call for 
an interpretation of “public body” under Article 1.1 of ASCM. There are three main 
cases that discuss “public bodies” within the WTO dispute settlement system. First is 
the Korea - Vessels Case where “control of government” is recognised as one crucial 
factor of a “public body”. 437  In addition, commercial principle and public policy 
objective may not qualify as factors to determine a “public body”. Then, in the US - AD 
and CVD Case, a “public body” is defined as an entity that possesses, exercises or is 
vested with governmental authority.438 “Control of government” as proposed in the 
Korea -Vessels Case may be of relevance but relies on certain circumstances. Despite 
“governmental authority” provides a clue for identifying a “public body”, the Appellate 
Body did not clarify what is necessary to demonstrate such authority, thus more criteria 
 
437 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 
2005. 
438 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
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shall be provided to prevent excessive discretion through the appropriate interpretations. 
The determination of “public body” is further improved in the US - CVD Case, where 
it focuses on ‘whether the entity itself possesses the core characteristics and functions’ 
that constitute a “public body”, and follows a principle to ‘avoid focusing exclusively 
or unduly on any single characteristic without affording due consideration to others that 
may be relevant’.439 In this regard, state intervention, as well as ‘the scope and content 
of government policies relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates’, 
could also be regarded as evidence for determine a “public body”. 
 
The CPTPP, as a recent free trade agreement closely links with the WTO system, 
especially in the dispute settlement dimension under the ADA and the ASCM. Its 
regulations are of referential value in evaluating the compliance of WTO law at 
international level. Article 17.3 of the CPTPP stipulates a new term “delegated 
authority”, which is not recorded in the GATT 1994 and the ASCM but relates to the 
“public body”. The analysis proposed that the criterion of “delegated authority” as 
stipulated in Article 17.3 serves same purposes with explanation by WTO tribunals in 
the term “public body”, thus, providing references to the interpretation of a “public 
body”. 
 
Based on the analysis of “public body” by WTO cases and provisions of the CPTPP, 
the “public body” can refer to the following: 
 
An entity that exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental authority 
that the Party has directed or delegated to such entity.  
 
Footnote 1: Examples of ‘exercising any regulatory, administrative or other 
governmental authority’ include: the power to expropriate, grant licenses, approve 
commercial transactions, or impose quotas, fees, or other charges. 
 
439 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 July 2019. 
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Footnote 2: The determination of a “public body” shall focus on ‘whether the entity 
itself possesses the core characteristics and functions’ that constitutes a “public body”, 
and follow the principle to ‘avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single 
characteristic without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant’. In 
this regard, state intervention, as well as the scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates. 
 
Footnote 3: Approaches to demonstrate “public body” may include, but not exhausted: 
 
(a) A state or other legal instrument expressly vests authority in the entity 
concerned; 
(b) An entity is exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence, 
particularly where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice; 
(c) A government exercises meaningful control over an entity in certain 
circumstances; (Formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there 
is evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way.) 
 
The findings also highlighted that SOEs in China, especially Chinese central SOEs 
(Yang Qi), are potentially “public bodies” when serving specific responsibility, for 
example, stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant industries through strictly 
following national macro-control measures. However, it may be impossible to identify 
the Yang Qi as a unified “public body” due to its diversified functions and 
responsibilities, further feedback and more evidence through questionnaires could help 









Chapter 5: The “non-market economy treatment” in the China’s Accession 
Protocol 
 
This chapter and the following Chapter 6 have explored the solution of the “double 
remedy” issue based on analysing the topic of “non-market economy treatment” in anti-
dumping investigations. They aim to prevent the abuse of trade remedies by seeking 
appropriate interpretations of the WTO anti-dumping agreements regulating the “non-
market economy treatment”. In specific, Article 15 of the China’s Accession Protocol 
to the WTO (CAP) is the direct legal basis of the “non-market economy treatment” 
targeting China within its validity under the WTO system. It allowed WTO Members 
to sidestep some controversies related to China’s economic structure, especially when 
calculating the dumping margin in the anti-dumping investigations. 440  The 
interpretation of Article 15 is also one of the major issues in the EU – Price Comparison 
Methodologies Case.441 This chapter showed that WTO Members cannot resort to the 
CAP when applying a discriminatory treatment or surrogate method to calculate the 
dumping margins for China’s products in the wake of the expiry of the provisions of 
Article 15. And especially, such discriminatory treatment for China cannot be based on 
its special market status. To reach this conclusion, the chapter has conducted a doctrinal 
analysis on the text of the CAP as well as its preparatory work (travaux préparatoires) 
and the WTO case law. 
 
However, as discussed by several commentators, ‘this does not mean that the EU or 
other markets will have no defence against genuine Chinese dumping practices’.442 
 
440  See James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou, Introduction: Non-market Economies in the Global Trading 
System—The Special Case of China in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the 
Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, 
‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global 
Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
441  See European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516) 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm. See also Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - Price 
Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market Economy Methodology in Light of the 
Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
442 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
224; Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market 
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Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994 have stipulated the determination 
of dumping margins in special situations. And interpretations of the CAP do not 
preclude WTO Members applying the general rules set out in Article 2 of the ADA and 
Article VI of the GATT 1994.443 As a very creative practitioner in this regard, the EU 
has made revisions to its anti-dumping regulations by replacing the non-market 
economy provisions with a country-neutral methodology dealing with market 
distortions caused by the state intervention.444 Therefore, another two major concerns 
in the EU – Price Comparison Methodologies Case regarding the EU anti-dumping 
regulations and WTO law has been evaluated in the following chapter.445 
 
5.1 The legal basis of the “non-market economy treatment” 
 
The “non-market economy treatment” in the anti-dumping investigation, , also called 
the non-market economy methodology, relates to the discriminatory determination of 
dumping margins albeit the term “non-market economy” is nowhere defined in any 
GATT or WTO agreements.446 In general, the determination of dumping margins is 
based on a comparison between export price and normal value (normally domestic price 
in investigated country). The discriminatory use of surrogate method in anti-dumping 
investigation based on the market economy conditions ‘could be a violation of the non-
discrimination obligation” and is a “derogation from the WTO obligations’.447 However, 
discriminatory treatment is allowed but may not for a sustained position due to the 
specific circumstances of the investigated country, which generally targets on non-
 
Economy Methodology in Light of the Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 
52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
443  See Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
444 Vermulst, Sud and Evenett (n 416) 224; Noël and Zhou (n 413). 
445  See European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516) 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm. 
446 See James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An 
Analysis of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in ames J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou 
(eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 




Three sources, to different extents, permit WTO Members to apply special treatment 
when calculating the dumping margin and imposing anti-dumping duty. The 
Accessional Protocol to the WTO, especially for China (the CAP), directly and 
expressly stipulated such discriminatory treatment in Article 15: 
 
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of GATT 1994 and the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese 
prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not 
based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the 
following rules: 
… 
(ii)The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a 
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under 
investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the 
industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, production and 
sale of that product. 
 
Under the Protocol, WTO Members may calculate dumping margin through a method 
not based on China’s domestic price. Subparagraph (d) of Article 15 stipulates a 
deadline for this treatment, it states that ‘in any event, the provisions of subparagraph 
(a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession’.449 Then, what should be the 
appropriate interpretation of the expiry of Article 15: (a)(ii) becomes a key issue for 
special treatment discussed by experts, 450 which will be analysed in the following 
 
448 See ibid. 
449 According to Article 15: (d):  
Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, 
the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's national law 
contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph 
(a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the 
national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry 
or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or 
sector. 
450 See for example, Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 
Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ 
(2015) 10 Global Trade and Customs Journal 176; Jochem De Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations 
against Imports from China’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 515; Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu and 
Tianzhu Han, ‘China’s Market Economy Dilemma and Its Interplay with EU Anti-Dumping Law’ (2019) 27 Asia 
Pacific Law Review 102; Roberto Soprano, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of the Protocol of 
Accession of China to the World Trade Organization: Market Economy Considerations in Anti-Dumping 
Investigations’ (2019) 46 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29. 
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sections. Notably, such a legal basis is not applicable to other countries, because they 
are commitments to specific countries when accessing the WTO, such as China and 
Vietnam.451 
 
Another legal basis with a rigorous threshold is the second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 of 
the GATT 1994, it provides that: 
 
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are 
fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability 
for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties 
may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison 
with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate. 
 
The second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 “euphemistically” allows Members to calculate 
dumping margins not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices. However, the 
requirements to apply this provision are far stricter than those of other legal bases. 
Under the second Ad Note, the exporting country must have ‘a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the state’. 
The provision describes a type of “Soviet Union” model where the central government 
makes an economic plan and controls the operation of the domestic market. The 
Appellate Body, in the European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China Case, pointed out that the second Ad Note 
stipulates a strict rule when identifying the exporting country in its context. Specifically, 
the non-market economy methodology is applicable to a country when it reflects a 
‘complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade’ and the ‘fixing of all prices by 
the State’, and it is not ‘applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that do not fulfil both 
conditions’.452 Accordingly, the investigating authority has to explicitly prove that the 
 
451 See Case T-512/09 Rusal Armenal ZAO v Council of the European Union [2013] ECLI:EU: T: 2013:571. 
452 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011, at para. 290.  
The Report interprets the rules when applying the Second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 as follows:  
We observe that the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to a "country which has a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade" and "where all domestic prices are fixed by the State". This appears to describe 
a certain type of NME, where the State monopolizes trade and sets all domestic prices. The second Ad Note to 
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Chinese economy meets these two criteria.453 And it does not fit China’s situation as a 
transitional economy described in Paragraph 150 of the Working Party Reports.454 As 
concluded by one commentator, ‘no country today would fall within this narrowly 
defined category’.455 Therefore, the application of this legal basis is very limited. 
 
Comparatively, Article VI: (b) of the GATT1994 and Article 2.2 of the ADA provide a 
general legal basis for alternative treatments among WTO Members. Based on Article 
VI of the GATT 1994: 
 
[A] product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an 
importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported 
from one country to another: 
 
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like 
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, 
 
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either  
 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country 
in the ordinary course of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable 
addition for selling cost and profit. 
 
Article VI:1 would thus not on its face be applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that do not fulfil both conditions, 
that is, the complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade and the fixing of all prices by the State. 
453 See Vermulst, Sud and Evenett (n 20) 219. 
454 See Doha WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China’ 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/Min01/3.pdf&Open=True> accessed 10 
July 2020. It records that: 
[S]everal members of the Working Party noted that China was continuing the process of transition towards a 
full market economy. Those members noted that under those circumstances, in the case of imports of Chinese 
origin into a WTO Member, special difficulties could exist in determining cost and price comparability in the 
context of anti-dumping investigations and countervailing duty investigations. In fact, way back in 1998, i.e. 
prior to China’s accession to the WTO, the EU had recognized that China is an economy in transition when it 
introduced the MET criteria in the basic AD Regulation. 
455 See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-
Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 889. See also Weihuan Zhou, Henry 
Gao and Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China’ 
(2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977, 1008; Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-




Article VI: 1(b) of the GATT 1994 stipulates two alternatives for dumping margin 
calculation “in the absence of domestic price”. One is to take the highest comparable 
price to any third country, and the other is to construct a normal value via cost of 
production and reasonable additions. However, it does not further explain how to define 
the situation of “absence”. Possible scenarios could be that the ‘domestic price is not 
reliable in a special market’456 or a situation that cannot fulfil the conditions listed in 
subparagraph (a). 
 
Article 2.2 of the ADA provides a similar method: 
 
When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the 
domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market 
situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting 
country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall 
be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like product when 
exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative, 
or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for 
administrative, selling and general costs and for profits. 
 
Compared with Article VI: (b) of the GATT 1994, the ADA provides an explanation of 
the situation “absence of such domestic price”. Pursuant to Article 2.2, “absence of such 
domestic price” refers to when there are no sales of the like product “in the ordinary 
course of trade”, there is a “particular market situation” or a “low volume of sales”. 
Thus, a discriminatory method is allowed based on any one of three situations. 
Nonetheless, Article 2.2 does not provide necessary instructions to demonstrate these 
thresholds, thus interpretations of these thresholds are explored in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2 Introduction of Article 15 of the CAP 
 
 
456 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. 
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Article 15 of the CAP regulates price compatibility in determining subsidies and 
dumping affairs under Article VI of the GATT 1994, the ADA and the ASCM. The most 
distinct feature of Article 15 of the CAP, especially in its subparagraph (a)(ii), provides 
WTO members with the possibility to derogate from domestic prices of China when 
determining normal value for dumping margin calculation. Accordingly, if Chinese 
manufactures were unable to show that the market economy conditions exist, the “non-
market economy treatment” will be applied. Compared with strict rules of Article 2.2 
of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994, CAP is undoubtedly a preferential source 
for WTO members to apply the alternative treatment in trade remedy field.457  
 
However, the discriminatory treatment in Article 15: (a)(ii) of the CAP officially 
expired on 12 December 2016,458 promoting debates on the legal effect of this expiry. 
Specifically, WTO members have different opinions on this issue, for example, 
Australia had already recognized China as a market economy in 2005, while the US 
opposes China’s demand that it be treated one. Moreover, experts hold different 
attitudes on this issue, some observers consider that the expiry of subparagraph (a)(ii) 
of Article 15 means that the remaining provisions of Article 15 still allow WTO 
Members to apply a surrogate method when calculating dumping margins for China’s 
products.459 And some commentators insist that WTO Members can no longer resort to 
a surrogate country method or similar methodology targeting China but must use 
Chinese domestic prices or costs to calculate dumping margins.460 
 
457 For examples of disputes relating to the interpretation of CAP, see Appellate Body Report, United States - 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 
March 2011. 
458 According to Article 15: (d) of CAP: “in any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years 
after the date of accession”. 
459 See Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is Contingent 
upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ (2015) 10 Global 
Trade and Customs Journal 176; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special 
Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272; Laurent 
Ruessmann and Jochen Beck, ‘2016 and the Application of an NME Methodology to Chinese Producers in Anti-
Dumping Investigations’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 457.  
460 Jochem De Kok analysed China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO and concluded WTO Members may ‘no longer 
have resources to an NME methodology’ based on the Protocol. See Jochem De Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade 
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The interpretation of Article 15 is one of the major issues in the EU – Price Comparison 
Methodologies Case, where the EU contended that the expiry of Article 15(a)(ii) still 
allowed the “non-market economy treatment” of China and merely shifted the burden 
of proof from Chinese producers to the investigating authorities.461 The EU based its 
arguments on interpreting the remaining paragraphs of Article 15 of the CAP, as well 
as the Report of the Working Party on China’s accession to the WTO.462 
 
The analysis of this issue below lends support to the view that WTO Members can no 
longer resort to a surrogate country method or similar methodology targeting China by 
the CAP, arguments by the EU will be analysed through interpretations of Article 15 of 
the CAP regarding its textual and contextual structure, preparatory work of the protocol 
based on VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), along with interpretations 
by the WTO panel and appellate body.463 
 
5.3 Textual and contextual analysis of Article 15 of CAP 
 
Based on the textual and contextual analysis of Article 15 of the CAP, WTO Members 
may not resort to remaining provisions of Article 15 (a) to apply the “non-market 
economy treatment” for China in anti-dumping investigation. Besides, the first and 
 
Defence Investigations against Imports from China’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 515; Yenkong 
Ngangjoh-Hodu and Tianzhu Han, ‘China’s Market Economy Dilemma and Its Interplay with EU Anti-Dumping 
Law’ (2019) 27 Asia Pacific Law Review 102; Roberto Soprano, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation 
of the Protocol of Accession of China to the World Trade Organization: Market Economy Considerations in Anti-
Dumping Investigations’ (2019) 46 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29. Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - 
Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market Economy Methodology in Light of the 
Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
 
Some researchers, such as Weihuan Zhou, insist WTO members may continue to label China as an NME but 
whatever this label may entail, it no longer justifies the application of the NME methodology. See Weihuan Zhou, 
‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese 
Journal of Comparative Law 345. Minyou Yu and Jian Guan, ‘The Non-Market Economy Methodology Shall Be 
Terminated After 2016’ (2017) 12 Global Trade and Customs Journal 16. 
461  See European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516) 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm. See also Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - Price 
Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market Economy Methodology in Light of the 
Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
462 See ibid. 
463  See Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
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third sentences of Article 15 (d) may not justify a surrogate method on China’s product. 
At least, China is not obliged to prove market economy conditions, to justify a “market 
economy treatment”, to WTO Members whose national law do not ‘contains market 
economy criteria as of the date of (China’s) accession’.  
 
According to its title, the purpose of Article 15 is to serve price comparability in 
determining subsidies and dumping.464 Its subparagraph (a) regulates the distinguished 
determination of normal value for China as follows:  
 
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 
1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO 
Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry 
under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict 
comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the 
following rules: 
 
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that market economy 
conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to 
the manufacture, production and sale of that product, the importing WTO 
Member shall use Chinese prices or costs for the industry under 
investigation in determining price comparability; 
 
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on 
a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers 
under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions 
prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to 
manufacture, production and sale of that product. 
 
Its subparagraph (d) provides a sunset clause for subparagraph (a)(ii) as follows:  
 
(d) Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO 
Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be 
terminated provided that the importing Member's national law contains market 
economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession.  In addition, 
should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, 
that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the 
 
464 According to CAP, title of Article 15 is “Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and Dumping”. 
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non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that 
industry or sector. 
 
Before interpreting related provisions, recalling the United States - Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Case,465 the Appellate Body admitted that 
WTO law could be interpreted by VCLT and recalled Article 31 of VCLT that: ‘A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.466 
Accordingly, interpretation of the treaty shall focus on several standards which include, 
but not exclusively, ordinary meaning, context, object and purpose.  
 
5.3.1 The first and third sentences of Article 15 (d) may not justify the “non-
market economy treatment” on China’s products 
 
Some exports consider that Article 15 (a)(i) and the first and third sentences of Article 
15 (d) are still justify non-market economy methodology when Article 15 (a)(ii) expires, 
and China has to meet market economy requirements to avoid special treatment.467 
 
Before discussing the connections between the sentences of Article 15 (d), the condition 
that ‘China has to meet market economy requirements’ has a threshold that is stipulated 
at the end of Article 15 (d). The proviso here is that the importing WTO Member’s 
national law ‘contains market economy criteria as of the date of (China’s) accession’.468 
 
465  See Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996. 
466 See ibid, at para 17. 
467 See Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is Contingent 
upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ (2015) 10 Global 
Trade and Customs Journal 176; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special 
Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272; Laurent 
Ruessmann and Jochen Beck, ‘2016 and the Application of an NME Methodology to Chinese Producers in Anti-
Dumping Investigations’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 457; James J. Nedumpara and Archana 
Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession 
and Member Practices’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global 
Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
468 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
215. Xuewei Feng, ‘The Termination of the Grandfather Clause in China’s Accession Protocol and the Normal Value 
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In other words, only when relevant WTO Members have national law stipulating market 
economy criteria, and especially no later than the time of China’s accession to the WTO, 
then the first sentence of Article 15 (d) can be applied. National laws that do not fulfil 
this threshold thus cannot justify a surrogate method being applied to China’s products 
in anti-dumping investigation. And China is not obliged to prove market economy 
conditions based on afore-mentioned national laws.  
 
Noticeably, the above-mentioned threshold may not easy to satisfy, albeit Members like 
the EU that has a long history regulating dumping affairs with “state-controlled 
economy”.469 As mentioned by Noël, Stéphanie and Zhou, Weihuan, the revision of EU 
AD regulation in 1998 created a list of non-market economy countries, including China; 
however, the EU Commission published a working document including five “country-
wide” criteria to evaluate the granting of market economy status in 2008, which after 
“the time of China’s accession to the WTO” (11 December 2011).470 Therefore, in this 
regard, the qualification of the EU is disputable. 
 
The afore-mentioned conclusion can also be supported in the aspect of the scope of 
China’s commitments in the CAP. According to the Ministry Commerce of China in 
2016, only 17 out of 162 WTO Members have national legislation referring to market 
economy status.471 If China has to fulfil the requirements of WTO Members who do not 
have clear market economy standards regardless of time, it might allow at least 145 
Members with discretion in enacting market economy standards that China is obliged 
 
Construction After Fifteen Years of Accession’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market 
Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
469 The EU’s first AD legislation was adopted in 1968 and contained a provision for state-controlled economies. See 
Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
470 See Commission of the European Communities, ‘Commission Staff Document on Progress by the People’s 
Republic of China towards Graduation to Market Economy Status in Trade Defence Investigations SEC (2008) 2503 
Final’ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_143599.pdf> accessed 10 July 2020. See also 
Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
471  Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of Commerce on March 2, 2016, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201603/20160301272238.shtml.  
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to follow. And without a clear stipulation of NME within the WTO legal system, the 
legality of and disputes related to these national laws are difficult for the WTO DSB to 
regulate. More importantly, such a scenario is not regulated and reflected within the 
CAP, thus it may ultimately increase China’s obligation and illegally expand China’s 
commitments in the CAP. Therefore, the surrogate method based on the CAP can only 
be justified for WTO Members whose national law stipulates market economy criteria, 
and especially, no later than the time of China’s accession to the WTO.  
 
Regarding the connections between the sentences of Article 15 (d), several 
commentators assert that the first and third sentences logically correspond to 
subparagraph (a), while the second sentence refers to subparagraph (a)(ii), thus ‘if it is 
only subparagraph (a)(ii) that provides Members with the ability to use a special 
methodology, there would be no reason for the first and third sentences to refer to 
subparagraph (a) instead of (a)(ii)’.472  
 
In response to this reading, first, subparagraph (a) or, more precisely, the chapeau of 
subparagraph (a) itself cannot provide a legal basis for the non-market economy 
methodology because the operation of the subparagraph (a) ‘is subject to the rules 
contemplated in the sub-paragraphs’ (discussed in detail in next Section). 473 
Subparagraph (a) itself does not provide a legal basis for options but only states such 
options are available. In this regard, it is meaningless to highlight the distinctions 
between the sentences of Article 15 (d) by the chapeau of subparagraph (a) and 
subparagraph (a)(ii), because it is subparagraph (a)(i) and subparagraph (a)(ii) that 
constitute the legal basis for a ‘methodology that is not based on a strict comparison 
with domestic prices or costs in China’. 
 
 
472 See Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special Methodology Remains 
Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272; Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why 
Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact 
Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 244. 
473  See Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
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Besides, what the first and the third sentences can justify is an early termination of the 
non-market economy methodology before 2016 by satisfying the market economy 
conditions.474 This interpretation is highlighted by the Appellate Body, in the European 
Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners 
from China Case, that: 
 
Paragraph 15(d) of China’s Accession Protocol establishes that the provisions of 
paragraph 15(a) expire 15 years after the date of China's accession (that is, 11 
December 2016). It also provides that other WTO Members shall grant before that 
date the early termination of paragraph 15(a) with respect to China's entire 
economy or specific sectors or industries if China demonstrates under the law of 
the importing WTO Member ‘that it is a market economy’ or that ‘market economy 
conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector’.475  
 
Accordingly, the two sentences are included ensure the China’s producers are not 
treated discriminatorily when they satisfy market economy conditions. As will be 
discussed in Section 5.5, subparagraph (d) is functionally established to ensure the 
“specials rules will expire” either in or before 2016. 
 
Besides, the links between the sentences of Article 15 (d) refer to the termination of a 
special methodology based on the expression “in any event”, as analysed by Edwin 
Vermulst. A common feature of the sentences in Article 15 (d) is that they relate to the 
termination of the non-market economy treatment. Both the first and third sentences 
stipulate termination of the surrogate method if the market economy requirements are 
satisfied, the only differences between them is the scope of the subject (the first 
sentence refers to the whole market of China, the third one refers to specific industries 
or sectors). The second sentence is based on scenarios established by the first and third 
sentences. Specifically, from the overall structure, it is unnecessary to use ‘in any event’ 
 
474 Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market 
Economy Methodology in Light of the Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 
52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
475 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011. 
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in the second sentence, if the first and third sentences continue to apply, and the 
surrogate method is still to be applied. “In any event” is added to ensure that China is 
not ‘subjected to the special/analogue country methodology which deviates from the 
normal value calculation in Article 2 of ADA’.476 Therefore, the first and third sentences 
of Article 15 (d) may not justify a discriminatory method for China’s products. 
 
5.3.2 Remaining provisions of Article 15(a) cannot justify the “non-market 
economy treatment” on China’s products 
 
Several commentators assert that in the wake of the expiry of subparagraph(a)(ii), the 
remaining provisions of Article 15 (a) still apply, such as the chapeau of subparagraph 
(a) and subparagraph (a)(i), thus allowing WTO Members to use the non-market 
economy methodology for China.477 One argument being pointed out is that using 
China’s domestic price for dumping calculation, post-2016, would make subparagraph 
(a)(i) meaningless.478 Because in addressing the rules of treaty interpretation of VCLT, 
the ‘Appellate Body has recognized that “interpretation must give meaning and effect 
to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result 
in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility”’.479 And 
 
476 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
215. See also Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
477 See Barbara Barone and others, ‘Market Economy Status for China after 2016?’ (European Parliament 2016) 
<http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:QA0216255:EN:HTML> accessed 10 July 2020. See also 
Bernard O’Connor, ‘The Myth of China and Market Economy Status in 2016’ (International Economic Law and 
Policy Blog) <https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/oconnorresponse.pdf> accessed 10 July 2020; Bernard 
O’Connor, ‘Market-Economy Status for China Is Not Automatic’ (VoxEU.org, 27 November 2011) 
<https://voxeu.org/article/china-market-economy> accessed 13 July 2020. Laurent Ruessmann and Jochen Beck, 
‘2016 and the Application of an NME Methodology to Chinese Producers in Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (2014) 
9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 457; Theodore R Posner, ‘A Comment on Interpreting Paragraph 15 of China’s 
Protocol of Accession by Jorge Miranda’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 146; Terence P Stewart and 
others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ 
(2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272; Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy 
Status after December 2016 Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ 
(2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 244.  
478 See Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special Methodology Remains 
Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272; Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why 
Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact 
Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 244. 
479 See Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special Methodology Remains 
Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272, 276. James J. Nedumpara and 
Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis of China’s WTO Protocol of 
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in this regard, subparagraph (a)(ii) is ‘nothing but a draftsman’s tautological 
reinforcement of paragraph (a)(i)’.480 
 
In response to this viewpoint, Article 31 of VCLT also highlights that treaties shall be 
interpreted “in their context”.481 In this regard, it was first analysed in Section 5.3.1 of 
this research that an non-market economy methodology is not preferable post-2016 due 
to the connections between the sentences of Article 15 (d). In particular, “In any event” 
in the second sentence of Article 15 (d) is added to ensure that China is not ‘subjected 
to the special/analogue country methodology which deviates from the normal value 
calculation in Article 2 of ADA’.482 
 
Besides, the chapeau of subparagraph (a) cannot provide a legal basis for the non-
market economy methodology because the operation of the chapeau ‘is subject to the 
rules contemplated in the sub-paragraphs’.483 Article 15(a) stipulates the determination 
of “price comparability” with two options based on China’s specific situation. The 
chapeau itself, however, does not provide options but only states such options are 
available. In other words, it is subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii) that provide specific 
methods that it should be “based on”.  
 
Furthermore, subparagraph (a)(i) alone cannot justify a non-market economy 
methodology for China, because subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii) should not be interpreted 
separately.484 As analysed by observers, those two subparagraphs are “two sides of one 
 
Accession and Member Practices’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the 
Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
480 James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis 
of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), 
Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
481 According to Article 31 of VCLT: ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
482 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
215; Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
483 See ibid. 
484 See ibid. 
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coin”, which constitutes an integral process or system to determine “price 
comparability”. The remaining subparagraph (a)(i) itself is not to be read ‘a contrario 
or as also conferring the right to employ the NME Methodology’ because it is ‘granted 
exclusively by subparagraph (a)(ii)’.485 Therefore, if subparagraph (a)(i) works as the 
legal basis of NME methodology, it makes subparagraph (a)(ii) redundant. 
 
Another reason claimed for continuing the non-market economy methodology for 
China is that Article 9 and Article 15 are twinned, while Article 9 provides that China 
should let its prices be set by the market, Article 15 regulates what should be done 
during the transition phase.486 Furthermore, if China cannot demonstrate it is a market 
economy, then WTO Members’ rights remain valid under subparagraphs(a), in 
particular, subparagraph (a)(i), and subparagraph (d).487 
 
One point overlooked by this viewpoint is that Article 9 stipulates a long-term 
requirement, but Article 15(a)(ii) along with second sentence of Article 15 (d) offer a 
temporary solution, thus their features do not correspond with each other. Moreover, 
the implementation of second sentence of Article 15 (d) does not reply to Article 9, thus 
they are focusing on a different issue, which cannot constitute a legal basis for special 
treatment for China. Recall Article 9(1) of CAP that states:  
 
China shall, subject to paragraph 2 below, allow prices for traded goods and 
services in every sector to be determined by market forces, and multi-tier pricing 
practices for such goods and services shall be eliminated. 
 
Article 9 states that prices for traded goods and services shall be determined by market 
forces, which is obviously a long-time commitment based on China’s market status 
when accessing the WTO. At the time of accession to the WTO, China was identified 
as continuing the process of transition towards a full market economy by some WTO 
 
485 See ibid. 
486 See Barbara Barone and others, ‘Market Economy Status for China after 2016?’ (European Parliament 2016) 9 
<http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:QA0216255:EN:HTML> accessed 10 July 2020. 
487 See ibid, at page 10. 
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Members, thus in a situation of neither a centrally -planned soviet model or a market-
controlled model.488 As domestic markets differ from country to country, there does not 
have to be a unified model to measure how long the transition of an economy will take, 
neither is it possible to calculate. And that is probably the reason why Article 9 does not 
have an expiry date as in Article 15. Thereby the commitment requires China to take 
steps and fulfil the requirement of price control gradually.  
 
However, Article 15: (a)(ii) and the second sentence of Article 15: (d) express a 
temporary nature. It states, in any event, that the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall 
expire 15 years after the date of accession. “In any event”, here addresses how, despite 
China still being a so-called “non-market economy” under the national laws of some 
WTO Members and maintaining a special form of market status for a comparatively 
long period since its accession to the WTO, Article 15 (a)(ii) shall still be abolished. In 
other words, under any circumstances (whether or not China has been granted market 
economy status), subparagraph (a)(ii) shall be terminated, which implies that 
implementation of the second sentence of Article 15: (d) does not rely on Article 9. In 
practice, 11 December 2016 has already passed, and Article 15 (a)(ii) has come to an 
end, but Article 9 may still have effect, which also reveals the differences between 
Article 15(a)(ii), the second sentence of Article 15 (d) and Article 9. Therefore, a 
surrogate method for China cannot be justified by the connections between Article 9 
and Article 15. 
 
Notably, as mentioned by James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, the principle 
of in dubio mitius may provide a thought on this issue.489 The Latin phrase in dubio 
 
488 See Doha WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China’ 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/Min01/3.pdf&Open=True> accessed 10 
July 2020, at para 150. 
489 James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis 
of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), 
Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
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mitius refer to “more leniently in case of doubt”.490 Regarding to international law, the 
principle holds that ‘where there is doubt about the existence of an obligation under 
international law, no obligation will be found in order to avoid limiting state 
sovereignty’.491 Accordingly, based on afore-mentioned debates of Article 15, its expiry 
does not suggest to bring obligations to China. For now, the obligations to China is to 
receive a special methodology in anti-dumping investigation if it cannot show the 
market economy condition prevail in its industry. Therefore, at least, it is not 
preferential for Chinese manufacturers continue to demonstrate market economy 
position and justify a treatment of using their own cost for dumping margin calculation 
as long as there does not has a result of this issue. 
 
5.4 Preparatory work (travaux préparatoires) of Article 15 of CAP 
 
The VCLT addresses the importance of supplementary documents such as preparatory 
work of the treaty for interpretation of international provisions. The chapeau of Article 
32 of the VCLT states:  
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31 … 
 
Pursuant to Article 32 of the VCLT, preparatory work on the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion can be applied to the interpretation of international 
clauses. The preparatory resources of Article 15 of the CAP, such as the Sino-US 
bilateral WTO agreement492 and the working paper on the accession of China,493 have 
 
490 Aaron X Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, Guide to Latin in International Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 
<https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-9780195369380> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
491 See ibid. 
492 See ‘U.S. - China Bilateral WTO Agreement’ (1999) <https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/WTO-
Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-004.html> accessed 13 July 2020.  
493 See Doha WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China’ 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/Min01/3.pdf&Open=True> accessed 10 
July 2020. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Bilateral Agreement on China’s 
Entry into the WTO Between China and the United States’ 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18051.shtml> accessed 13 July 
2020. 
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indicate that market status of China cannot justify a continuance of the “non-market 
economy treatment”, and such a treatment is not recommended for modern China and 
preferable to be terminated in the wake of expiry of Article 15 (a)(ii). 
 
5.4.1 The Sino-US bilateral WTO agreement 
 
The interpretation of the bilateral agreement suggests that the market status of China 
cannot justify a continuance of the “non-market economy treatment” and such a 
treatment is preferable to be terminated in the wake of expiry of Article 15 (a)(ii). 
 
A Chinese Government Delegation held a series of talks with different government 
delegations in order to achieve a general agreement before formally accessing to the 
WTO. In November 1982, the Chinese Government obtained observer status and sent 
a delegation to attend the 36th Session of the Contracting Parties of GATT for the first 
time. On 10 July 1986, Ambassador Qian Jiadong, Permanent Representative of the 
People's Republic of China to the UN Office at Geneva, formally submitted an 
application for the resumption of China's membership of GATT as a Contracting Party. 
China later started bilateral talks with the Contracting Parties of GATT. From 10 and 
15 November of 1999, the Chinese Government Delegation and the US Government 
Delegation held talks on China's accession to the WTO in Beijing. On 15 November, 
the two sides signed a bilateral agreement on China's entry to the WTO, which formally 
brought their talks to an end.494 
 
The Sino-US bilateral WTO agreement (henceforth the bilateral agreement), as 
mentioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, not 
only promotes the all-round development of China-US trade and economic ties, and 
stabilizes and expands overall China-US relations, but, more importantly, helps to 
 
494 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Bilateral Agreement on China’s Entry into 
the WTO Between China and the United States’ 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18051.shtml> accessed 13 July 
2020.  
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accelerate the process of China’s entry to the WTO.495 
 
The bilateral agreement covers all agricultural products, all industrial goods, and all 
service areas,496 part two of the agreement lists the “resolution of key unsolved issues”, 
which is relevant to Article 15 of CAP. Specifically, part two provides: 
 
Anti-dumping. The agreement ensures that the United States can continue to apply 
our current non-market economy methodology in antidumping cases involving 
imports from China for 15 years. China can, of course, request review under U.S. 
law of specific sectors or the economy as a whole to determine if it is market 
oriented and no longer subject to the special methodology …497 
 
Two points are indicated by part two: first, the title of part two, namely, “resolution of 
key unsolved issues”, reaffirmed the “temporary” nature of the non-market economy 
methodology, which cannot last long. The “resolution of key unsolved issues” implies 
that issues relating to normal value construction cannot be properly solved when 
contracting the agreement, which might foreshadow the later CAP. Despite it is listed 
as “resolution”, it is not a solution in a real sense, the blurry expression “non-market 
economy methodology” does not specify what the methodology is and without further 
instructions. One conjecture or explanation of the ambiguous regulation of such a 
methodology, under this situation, is that the so called “non-market economy 
methodology” is a compromise attempt to deal with the dilemma of China’s anti-
dumping issue, and as an “attempt”, it is not authorized as a formal method in this 
agreement. Therefore, the method is temporarily effective for a limited period as 
negotiated in the agreement.  
 
Notably, part two does not bind the exchange of a “non-market economy 
methodology” to requirement that demonstrating a market economy. At least one 
 
495 See ibid. 
496 See ‘U.S. - China Bilateral WTO Agreement’ (1999) <https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/WTO-
Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-004.html> accessed 13 July 2020. 
497 See ibid. 
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commentator considers that as the provisions of Article 15 do not state that China 
will automatically become a market economy, then the special treatment shall remain 
unchanged.498 However, from a literal reading of part two of the bilateral agreement, 
the “non-market economy methodology” is an independent methodology, and the 
reason why the US is vested with the authority to apply such a method is because the 
agreement confers such a right. In other words, the NME treatment is not created to 
evaluate China’s economic status but to provide a method in anti-dumping 
investigation. The proof of a market economy status, in the agreement, is to allow 
earlier termination of this method if China can satisfy the market-oriented standards. 
Therefore, continuance of the “non-market economy methodology” cannot be 
justified by China’s economic status based on the bilateral agreement. 
 
Second, when it comes to the 15-year deadline, the “non-market economy methodology” 
shall be terminated. One could argue that the agreement does not literally mention a 
“termination” or “expiry” as in Article 15 (d) of the CAP, thus it does not relinquish the 
application of “non-market economy methodology”. The bilateral agreement provides 
no direct instruction on this issue. However, relying on context of the agreement, it is 
unnecessary to negotiate a timescale, if the “non-market economy methodology” is 
always available. The ambiguous regulation of “non-market economy methodology” in 
the bilateral agreement provides the US with discretion in anti-dumping investigations 
neglecting domestic price of China’s products for 15 years. In return, after expiry, 
termination should also include a methodology that is ambiguously applied in anti-
dumping investigations. The time limit can also be reflected by Summary of US – China 
Bilateral Agreement, it provides that: 
 
Anti-dumping and Subsidies Methodology: 
The agreed protocol provisions ensure that American firms and workers will have 
strong protection against unfair trade practices including dumping and subsidies. 
The U.S. and China have agreed that we will be able to maintain our current anti-
 
498 See Barbara Barone and others, ‘Market Economy Status for China after 2016?’ (European Parliament 2016) 
<http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:QA0216255:EN:HTML> accessed 10 July 2020.  
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dumping methodology (treating China as a non-market economy) in future anti-
dumping cases without risk of legal challenge. This provision will remain in force 
for 15 years after China’s accession to the WTO.499 
 
The phrase “remain in force” indicate that the validity of special methodology has a 
deadline and it is not designated as common methodology for trade remedy 
investigations. When the special methodology is expired, WTO Members shall follow 
the clear rules in Article VI of the GATT 1994, the ADA and the ASCM as stipulated in 
the chapeau of Article 15.  
 
Crucially, this is more of referential value when compared with Article 15. As the 
provisions in Article 15 of the CAP are stipulated in the form of different layers in order 
to regulate the special situation of China, the expiry of one layer might inevitably trigger 
confusion in understanding the whole provision. By reference to the bilateral agreement, 
the expiry of Article 15(a)(ii) is preferably indicates termination of the non-market 
economy methodology in all its forms.  
 
5.4.2 The report of the working paper on the accession of China 
 
The analysis of reports on the working paper rebuts the view that the market status of 
China can justify the continuance of the non-market economy methodology.500 
 
On March 4, 1987, a working party was established to examine a request from the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China for resumption of its status as a GATT 
contracting party, and to submit to the General Council of WTO recommendations 
 
499 See as cited by See Xuewei Feng, ‘The Termination of the Grandfather Clause in China’s Accession Protocol and 
the Normal Value Construction After Fifteen Years of Accession’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), 
Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
500  For example, see Barbara Barone and others, ‘Market Economy Status for China after 2016?’ (European 
Parliament 2016) <http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:QA0216255:EN:HTML> accessed 10 July 
2020; James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis 
of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), 
Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
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which could include a Draft Protocol on the status of China. On December 7, 1995, the 
Government of China applied for accession to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, the existing working party which then transformed into 
the WTO Accession Working Party. The Report of the working party on the accession 
of China (henceforth the working paper) was published on 10 November 2001.501 
 
The working paper covers the evaluation of China’s trade regime including economic 
policies, a framework for making and enforcing policies, policies affecting trade in 
goods, a trade- related intellectual property regime, policies affecting trade in services 
and other issues.502 Section IV (13) of the working paper records discussions of the 
trade remedy issue for China’s special domestic market and a draft of China’s 
commitments relating to Article 15 of the CAP.  
 
Paragraph 150 of Section IV (13) addresses cost and price comparability concerning 
China, it provides that: 
 
Several members of the Working Party noted that China was continuing the process 
of transition towards a full market economy. Those members noted that under those 
circumstances, in the case of imports of Chinese origin into a WTO Member, 
special difficulties could exist in determining cost and price comparability in the 
context of anti-dumping investigations and countervailing duty investigations. 
Those members stated that in such cases, the importing WTO Member might find 
it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with 
domestic costs and prices in China might not always be appropriate. 
 
Despite paragraph 150 recording the discussion of China’s economic structure,503 the 
function of this paragraph does more than that; it, rather aims to reach an agreement on 
a trade remedy treatment for China. The WTO’s legal rules grew out of the Uruguay 
 
501 See Doha WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China’ 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/Min01/3.pdf&Open=True> accessed 10 
July 2020. 
502 See ibid, at pp. i-iv. 
503 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212. 
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Round negotiations, they aim to ‘facilitate trade among countries with different 
economic structures rather than force a country to adopt another’s structure’.504 The 
negotiators anticipated that a member’s economy might differ from a market-oriented 
structure, thus they foresaw four alternative economic structures and crafted WTO rules 
to regulate them.505 As a draft of commitments for accessing the WTO, paragraph 150 
is obviously not an obligation for China’s economic structure. In fact, China did not 
pronounce its economic status when accessing the WTO.506 It, rather, attempted to 
avoid a negative effect on its specific economic structure from a trade remedy treatment, 
which is supported by the Chinese representative’s statement in paragraph 151 of the 
working paper, that ‘certain WTO Members ... had treated China as a non-market 
economy and imposed antidumping duties on Chinese companies without identifying 
or publishing the criteria used’. 507  The following subparagraphs of paragraph 151 
established cautious regulations when determining price comparability, which clearly 
indicates the purpose of Article 15 is to tackle the trade remedy issue,508 albeit it may 
not clarify the abolition of the “non-market economy treatment” in the CAP.509 
 
Besides, the Working Party, through the literal expression of paragraph 150, clearly 
expressed their concern over price comparability in trade remedy investigations rather 
than a demonstration of market status. In other words, the Working Group worried that 
‘special difficulties could exist in determining cost and price comparability’ but not 
‘China was continuing the process of transition towards a full market economy’. The 
focus of the Working Party is on the construction of a proper method ensuring cost and 
 
504 See Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law 
Journal 261, 287. 
505 Four alternative economic structures include a command economy structure prevalent in Communist countries, 
a “transition” economy from a centrally planned economy system to a market-oriented system, corporatism, and an 
integrated conglomerate-led structure. See ibid. 
506 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212. 
507 See ibid. 
508  Folkert Graafsma and Elena Kumashova, ‘In Re China’s Protocol of Accession and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement: Temporary Derogation or Permanent Modification?’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 154. 
509 Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special Methodology Remains 
Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272. 
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price comparability, despite China’s special market situation being the origin of the 
difficulty. Therefore, the recommendation for a surrogate method in the last sentence 
of paragraph 150 already contains the consideration that China is not regarded as a 
market economy by some WTO Members, while confirmed as market economy by 
others. The title of Article 15 of the CAP, namely, “Price Comparability in Determining 
Subsidies and Dumping”, further reaffirms its focus. 
 
Notably, the second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 of GATT 1994 contains similar expressions 
to paragraph 150 as follows:  
 
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are 
fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability 
for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties 
may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison 
with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate. 
 
The second Ad Note also allows a surrogate method in anti-dumping investigation, but 
it specifies the requirements for that method. According to the Appellate Body, the 
second Ad Note stipulated a strict rule when identifying an exporting country in its 
context.510 Specifically, a non-market economy methodology is applicable to a country 
when it reflects a complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade and the fixing 
of all prices by the State, and it is not ‘applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that do not 
fulfil both conditions’.511 China, when under evaluation by the Working Party, might 
reflect some features of a country in the second Ad Note. However, ‘no country today 
would fall within this narrowly defined category’.512 In this sense, as the surrogate 
 
510 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011, at para290.  
The Report interprets the rules when applying the Second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 as follows:  
We observe that the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to a "country which has a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade" and "where all domestic prices are fixed by the State". This appears to describe 
a certain type of NME, where the State monopolizes trade and sets all domestic prices. The second Ad Note to 
Article VI:1 would thus not on its face be applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that do not fulfil both conditions, 
that is, the complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade and the fixing of all prices by the State. 
511 See ibid. 
512 See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-
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method in the second Ad Note is not applicable to a country like China, then, the same 
method as in paragraph 150 may have a similar interpretation, which provides reference 
for Article 15 of the CAP.513   
 
5.5 References of interpretation by the European Communities - Definitive Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China Case514and the 
Rusal Armenal ZAO V Council of the European Union Case515 
 
The discussion of WTO case law also shed light on the understanding of Article 15 of 
the CAP. Based on the analysis of the WTO tribunals, the remaining provisions of 
Article 15 (a) and (d) cannot justify NME treatment for China. And China’s market 
status cannot justify an exception to treat China differently in the anti-dumping 
investigation. 
 
The Appellate Body, in the European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China Case, addressed an integral 
feature of Article 15:  
 
Paragraph 15(d) of China's Accession Protocol establishes that the provisions of 
paragraph 15(a) expire 15 years after the date of China's accession (that is, 11 
December 2016). It also provides that other WTO Members shall grant before that 
date the early termination of paragraph 15(a) with respect to China's entire 
economy or specific sectors or industries if China demonstrates under the law of 
the importing WTO Member ‘that it is a market economy’ or that ‘market economy 
conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector’. Since paragraph 15(d) 
provides for rules on the termination of paragraph 15(a), its scope of application 
cannot be wider than that of paragraph 15(a). Both paragraphs concern exclusively 
 
Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 889; Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao and 
Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 
68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977, 1008; Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market 
Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
513 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212. 
514 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011. 
515 See Case T-512/09 Rusal Armenal ZAO v Council of the European Union [2013] ECLI:EU:T:2013:571. 
 198 
the determination of normal value. In other words, paragraph 15(a) contains special 
rules for the determination of normal value in antidumping investigations involving 
China. Paragraph 15(d) in turn establishes that these special rules will expire in 
2016 and sets out certain conditions that may lead to the early termination of these 
special rules before 2016.516 
 
The analysis of the Appellate Body clearly rebuts the viewpoint that in the wake of the 
expiry of subparagraph(a)(ii), the remaining provisions of Article 15 (a) and (d) still  
allow WTO Members to use the non-market economy methodology for China. 517 
According to the Appellate Body, subparagraphs (a) and (d) constitute an integral 
provision regulating special rules for the termination of normal value, where 
subparagraph (a) provides a description of the special rules and subparagraph (d) 
provides a termination clause. 518  In other words, their functions are mutually 
complementary, thus they cannot be interpreted separately. The Appellate Body is very 
prudent to pick the words, it applied “paragraph 15(a)” rather than “paragraph 15(a)(ii)” 
or “chapeau of paragraph 15(a)” to describe “special rules for the determination of 
normal value”, which highlights the “non-market economy treatment” in paragraph 
15(a) should be understand as an integral part. It then confirmed that paragraph 15 (d) 
establishes expiry of “these special rules”, which emphasises paragraph 15 (d) affecting 
on the “non-market economy treatment” under whole part of paragraph 15(a). in this 
regard, subparagraph (b) is functionally established to ensure that the “special rules will 
expire” either in or before 2016.519 
 
 
516 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011. 
517 For example, several experts contend that the NME methodology is still available after 11 December 2016, 
because Article 15(d) refers to the expiry of Article 15 (a)(ii) only, not the whole of Article 15 (a). See Jorge Miranda, 
‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is Contingent upon Whether China 
Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 244; Bernard 
O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ (2015) 10 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 176; Terence P Stewart and others, ‘The Special Case of China: Why the Use of a Special 
Methodology Remains Applicable to China after 2016’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 272; Laurent 
Ruessmann and Jochen Beck, ‘2016 and the Application of an NME Methodology to Chinese Producers in Anti-
Dumping Investigations’ (2014) 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal 457. 
518  See Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
519 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011, at para. 289. 
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Moreover, the integral features of Article 15 may also be reflected in the scope of Article 
15 (d) as delineated by the Appellate Body.520 Regarding Article 15 (d), the Appellate 
Body literally expressed that ‘its scope of application cannot be wider than that of 
paragraph 15(a)’. In other words, the tribunals worried that the interpretation of such a 
provision might exceed the scope of subparagraph 15 (a), i.e. be applied to subsidy 
related affairs. Conversely, the interpretation of Article 15 (d) shall at least including 
Article 15 (a), because it would be unnecessary to use “wider” if subparagraph (d) only 
imply expiry of one part of paragraph (a).  
 
Besides, the tribunal’s analysis also challenges the viewpoint that the “non-market 
economy treatment” is still available due to China’s special market status. 521  The 
Appellate Body stated: 
 
In our view, therefore, Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol does not authorize 
WTO Members to treat China differently from other Members except for the 
determination of price comparability in respect of domestic prices and costs in 
China, which relates to the determination of normal value. We consider that, while 
Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol establishes special rules regarding the 
domestic price aspect of price comparability, it does not contain an open-ended 
exception that allows WTO Members to treat China differently for other purposes 
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, such as the determination 
of export prices or individual versus country-wide margins and duties.522 
 
According to the Appellate Body, Article 15 only allows WTO Members to apply a 
discriminatory treatment to China for price comparability in relation to the 
determination of normal value. An obligation to prove a market economy condition is 
certainly not included and, in the tribunal’s words, this may create a new exception and 
enlarge China’s commitments to the CAP. Therefore, when the provisions of Article 15 
 
520 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
217. 
521 See Barbara Barone and others, ‘Market Economy Status for China after 2016?’ (European Parliament 2016) 
<http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:QA0216255:EN:HTML> accessed 10 July 2020. 
522 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011, at para. 290. 
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expired, there was no reason for a surrogate method to be available based on the claim 
that China is not a market economy country.  
 
The EU’s General Court made similar statements in the Rusal Armenal ZAO V Council 
of the European Union Case:  
 
… [T]he Council states that there are also other members of the WTO which do 
not treat Armenia as a market economy and that, unlike in the cases of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Armenia 
did not negotiate a deadline beyond which the other WTO members were required 
to treat it as a market economy.523  
 
Accordingly, the Court directly believed there were negotiated deadlines for China and 
Vietnam relating to the “non-market economy treatment” as a commitment to them.524 
The Court also, at paragraph 47, emphasized such cut-off date for the expiry of China’s 
commitments for price comparability. The Court stated: 
 
In that regard, the Court notes that point 15 of Part I of the Protocol on the accession 
to the WTO of the People’s Republic of China expressly provides for the possibility 
that other WTO members may not apply Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
where the producer(s) concerned fail to show that they operate under market 
economy conditions as regards the manufacture, production and sale of the like 
product. The same is true of point 3 of Part I of the Protocol on the Accession to 
the WTO of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which, by reference to paragraphs 
527 and 255 of the Working Party Report on the Accession of that country to the 
WTO, lays down an identical exception. It must be emphasised that, contrary to the 
Council’s and the Commission’s contentions, the exceptions in question were not 
requested by those two candidate countries for accession in exchange for setting a 
cut-off date after which they would be repealed. As is apparent from paragraph 150 
of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession to the WTO of the People’s 
Republic of China and from paragraph 254 of the Report of the Working Party on 
the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, it was the WTO members 
which raised the issue of price comparability in the candidate countries and 
obtained the abovementioned commitments from them together with a cut-off date 
 
523 See Case T-512/09 Rusal Armenal ZAO v Council of the European Union [2013] ECLI:EU: T: 2013:571. 
524 See ibid at para 30. See also Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-
Dumping Proceedings against China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade 
and Customs Journal 212, 217.  
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after which the commitments would expire. 
 
The Court confirmed the viewpoint that China’s commitment in the Article relates to 
the price comparability issue, but it is not an obligation to prove its market status. In 
addition, a cut-off date is set to guarantee the expiry of such a commitment. NME 
treatment, thus, cannot be justified by the Protocol based on the cut-off date. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
Three sources, to different extent, permit WTO Members to apply special treatment 
calculating the dumping margin and impose anti-dumping duty. The CAP directly and 
expressly stipulated such discriminatory treatment to China in its Article 15. The 
analysis has attempted to show that WTO Members cannot resort to the CAP when 
applying a surrogate method to calculate dumping margins for China’s products in the 
wake of the expiry of the provisions of Article 15. And especially, such discriminatory 
treatment for China cannot be based on its special market status.  
 
The findings are based on the interpretations of Article 15 of the CAP regarding its 
textual and contextual structure, preparatory work of the protocol along with the WTO 
case law. In detail, based on textual and contextual analysis of Article 15 of the CAP, 
WTO Members may not resort to remaining provisions of Article 15 (a) to apply “the 
non-market economy treatment” for China’s exporters in the anti-dumping 
investigation. Besides, the first and third sentences of Article 15 (d) may not justify a 
surrogate method for China’s product. At least, China is not obliged to prove a market 
economy condition to justify market economy treatment, to WTO Members whose 
national law do not ‘contains market economy criteria as of the date of (China’s) 
accession’. The preparatory resources of Article 15 of CAP, such as the Sino-US 
bilateral WTO agreement525 and working paper on the accession of China526,  indicate 
 
525 See ‘U.S. - China Bilateral WTO Agreement’ (1999) <https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/WTO-
Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-004.html> accessed 13 July 2020.  
526 See Doha WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China’ 
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that the market status of China cannot justify a continuance of the “non-market 
economy treatment”, and such treatment is not recommended for modern China and 
preferable to be terminated in the wake of the expiry of Article 15 (a)(ii). Based on the 
analysis of international cases, the European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China Case527 and the Rusal Armenal 
ZAO V Council of the European Union Case,528 the remaining provisions of Article 15 
(a) and (d) cannot justify the “non-market economy treatment” for China. And China’s 
market status cannot support an exception to treat China differently in anti-dumping 
investigation. 
 
However, as discussed by several commentators, ‘this does not mean that the EU or 
other markets will have no defence against genuine Chinese dumping practices’.529 
Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994 stipulated the determination of 
dumping margins in special situations. And the interpretations of the CAP do not 
preclude WTO Members from applying general rules as set out in Article 2 of the ADA 
and Article VI of the GATT 1994.530 As a very creative practitioner in this regard, the 
EU has made revisions to its anti-dumping regulations by replacing the non-market 
economy provisions with a country-neutral methodology dealing with market 




<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/Min01/3.pdf&Open=True> accessed 10 
July 2020. 
527 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011. 
528 See Case T-512/09 Rusal Armenal ZAO v Council of the European Union [2013] ECLI:EU:T:2013:571. 
529 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
224; Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
530  See Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
531 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
224; Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
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Chapter 6: The special treatment in the EU anti-dumping regulations 
 
This chapter has explored the appropriate interpretation of another legal basis to the 
“non-market economy treatment” – Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 
1994 – under the WTO law. In specific, it examined the revisions of the “non-market 
economy treatment” provisions in the EU anti-dumping regulations and their 
conformity with the WTO law. It concluded that, when conducting the anti-dumping 
investigations of either market or non-market economies under the WTO legal system, 
the primary choice in determining a normal value shall be based on the actual cost of 
production “in the country of origin”, even though such cost is considered to be 
“distorted”. When the construction of a normal value is necessary, all factors related to 
the costs in that country, including “price distortions” should be considered ‘as long as 
they reflect the prevailing conditions in the market of exportation’. 
 
6.1 The EU anti-dumping regulations: a response to the “non-market economy 
treatment” 
 
Revisions to the anti-dumping regulations were made by the European Parliament and 
the Council in 2016 and 2017, respectively; these reflect that the EU intended to take 
steps regulating special treatment at the national level due to a number of external 
factors. 532  On June 8, 2016, the European Parliament and the Council published 
Regulation 2016/1036533 (henceforth 2016 Regulation) serving as a revision of the 2009 
Regulation534 and regulating NME related affairs. Soon after, on 12 December 2017, a 
 
532  Factors include “huge overcapacities overseas fuelled by massive subsidies and price-distorting policies”, 
especially, in the steel industry, see Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market 
Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 
886. See also Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union 
– A Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global 
Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
533 Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union [2016] L176/21. 
534 Council Regulation (EC) 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries 
not members of the European Community [2009] OJ L343/51. 
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new regulation was released, the new 2017 Regulation535 revised the articles of the 2016 
Regulation with respect to determinations of normal value in the case of imports from 
countries with “significant market distortions”. The new regulation also abolished the 
notion of “non-market-economy” countries and provisions pertaining to their treatment.  
 
The 2017 Regulation seems to be an attempt that eliminates the boundary between 
market economy and non-market economy countries, thus treating all WTO Members 
equally. It is supposed that China and other so called “non-market economies” can be 
treated equally as market economies, meanwhile, normal value construction and the 
third country or analogue country methodology will not be applied to products 
produced in and exported from those countries. Undoubtedly, if the regulation serves 
that purpose, the EU’s move will play a representative role in reducing trade disputes 
raised by special treatment of non-market economies. Opponents of this view 
commented that the new methodology ‘is designed to maintain the effects of the NME 
Methodology by ensuring the same level of AD duties as the EU had been able to 
impose through the NME Methodology’.536 
 
More importantly, the revisions of EU anti-dumping regulations reflect the EU’s 
attitude to the interpretation of China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO.537 After 2016, 
Article 15(a)(ii) of the China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO officially expired; then, 
the treatment of China’s products in anti-dumping investigations was urged to be put 
on the table. Obviously, China expects the EU to follow standard comparisons for 
dumping margins under Article 2 of the ADA. However, the “non-market economy 
 
535 Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Union [2017] L338/1. 
536 See Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-
Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
537 See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-
Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 886. See also Edwin Vermulst and 
Juhi Sud, ‘Treatment of China in EU Anti-dumping Investigations Post-December 2017: Plus ça change, plus c’est 
la même chose’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading 
System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
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treatment” could enable the EU to protect its domestic industry through implementation 
of anti-dumping measures while sidestep controversary by China’s unique economic 
structure. In this regard, new anti-dumping regulation is enacted as a response. 
 
6.2 The “non-market economy treatment” in the EU 2016 anti-dumping regulation 
 
Under the WTO framework, there is no specific definition of a market economy and an 
non-market economy.538 Although the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 
defines a special situation/status of an economy that ‘has a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State’, it 
intended to describe a special situation to evaluate dumping margins. And even though 
they may be regarded as a standard for non-market economy, it is too strict and 
accordingly ‘not a single WTO Members would qualify as a non-market economy 
anymore’.539  
 
Comparatively, the EU provides systematic standards around the topic of market status 
for trade remedy. First, the European Commission has a set of standards to determine 
economic status. 540  Accordingly, non-market economies can be granted market 
 
538 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
228. 
539 See Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A 
Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global 
Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
540 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Commission Staff Document on Progress by the People’s Republic 
of China towards Graduation to Market Economy Status in Trade Defence Investigations SEC (2008) 2503 Final’ 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_143599.pdf> accessed 10 July 2020.  
In China’s case, the five criteria are as follows: 
1 a low degree of government influence over the allocation of resources and decisions of enterprises, 
whether directly or indirectly (e.g. public bodies), for example through the use of state-fixed prices, 
or discrimination in the tax, trade or currency regimes. 
2 an absence of state-induced distortions in the operation of enterprises linked to privatisation and the 
use of nonmarket trade or compensation system. 
3 the existence and implementation of a transparent and nondiscriminatory company law which 
ensures adequate corporate governance (application of international accounting standards, protection 
of shareholders, public availability of accurate company information). 
4 the existence and implementation of a coherent, effective, and transparent set of laws which ensure 
 206 
economy status, if it fulfilled criteria enacted by European Commission. Besides, 
countries that cannot get market economy status may be able to acquire the same 
“treatment” as a market economy if they comply with Article 2.7 (c) of the EU 2016 
Regulation.541  
 
Otherwise, Article 2.7 allows discriminatory treatment in dumping margin calculation 
for non-market economies, it provides that: 
 
In the case of imports from non-market-economy countries, the normal value shall 
be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy 
third country, or the price from such a third country to other countries… 
 
The stipulation has similar expressions to Article 2.2 of the ADA and Article VI: (b) of 
the GATT 1994 on building normal value, but they differ in the details. Article 2.7 
clearly points out that the construction of normal value applies to non-market 
economies, while the WTO rules do not address the nature of targeted countries. 
According to Article 2.2 of the ADA and Article VI: (b) of the GATT 1994, alternative 
treatments in the anti-dumping investigation might be applied when “a proper 
comparison” is not available. And this is further explained by three situations: no sales 
 
the respect of property rights and the operation of a functioning bankruptcy regime. 
5 the existence of a genuine financial sector which operates independently from the state and which in 
law and practice is subject to sufficient guarantee provisions and adequate supervision.” 
541 The standards of Article 2.7 (c) include: 
1) decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of 
technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting 
supply and demand, and without significant State interference in that regard, and costs of major inputs 
substantially reflect market values, 
2) firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited in line with 
international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes,   
3) the production costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant distortions carried 
over from the former non-market-economy system, in particular in relation to depreciation of assets, other 
write-offs, barter trade and payment via compensation of debts, 
4) the firms concerned are subject to bankruptcy and property laws which guarantee legal certainty and 
stability for the operation of firms, and 
5) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate. 
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of a like product “in the ordinary course of trade”, a “particular market situation” or a 
“low volume of the sales”. The three situations illustrate three main problems that the 
authority may confront in anti-dumping investigations. The attitude of WTO rules is 
thus more problem-based and relates to a specific situation where a proper comparison 
is not possible. Comparatively, Article 2.7 connects a special economic status directly 
to discriminatory treatment, which indicates it recognises that a non-market economy 
may represent all the abnormal circumstances stipulated in the ADA. According to the 
Court of Justice (EU) in the Commission v Rusal Armenal Case, ‘the NME 
methodology under Article 2.7 of the Basic Regulation represented “an approach 
specific to the EU legal order” rather than an implementation of particular WTO 
obligations regarding determination of dumping’.542  
 
Notably, although the EU Commission has standards to determine economic status, it 
is not stipulated within the 2016 Regulation, but conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
Despite a market economy treatment being available under Article 2.7(c), producers 
have a burden of proof and it is not easy to satisfy the thresholds.543 The notion of a 
“non-market economy”, without a unified definition, may grant the EU excessive 
autonomy in determining market status, which may lead to disputes in anti-dumping 
investigations.544  
 
Nevertheless, the 2016 Regulation has a well-built system for the identification of 
market status and the treatment of an “immature” market; even for a transitional market, 
it provides a “market economy” treatment solution. However, such a system is 
challenged when targeting on China, especially by the expiry of Article 15: (a)(ii) of 
 
542 See Judgment of the Court of 16 July 2015, Commission v Rusal Armenal, C-21/14 P, EU:C:2015:494, at paras 
53 and 59, as cited by Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market Distortions, and the 
2017 EU Anti-Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 888. 
543 “As market economy treatment was granted in response to only 41 (or 17%) out of 248 requests received between 
2006 and 2015”. See Shadikhodjaev, Sherzod. “Non-Market Economies, Significant Market Distortions, and the 
2017 EU Anti-Dumping Amendment.” Journal of International Economic Law., vol. 21, no. 4, 2018, pp. 888–889. 
544 For example, in 2016, China requested consultations with the European Union on measures related to price 
comparison methodologies under EU 2016 anti-dumping regulation. See Communication from the Panel, 
EUROPEAN UNION — MEASURES RELATED TO PRICE COMPARISON METHODOLOGIES, WT/DS516/9, 
3 October 2017. 
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China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO. Some experts consider that from 12 December 
2016, WTO members can not resort to the CAP applying the “non-market economy 
treatment” to China in the anti-dumping investigation, but rather use domestic prices or 
costs of China’s products.545 As alternatives, WTO Members may resort to general rules 
set out in Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Therefore, as a 
response to the non-market economy issue by the Accession Protocol, the EU published 
its 2017 Regulation.546 
 
6.3 An evaluation of the special treatment in the EU 2017 anti-dumping regulation 
and its conformity with WTO law 
 
The analysis showed that the special treatment in the EU’s 2017 Regulation may not 
conform to WTO anti-dumping regulations. It suggested that when conducting anti-
dumping investigation on either market or non-market economies, the primary choice 
for determining the normal value shall be based on the actual cost of production, even 
though such cost is considered to be “distorted”. When the construction of a normal 
value is necessary, all factors related to the costs in that country, including “price 
distortions”, should be considered ‘as long as they reflect the prevailing conditions in 
the market of exportation’. 
 
In detail, the revisions to the “non-market economy treatment” are reflected in two parts 
in the 2017 Regulation. First, the Commission is vested with the authority to disregard 
the domestic prices of producers or exporters when there are “significant distortions” 
 
545 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
228. See also Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union 
– A Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global 
Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
546 See Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-
Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. Edwin Vermulst and Juhi Sud, ‘Treatment of 
China in EU Anti-dumping Investigations Post-December 2017: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’ in James 
J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of 
China (Springer Singapore 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
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in the country under anti-dumping investigation. The 2017 Regulation further explains 
“significant distortion” as ‘distortions which occur when reported prices or costs, 
including the costs of raw materials and energy, are not the result of free market forces 
because they are affected by substantial government intervention’ in Article 6a: (b). 
Moreover, in identifying “significant distortion”, the Commission shall consider six 
elements,547 which are mainly on the same basis as the five criteria evaluating China’s 
economy status. Unlike the five criteria, not all of these elements need to be satisfied, 
this might be because the burden of proof is transferred from the producers to the 
Commission, and as a result, reduces the pressure of the Commission.548 Therefore, the 
Commission still has wide discretion to identify any of the elements.549 
 
Second, the surrogate country approach is removed from the discriminatory treatment 
and ‘normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production 
and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’ as long as a “significant distortion” 
is proved. A list of referential sources is provided by the 2017 Regulation for the 
construction of normal value.550 
 
547 Potential impact of elements to assess the existence of significant distortions include: 
— the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, 
control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country; 
— state presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs; 
— public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free 
market forces; 
— the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws; 
— wage costs being distorted; 
— access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting 
independently of the state. 
548 See Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-
Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
549 See ibid. 
550 The sources the Commission may use include: 
— corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country with a similar level of 
economic development as the exporting country, provided the relevant data are readily available; where there 
is more than one such country, preference shall be given, where appropriate, to countries with an adequate 
level of social and environmental protection; 
— if it considers appropriate, undistorted international prices, costs, or benchmarks; or 
— domestic costs, but only to the extent that they are positively established not to be distorted, on the basis of 
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The amendments are generally critiqued as extreme ambiguity, reintroduction of “non-
market economy treatment” and country-wide approach (that ignores the individual 
exporters). 551  In addition to the critiques, the following sections will analyse the 
consistency between these amendments and WTO rules in depth.   
 
6.3.1 Thresholds of alternative treatments under WTO rules and the 2017 
Regulation 
 
Regarding thresholds for alternative treatment, the 2017 Regulation may not conform 
to WTO regulations, because the “significant distortion” relying on “substantial 
government intervention” does not satisfy the interpretations of two standards of WTO 
rules: “in the ordinary course of trade” and “the particular market situation”.  
 
6.3.1.1 The standard of “no sales in the ordinary course of trade” 
 
As mentioned by the Appellate Body in the United States - Anti-dumping Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan Case, Article 2.2.1 of the ADA sets forth 
a method for determining whether the sales between any two parties are “in the ordinary 
course of trade”, but it does not address the more specific issue of transactions between 
affiliated parties.552 Therefore, the expression “in the ordinary course of trade” shall be 
analysed and interpreted through international regulations. 
 
Regarding the principles of interpretation, recalling the United States - Standards for 
 
accurate and appropriate evidence, including in the framework of the provisions on interested parties in point 
(c). 
551 See Edwin Vermulst and Juhi Sud, ‘Treatment of China in EU Anti-dumping Investigations Post-December 2017: 
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies 
in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
552 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 24 July 2001, at para 147. 
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Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Case553, the Appellate Body announced that 
WTO law could be interpreted by the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties), and recalled Article 31 of the VCLT whereby ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.554Accordingly, “ordinary 
meaning”, “context” and “object and purpose” are the references when interpreting the 
WTO provisions. 
 
Based on the VCLT, the interpretation begins with an analysis of the ordinary meaning 
of “the ordinary course of trade”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
“ordinary” refers to “belonging to the regular or usual order or course of things”,555 
“trade” refers to “commercial activity; the buying and selling of goods and 
commodities”; 556  furthermore, commercial refers to “looking toward financial 
profit”.557 Then, the ordinary meaning of “the ordinary course of trade” is pursuing 
profit by buying and selling goods and commodities.558 Thus, one essential standard as 
implied by Article 2.2.1 is whether the destination of sale is making profits, thereby 
activities which are not aiming to make profits are beyond this meaning.  
 
Under the 2017 Regulation, the “significant distortion” is stipulated as a domestic 
market where prices or costs “are not the result of free market forces” because of 
“substantial government intervention”.559  
 
 
553  See Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996. 




558 The ordinary meaning of “ordinary course of trade” is also addressed by experts, see Christian Tietje and Vinzenz 
Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc 
Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global Policy Trends and Legal Challenges 
(Springer International Publishing 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 
2020. 
559 Article 6a: (b) of 2017 Regulation provides: ‘significant distortions are those distortions which occur when 
reported prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials and energy, are not the result of free market forces 
because they are affected by substantial government intervention’. 
 212 
The standard of “profit” is not reflected in this provision. Instead, evaluation of 
“significant distortion” relies on expression of prices or costs. In the United States - 
Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan Case, the 
Appellate Body expressed that price is merely one of terms and conditions of a 
transaction, and to evaluate the price in “the ordinary course of trade”, different factors 
shall be considered, such as the volume of sales transactions and additional liabilities 
or responsibilities in some transactions.560 Accordingly, despite price is of relevance, it 
is not the decisive factor to demonstrate whether an activity is “in the ordinary course 
of trade”.  
 
Arguably, “government intervention” may neither contribute to the requirements in 
Article 2.2.1 of the ADA. For example, a government may organize cooperation and 
training project among companies. And as a result, although the costs and prices of 
products decreased, the overall profits increase because of the training of technicians 
and upgrading of technology, which increase the competitiveness of the products at 
issue, and such a result embodies the overall goal of the manufacturer intending to make 
profits. In this sense, “government intervention” could assist manufacturers in making 
profits in the market and this does not necessarily violate free market forces. In addition, 
as Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher state in their research, a price resulting from 
circumstances other than free market forces does not mean that the actual transaction 
no longer follows economic procedures.561 
 
6.3.1.2 Standard of “particular market situation” 
 
The interpretation of “particular market situation” shall also accord with the VCLT. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “market” refers to “a place at which trade 
 
560 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 24 July 2001, at para 142. 
561 See Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A 
Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global 
Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
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is conducted” 562 , and “situation” refers to a “place, position … in relation to its 
surroundings”; 563  further, “particular” refers to “distinct, individual, specific”. 564  A 
“market” itself is a neutral word that only indicates a platform offering transactions. 
And “market situation” can be understood as a market position or a market within its 
surroundings. Thus, the ordinary meaning of a “particular market situation” is a specific 
market position or market surrounding, and the reason why such a market position is 
specific is because the market is affected by external factors.565  
 
According to the 2017 Regulation, a significantly distorted market is one which is 
“affected by substantial government intervention”. However, “intervention” means 
“interfering in any affair, so as to affect its course or issue”, thus “government 
intervention” also stands for a neutral position which implies the government may have 
an effect in the course of trade but it is uncertain that whether it has positive or negative 
results. Therefore, simply connecting negative circumstances of “significant distortion” 
with “government intervention” may be improper. The “government intervention” itself 
does not cause any injury to the domestic industries of importing countries, and positive 
evidence shall be provided that the relevant price is outside free market forces or the 
objectives law of economy, if that intervention has any negative effect. As some experts 
state, the finding of a “particular market situation” cannot be only based on government 
interference, and such interference must lead to dysfunction in free market forces.566 
 
Furthermore, ascribing “significant distortion” to “government intervention” may lead 
to controversary between the ADA and the ASCM.567 Dumping and subsidy are two 





565 As analysed by Christian Tietje, “whenever a market situation is particular, pricing is not determined by these 
market forces but rather influenced by external factors”. See Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-
Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), 
The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International 
Publishing 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
566 See ibid. 
567 See ibid. 
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The ADA aims to offset injuries from dumping by private manufacturers, while the 
ASCM aims to counteract injuries from state subsidies. Therefore, an anti-dumping 
measure based on a “particular market situation” and state behaviour may conflate 
purposes of the ADA and the ASCM.  
 
In this regard, it may be improper to limit ‘cases of normal value construction to the 
situation of substantial government intervention’.568 This interpretation may be further 
supported by the “double remedy” issue as analysed by the Appellate Body in the 
United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China Case. According to the Appellate Body, the “double remedy” issue is a 
combination of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures that: 
 
…reflects not only price discrimination by the investigated producer between the 
domestic and export markets (“dumping”), but also “economic distortions that 
affect the producer’s costs of production”, including specific subsidies to the 
investigated producer … An anti-dumping duty calculated based on an NME 
methodology may, therefore, “remedy” or “offset” a domestic subsidy, to the extent 
that such subsidy has contributed to a lowering of the export price.569 
 
The Appellate Body established a connection between “economic distortions” and 
“subsidy” by a state, which is under the governance of countervailing law. The 
stipulations of the 2017 Regulation, with a similar connection, however, are under the 
governance of anti-dumping law. In that circumstance, since a government subsidy is 
one type of “government interference”, then it belongs to the case of “significant 
distortion” under the govern of 2017 Regulation, while it also belongs to a case of 
“economic distortion” under the ASCM, so a contradiction occurs between two kinds 
of law.  
 
Notably, the US Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 links “ordinary course of 
 
568 See ibid. 
569 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 519. 
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trade” with “particular market situation”.570 The Act adds a situation that outside the 
“ordinary course of trade” as follows: ‘the administering authority determines that the 
particular market situation prevents a proper comparison with the export price or 
constructed export price’.571 Based on this provision, the USDOC is granted with the 
authority to apply special methodology in anti-dumping investigation, i.e. disregarding 
the cost in exporting country, if it believes the ‘particular market situation prevents a 
proper comparison with the export price or constructed export price’. And this is the 
case in the administrative review on oil country tubular goods (OCTG) from the 
Republic of Korea.572 In this case, the USDOC made affirmative decision that Korean 
OCTG market as particular market without defining “particular market situation” or 
factors that constitute “particular market situation”. 573  As commented by James J. 
Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘decision of the USDOC leaves the meaning 
and criteria of the term PMS ambiguous and leaves the door open for similar allegations 
against China, wherein U.S. producers can claim that state interference creates market 
distortions which do not allow for proper price comparison’.574 Furthermore, the Act 
also make market economy producers no longer “immune” to a surrogate method that 
usually targets on non-market economies. 575  Because a justification of alternative 
method of constructing normal value is based on a founding of “particular market 
situation” but not the market economy status. However, disregarding the “actual cost” 
incurred by the particular producer or exporter for the product when calculating 
dumping margin in anti-dumping investigation solely relying on “particular market 
 
570 Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–27, §504, 129 Stat. 362–419 (2015). 
571 See ibid. 
572  See International Trade Administration United States Department of Commerce, ‘Issues and Decision 
Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2014-2015 Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on 
Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea A-580-870’ 40 
<https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/korea-south/2017-07684-1.pdf> accessed 10 July 2020. See also, 
James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, ‘China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis of 
China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices’ in J James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-
Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
573 See ibid. 
574 See ibid. 
575 See Moushami Joshi, ‘Shifting Sands: The Evolution and Future Course of U.S. Anti-dumping Law and Practice 
Aginst China and Vietnam’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global 
Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
 216 
situation” is against the decision of the Appellate Body in the European Union - Anti-
Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina Case, which will be discussed in the 
following sections.576 
 
6.3.2 The construction of normal value  
 
Regarding the construction of normal value, a constructed normal value without 
reflecting distortion by the exporting country may be contrary to the Appellate Body’s 
decision in the European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina 
Case.577 And it may further lead to an increase of dumping margin and a “double 
remedy” issue. The analysis suggested that when conducting anti-dumping 
investigations on either market or non-market economies, the primary choice in 
determining a normal value shall be based on the actual costs of production, even if 
such cost is considered to be “distorted”. When a construction of normal value is 
necessary, all factors related to the costs in that country, including “price distortions”, 
should be considered ‘as long as they reflect the prevailing conditions in the market of 
exportation’. 
 
6.3.2.1 Options to determine the normal value 
 
In the anti-dumping investigation, one salient difference between Article 2.2 of the 
ADA, Article VI:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and the 2017 Regulation in terms of special 
treatment is the options provided for the normal value determination. WTO rules 
allow two methods to determine normal value, one is to ‘take a comparable price of 
a like product when exported to an appropriate third country’, the other is to construct 
normal value based on ‘the cost of the product in the country of origin plus a 
reasonable amount’. Compared with WTO law, the surrogate country method is 
 
576  See Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016. 
577 See ibid, at para. 7.3. 
 217 
eliminated by the 2017 Regulation in the context of “significant distortions”, and only 
one method is left, ‘the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on costs of 
production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’.  
 
It is difficult to determine whether more options could be more efficient to deal with 
anti-dumping issues. For a single option, the authority may focus on one method and 
save time when assessing which option is more scientific and closer to the facts. 
Comparatively, the construction of normal value itself is a complicated task, thus 
consuming time, so in this sense, a surrogate country method might be a wise choice if 
strictly proved. Neither the WTO anti-dumping law nor the tribunals clear discusses the 
options of normal value determination. So, it is supposed that two methods to determine 
normal value under Article 2.2 of the ADA, Article VI:1(b) of the GATT 1994 are 
results of the Uruguay Round Negotiations, where negotiators reached a conclusion that 
the purpose of WTO anti-dumping agreement can be achieved by two options. 
 
6.3.2.2 The “distorted prices” shall be considered for the normal value 
construction 
 
Both the WTO law and the EU regulation agree that the construction of the normal 
value is based on the cost of the product. However, the WTO rules regulate the cost of 
the product “in the country of origin”, while the EU regulation regulates it by reflecting 
“undistorted prices”, thus they have differences in the origin of sources. In the European 
Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina Case, the EU authorities 
sought to impose anti-dumping duty on the imports of biodiesel from Argentina. The 
dumping margin was constructed by cost of production other than Argentine biodiesel 
producer’s records based on the finding that the prices of soybeans and soybean oil in 
Argentina were lower than international prices due to the export tax system, which 
constitutes a particular market situation (PMS). The WTO tribunal addressed the issue 
that picking of cost of production under anti-dumping investigation, which relates to 
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the EU’s approach in using “undistorted prices”.578  
 
The Appellate Body first addressed the thresholds of Article 2.2.1.1 of the ADA. Under 
Article 2.2.1.1, investigating authorities are required to use the records kept by the 
exporter or producer for the construction of normal value as long as the records comply 
with ‘‘generally accepted accounting principles’’ (GAAP) and ‘‘reasonably reflect the 
costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration’’ 
(Reasonably Reflecting Test).579 The main argument is whether the second threshold 
refers to “actual cost” incurred by the specific exporter or producer under 
investigation.580 Argentina is the proponent of “actual cost”. And the EU disagree with 
this view based on two claims. First, the EU claims the term “associated” in the second 
threshold refers to “in normal circumstances”, thus ‘the European Union was fully 
entitled to consider which costs would pertain [or relate] to the production and sale of 
biodiesel in normal circumstances” instead of insisting on “actual costs’.581  
 
The Appellate Body rejected EU’s first claim and aligned with the Panel that ‘although 
Article 2.2.1.1 does not explicitly refer to “actual” costs’, the second threshold ‘relates 
to whether the costs set out in a producer's or exporter's records “correspond – within 
acceptable limits – in an accurate and reliable manner to all the actual costs incurred by 
the particular producer or exporter for the product under consideration”’. 582 
Accordingly, the comparison, under the second threshold of Article 2.2.1.1, involves 
either costs ‘reported in the producer[’s]/exporter’s records’ or ‘the costs actually 
incurred by that producer’.583 In this regard, concluding by the Appellate Body, the 
 
578  See Panel Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/DS473/R, 
adopted 29 March 2016 (as modified by the Appellate Body Report). Appellate Body Report, European Union - 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016. 
579 See Weihuan Zhou, ‘Appellate Body Report on EU-Biodiesel: The Future of China’s State Capitalism under the 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement’ (2018) 17 World Trade Review 609, 617. See also Appellate Body Report, 
European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016. 
580  See Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, at para 6.28. 
581 See ibid. 
582 See ibid, at para 6.30. 
583 See ibid. 
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second threshold of Article 2.2.1.1 concerns the costs incurred by the producer that are 
“genuinely related” to the production and sale of the product, which refers to the “actual 
costs” as used by the Panel.584 And the interpretation of “in normal circumstances”, i.e. 
in the absence of the alleged distortion caused by Argentina’s export tax system, would 
add words to the second threshold ‘at issue that are not present in Article 2.2.1.1, namely, 
the costs that “would pertain” and “in normal circumstances”’.585 
 
In addition, the Appellate Body also rejected the EU’s submission that because the first 
threshold of Article 2.2.1.1 prescribes costs that actually incurred, then the second 
threshold ‘must be interpreted to mean something more than that’.586 Conversely, the 
Appellate Body consider the first threshold of Article 2.2.1.1 concerns the general 
activity of producer or exporter, thus the second threshold is ‘specific to the costs 
associated with the production and sale of the product’.587 Therefore, GAAP-consistent 
may nonetheless be found not the reasonably reflect the second threshold.588 
 
Another argument relates to the interpretation of “reasonableness” of the second 
threshold in Article 2.2.1.1. Argued by the EU, the “‘reasonableness’ informs not only 
the term ‘reflect’, but also the determination of the costs associated with the production 
and sale of the product under consideration”.589 The investigation authority is thus 
permitted to consider whether the costs in the records are reasonable, and a fact of 
unreasonableness would allow a replacement of those costs in an appropriate manner.590  
 
The Appellate Body, however, rejected the EU’s claim. According to the Appellate 
Body, there is clearly and simply not an ‘additional or abstract standard of 
‘reasonableness’ that governs the meaning of ‘costs’ in the second condition in the first 
 
584 See ibid. 
585 See ibid. 
586 See ibid, at para 6.3.1. 
587 See ibid, at para 6.33. 
588 See ibid. 
589 See ibid, at para 6.35. 
590 See ibid. 
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sentence of Article 2.2.1.1’.591 
 
In this regard, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that ‘the EU authorities’ 
determination that domestic prices of soybeans in Argentina were lower than 
international prices due to the Argentine export tax system was not, in itself, a sufficient 
basis under Article 2.2.1.1 for concluding that the producers’ records do not reasonably 
reflect the costs of soybeans associated with the production and sale of biodiesel, or for 
disregarding those costs when constructing the normal value of biodiesel’.592 
 
Article 2.2.1.1, as interpreted by the tribunals, emphasizes the use of “actual cost” of 
production, even though such cost is considered to be “distorted” or “artificially 
lowered”. Price distortion may not able to justify the use of surrogate costs for normal 
value construction as long as they are suitably and sufficiently reflected by records kept 
by the exporter or producer. At least, “price distortions” from the export tax system in 
the European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina Case 
clearly neither constitute a PMS nor correspond to a violation of two thresholds in 
Article 2.2.1.1. As analysed by one commentator, ‘the Appellate Body’s rulings come 
very close to the proposition that price distortions caused by state intervention, and a 
finding of PMS on that basis, is irrelevant to the determination of whether surrogate 
costs should be employed’.593  
 
The findings by the tribunal in the European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Biodiesel from Argentina Case is supported in the Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Ammonium Nitrate Case, where the Appellate Body recalled that ‘it is the records of 
the individual exporter or producer under investigation that are subject to the condition 
to “reasonably reflect” the “costs” associated with the production and sale of the 
product under consideration’.594  The Panel in the recent European Union – Cost 
 
591 See ibid, at para 6.37. 
592 See ibid, at para 6.55. 
593 See Weihuan Zhou, ‘Appellate Body Report on EU-Biodiesel: The Future of China’s State Capitalism under the 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement’ (2018) 17 World Trade Review 609, 618. 
594 See Appellate Body Report, Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate, WT/493/AB/R, adopted 
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Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti – Dumping Measures on Imports from 
Russia Case also highlighted findings in aforementioned two cases that the existence 
of government measures (at least in the two cases) ‘did not constitute a sufficient or 
adequate basis to conclude, in application of the second condition in Article 2.2.1.1, 
that the records of the producer or exporter under investigation do not “reasonably 
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under 
consideration”’.595 
 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body, in analysing the “as such” claim, considered two 
circumstances in footnotes where the construction of normal value might be 
necessary. 596  In analysing out-of-country information, the tribunal admitted that 
‘sources outside the “country of origin” may need to be analysed’.597 However, there 
is one rule that needs to be follow under the Article 2.2 of the ADA, according to the 
Appellate Body in European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from 
Argentina Case: 
 
In circumstances where the obligation in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 to 
calculate the costs on the basis of the records kept by the exporter or producer under 
investigation does not apply, or where relevant information from the exporter or 
producer under investigation is not available, an investigating authority may have 
recourse to alternative bases to calculate some or all such costs. Yet, Article 2.2 
does not specify precisely to what evidence an authority may resort. This suggests 
that, in such circumstances, the authority is not prohibited from relying on 
information other than that contained in the records kept by the exporter or 
producer, including in-country and out-of-country evidence. This, however, does 
 
12 September 2019, at para 6.88. 
595 See Pane Report, European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti – Dumping Measures on 
Imports from Russia, WT/494/R, adopted 24 July 2020, at para 7.98. 
596 One is “where the producer under investigation purchases inputs from outside the country of origin to produce 
the product under consideration”. Another is “where the producer under investigation refuses access to and does not 
provide information concerning costs, and the investigating authority relies on ‘best information available’ under 
Article 6.8 and Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement”. See Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-
Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, footnote 228, footnote 
230. 
597 According to the Appellate Body:  
We do not see, however, that the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 precludes information or evidence from other 
sources from being used in certain circumstances. Indeed, it is clear to us that, in some circumstances, the 
information in the records kept by the exporter (...) may need to be analysed (...) including (...) sources outside 
the “country of origin. 
See Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, at para. 6.71. 
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not mean that an investigating authority may simply substitute the costs from 
outside the country of origin for the ‘cost of production in the country of origin’. 
Indeed, Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the 
GATT 1994 make clear that the determination is of the ‘cost of production … in 
the country of origin’. Thus, whatever the information that it uses, an investigating 
authority has to ensure that such information is used to arrive at the ‘cost of 
production in the country of origin’. Compliance with this obligation may require 
the investigating authority to adapt the information that it collects.598 
 
Accordingly, out-of-country sources are not simply a substitute for original sources, but 
work as a reference to ‘arrive at the cost of production in the country of origin’ as 
stipulated as basic principle in Article 2.2 of the ADA. The investigating authority is 
obliged to “adapt” collected information including out-of-country information closely 
to the cost of production “in the country of origin”. As has been readdressed by the 
Panel in the recent European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti 
– Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia Case and the Appellate Body in the 
Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate Case, an investigating 
authority is ‘not allowed to simply substitute the costs from outside the country of origin 
for the “cost of production in the country of origin”’.599 
 
In this regard, there are two trains of thoughts on how to “adapt” the information to “in 
the country of origin”. One comes from the interpretation of Article 2.2.1.1. As analysed 
by the tribunal, actual costs kept by the exporter or producer shall reflect the ‘costs 
associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration’ where 
“distorted” or “artificially lowered” prices are of concern. Thus, such a “distorted” price 
shall be considered to reflect “in the country of origin”.  
 
Another one is indicated by the Appellate body’s ruling on the adjustment of 
constructed normal value by EU authorities. It states: 
 
 
598 See ibid, at para. 6.73. 
599 See Pane Report, European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti – Dumping Measures on 
Imports from Russia, WT/494/R, adopted 24 July 2020, at para 7.122; See Appellate Body Report, Ukraine - Anti-
Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate, WT/493/AB/R, adopted 12 September 2019, at para 6.73. 
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Other than pointing to the deduction of fobbing costs, the European Union has not 
asserted, either before the Panel or before us, that the EU authorities adapted, or 
even considered adapting, the information used in their calculation in order to 
ensure that it represented the cost of production in Argentina. On the contrary, the 
EU authorities specifically selected the surrogate price for soybeans to remove the 
perceived distortion in the cost of soybeans in Argentina. As the Panel stated, the 
EU authorities selected and used this particular information precisely because it 
did not represent the cost of soybeans in Argentina. Thus, we agree with the Panel 
that the surrogate price for soybeans used by the EU authorities did not represent 
the cost of soybeans in Argentina for producers or exporters of biodiesel.600 
 
Accordingly, the investigating authority is obliged to adapt information representing 
the cost of production in original country. An adjustment is thus required to represent 
all factors related to the costs in that country, including the “distorted” situation. 
Conclusively, “price distortions” should be considered for normal value construction 
‘as long as they reflect the prevailing conditions in the market of exportation’.601 The 
investigating authority is only allowed to apply external benchmark when: (i) the 
records do not comply with ‘‘generally accepted accounting principles’’ (GAAP); and 
(ii) the records do not ‘suitably and sufficiently correspond to or reproduce the costs 
that have a genuine relationship with the production and sale of the specific product 
under consideration’.602 This also corresponds to the analysis of one commentator that 
‘if an authority collects data from external sources (i.e. third countries or international 
reference prices) these data have to be adapted in a way that they reflect the prevailing 
distortions in the market at issue’.603  
 
The controversary on whether applying “undistorted price” can also be analysed in the 
context of “double remedy” issue through a simple calculation of dumping margin and 
 
600  See Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, at para. 6.81. 
601 See ibid. 
602 See ibid, at para. 6.22. See also, Mukesh Bhatnagar, Pallavi and Isha Das, ‘External Benchmark Choices in Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings: A Battle of ‘Proxies’?’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou 
(eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. 
603 See Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A 
Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global 
Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
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duties. Pursuant to Article 2.2 and 2.4 of the ADA,604 the dumping margin (henceforth 
DM) is calculated by a fair comparison between the normal value (henceforth NV) and 
the export price (henceforth EP; then, the formula is: DM=NV-EP. If NV — usually the 
domestic price of a product in the market of the exporting country — is higher than the 
EP, then a positive DM indicates a potential dumping behaviour, and anti-dumping 
measures may be implemented based on a determination of injury by investigation.  
 
In cases of export subsidy, the EP, probably lower than the domestic price due to subsidy, 
is reflected in the dumping calculation, thus increasing the DM compared to that of an 
unsubsidized case, which will lead to the application of an anti-dumping measure. If a 
countervailing duty is applied to the same product due to that export subsidy, then the 
export subsidy has been compensated for twice through anti-dumping duty and 
countervailing duty. “Double counting” in this case is officially prohibited by Article 
VI: 5 of the GATT 1994.605  
 
In the case of domestic subsidy, WTO law does not give specific rules, because usually 
it will not trigger the issue of “double remedy”. In general, domestic subsidization 
affects the NV (normally the domestic price), the EP and the DM equally, thus leaving 
the DM unchanged. Hence it might be a simple countervailing issue. 
 
Pursuant to Article 2.6a.(a) of the 2017 Regulation, the NV shall be constructed 
exclusively based on the cost of production and undistorted sale. As analysed above, 
distortions are subtracted from the NV, thus it cannot reflect the impact of the subsidy 
on relevant products. As a result, the subsidy’s impact on the EP remains, but its impact 
is removed from the NV, which leads to an increase in the dumping margin. As a result, 
an anti-dumping measure and a countervailing measure might be applied 
simultaneously based on subsidy and an approach of normal value construction, thus 
 
604 Article 2.4 of ADA stipulates that: ‘a fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal 
value’. 
605  Article VI: 5 of GATT 1994 stipulates that: ‘No product … shall be subject to both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization’. 
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leading to the issue of “double remedies”. 
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Table 1 illustrates that the application of “undistorted price” to construct a normal value 
under the 2017 Regulation could lead to a higher dumping margin. In general, the 
original DM in China would be ₤100, when the NV and the EP are ₤500 and ₤400, 
respectively. However, the market in China is considered to be significantly distorted, 
which is very probable in practice, thus the NV would not be China’s domestic price, 
but constructed by sources without distortion (for the purpose of comparison, normal 
value without distortion derives from that of India, with a similar level of economic 
development as China and whose market in generally not considered to be distorted). 
Hence, the DM would be increased by 30% to ₤130, based on a comparison between 
an increased NV — “undistorted” domestic price in India — and China’s EP.  
 
The result can be further supported by the anti-dumping duties in the European Union 
- Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina Case where the margins of 
Argentina’s product calculated in the EU Provisional Regulation, ‘ranging from 6.8% 
to 10.6%, with the duties imposed by the EU authorities in the Definitive Regulation, 
which ranged from 22.0% to 25.7%, i.e. two to three times higher’.606 
 
606  See Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
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The impact of “undistorted price” in the case of domestic subsidy will be magnified. In 
general, under a domestic subsidy of ₤50, the DM will stay unchanged if the normal 
value construction follows the domestic price in China, because both the domestic price 
and the EP will be decreased by the impact of the subsidy. In contrast, the constructed 
NV without distortion may lead to an increase of DM when compared with the China’s 
EP. Hence, the “undistorted price” may result in an unfair calculation of dumping 
margin.     
 
Table 2 Calculation of duties under domestic subsidy 
 No 
subsidy 
Domestic subsidy ₤50, 
normal value by 
distorted price 
Domestic subsidy ₤50, 
normal value by 
undistorted price 
Normal value ₤500 ₤500-₤50=₤450 ₤500-₤0=₤500 
Export price ₤400 ₤400-₤50=₤350 ₤400-₤50=₤350 
AD ₤100 ₤450-₤350=₤100 ₤500-₤350=₤150 
CVD ₤0 ₤50 ₤50 
 
Table 2 illustrates that the application of “undistorted price” to construct normal value 
under domestic subsidy could lead to a serious issue of “double remedy”. When 
following China’s domestic price as the NV, both the domestic price and the EP 
decrease under domestic subsidy, the DM remain at ₤100 and is well balanced by 
market forces. And even though there exists a DM of ₤100 and a ₤50 subsidy, they are 
subject to anti-dumping law and countervailing law, respectively, thus leaving no 
potential mistakes and confusion in calculating anti-dumping duty and countervailing 
duty.  
 
However, when applying the 2017 Regulation, the domestic price is replaced by an 
 
WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, at para 6.108. 
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“undistorted price” that has not been affected by domestic subsidy, thus it would not 
decrease pro -rata like EP, which leads to an increase in the DM. Conclusively, the anti-
dumping duty and the countervailing duty is ₤200 (₤150+₤50) under the “undistorted” 
method, while the fact is that at ₤150 (₤100+₤50), by which the ₤50 domestic subsidy 
has been compensated for twice.607  
 
The Appellate Body, in the United States - Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-
Rolled Steel Products from Japan Case, addressed the issue by referring to “fair 
comparison” as stipulated in Article 2.1 of the ADA, it stated:  
 
…to ensure that prices are ‘comparable’, the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides a 
mechanism, in Article 2.4, which allows investigating authorities to take full 
account of the fact … [that] In making a ‘fair comparison’, Article 2.4 mandates 
that due account be taken of ‘differences which affect price comparability’, such 
as differences in the ‘levels of trade’ at which normal value and export price are 
calculated.608 
 
Therefore, to arrive at a fair comparison, the investigating authority shall “take full 
account of the facts”, and such facts shall include the decrease in domestic price in a 
“distorted” market, because the domestic price at issue will affect the calculation of the 
dumping margin. In addition, due account shall be taken of differences which affect 
“price comparability”, and “level of trade” shall be considered as well, thus the 
domestic subsidization involved in trade activities of the exporting country under 
investigation shall also be considered. Conclusively, any form of trade behaviours 
which will affect “price comparability” shall be considered by the authorities, and as a 
significant factor, trade behaviours in a distorted market are also a matter of concern. 
And undistorted prices as applied by the 2017 Regulation may not conform to WTO 
 
607 See similar illustration by Katarzyna Kaszubska, ‘Double Remedy: Beyond the Non-market economy status’ in 
James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special 
Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 
2020. 
608 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 24 July 2001, at para 167. 
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anti-dumping law as interpreted by the Appellate Body. 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
The EU’s 2017 Regulation was enacted to regulate dumping issues relating to WTO 
Members with special domestic markets. It particularly deals with a dilemma that the 
non-market economy provisions of 2016 Regulation may not be efficient in the wake 
of Article 15(a)(ii) CAP’s expiry in December 2016.609  
 
However, the 2017 Regulation may not conform to WTO regulations. Regarding 
thresholds of alternative treatments, the “significant distortion” relying on “substantial 
government intervention” does not satisfy the interpretations of two standards of WTO 
rules: “in the ordinary course of trade” and “particular market situation”. Moreover, for 
approaches to construct the normal value, a constructed normal value without reflecting 
distortion of exporting country may be contrary to the Appellate Body’s decisions, such 
as the European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina Case 
and the recent European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti – 
Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia Case.610 Moreover, it may further lead to 
an increase of the dumping margin and a “double remedy” issue. 
 
Conclusively, when conducting an anti-dumping investigation of either market or non-
market economies, the primary choice in determining the normal value shall be based 
on the actual cost of production, even though such cost is considered to be “distorted”. 
When the construction of a normal value is necessary, all factors related to the cost in 
that country, including “price distortions”, should be considered ‘as long as they reflect 
the prevailing conditions in the market of exportation’. 
 
609 See Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A 
Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global 
Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
610 Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, 
adopted 6 October 2016; Pane Report, European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti – 
Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia, WT/494/R, adopted 24 July 2020. 
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Noticeably, China initiated consultations and later a dispute with the EU after 12 
December 2016, arguing that ‘the determination of normal value for “non-market 
economy” countries in anti-dumping proceedings involving products from China’ 
contrary to WTO law.611 China claimed that the EU’s determination of normal value 
appears to be inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the ADA and Articles I:1 and 
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994. However, for unknown reasons, China requested the 
panel to suspend its proceedings. As a result, the legality of the EU’s method remains 
unsettled under the WTO anti-dumping agreement.612 And during this period, “market 
distortion” criteria ‘essentially serve to continue the distinction between MEs and 





















611  See European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm.  
612 See Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-
Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
613 See ibid. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 The “double remedy” issue is a compound issue that requires appropriate 
interpretations of WTO provisions 
 
The issue of “double remedies” is the embodiment of the abuse of trade remedies due 
to the ambiguity of the WTO trade remedies agreements. It refers to the duplication of 
duties where both the anti-dumping and countervailing measures have contributed to 
the formation of it. The ambiguous WTO trade remedies agreements require systematic 
and comprehensive countermeasures to the “double remedy” issue where 
interpretations of the legal basis of the “non-market economy” treatment and the 
“public body” identification criteria are major concerns.  
 
It is noteworthy that the interpretation of WTO countervailing rules plays an important 
role on preventing the abuse of trade remedies in the context of the “double remedy” 
issue. The non-market economy disputes at the US national court, especially, the 
Georgetown Case and the GPX Case, suggests the ambiguity of countervailing law is 
one origin of the “double remedy” issue. The US cases reflect a dilemma that the anti-
dumping statute has been frequently revised to regulate the countervailing issue due to 
an asymmetric development of the US trade remedy laws when confronting the non-
market economy disputes. The subsequent US new legislation regulating the issue of 
“double remedies” does not serve as an efficient solution, but continue such asymmetric 
development. In this regard, it is still necessary to explore the appropriate 
interpretations of countervailing law at the WTO level to deal with the issue of “double 
remedies”. 
 
Accordingly, regulating the trade remedies in the context of the “double remedy” issue 
calls for interpretations of the WTO trade remedies agreements from both anti-dumping 
and countervailing perspectives. Concerning the anti-dumping perspective, it is 
required to explore the interpretations of three legal bases regarding the non-market 
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economy methodology in the anti-dumping investigations. First, Article 15 of China’s 
Accession Protocol to the WTO (CAP) is the direct legal basis of the non-market 
economy methodology targeting China within its validity under WTO system. It allows 
WTO Members to sidestep some controversies related to China’s economic structure, 
especially when calculating dumping margins in anti-dumping investigation. 614 
However, subparagraph (d) of Article 15 stipulates a deadline for this treatment, it states 
‘in any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date 
of accession’.615 Then what should be the appropriate interpretation of the expire of 
Article 15: (a)(ii) becomes a key issue to special treatment discussed by experts,616 and 
it is also one of major issues in the EU – Price Comparison Methodologies Case.617  
 
Second, the second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 “euphemistically” allows Members to 
calculate dumping margins not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices. 
However, the requirements to apply this provision are far stricter than those of other 
legal bases. Under the second Ad Note, the exporting country must have ‘a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by 
 
614  See James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou, ‘Introduction: Non-market Economies in the Global Trading 
System—The Special Case of China’ in James J Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-Market Economies in 
the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Springer Singapore 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811313301> accessed 9 July 2020. Also see Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan 
Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 
Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
615 According to Article 15: (d):  
Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, 
the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's national law 
contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph 
(a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the 
national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry 
or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or 
sector. 
616 See for example, Jorge Miranda, ‘More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 
Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 244; Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: 2016, China and Market Economy Status’ 
(2015) 10 Global Trade and Customs Journal 176; Jochem De Kok, ‘The Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations 
against Imports from China’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 515; Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu and 
Tianzhu Han, ‘China’s Market Economy Dilemma and Its Interplay with EU Anti-Dumping Law’ (2019) 27 Asia 
Pacific Law Review 102; Roberto Soprano, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of the Protocol of 
Accession of China to the World Trade Organization: Market Economy Considerations in Anti-Dumping 
Investigations’ (2019) 46 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29. 
617  See European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516) 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm. See also Weihuan Zhou and Delei Peng, ‘EU - Price 
Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Challenging the Non-Market Economy Methodology in Light of the 
Negotiating History of Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol’ (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 505. 
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the state’. The Appellate Body, in the European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China Case, pointed out that the 
second Ad Note stipulated a strict rule when identifying the exporting country under its 
context. Specifically, the non-market economy methodology is applicable to a country 
when it reflects a ‘complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade’ and the 
‘fixing of all prices by the State’, and it is not ‘applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that 
do not fulfil both conditions’. 618  Accordingly, the investigating authority has to 
explicitly prove that the Chinese economy meets the two criteria.619 And it does not fit 
China’s situation as a transitional economy described in Paragraph 150 of the Working 
Party Reports.620 As concluded by one commentator, ‘no country today would fall 
within this narrowly defined category’.621 Therefore, the application of this legal basis 
is very limited. 
 
Comparatively, Article VI: (b) of the GATT1994 and Article 2.2 of the ADA provide a 
general legal basis for alternative treatments among WTO Members as the third legal 
 
618 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011, at para. 290.  
The Report interprets the rules when applying the Second Ad Note to Article VI: 1 as follows:  
We observe that the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to a "country which has a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade" and "where all domestic prices are fixed by the State". This appears to describe 
a certain type of NME, where the State monopolizes trade and sets all domestic prices. The second Ad Note to 
Article VI:1 would thus not on its face be applicable to lesser forms of NMEs that do not fulfil both conditions, 
that is, the complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade and the fixing of all prices by the State. 
619 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
219. 
620 See Doha WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China’ 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/Min01/3.pdf&Open=True> accessed 10 
July 2020. It records that: 
[S]everal members of the Working Party noted that China was continuing the process of transition towards a 
full market economy. Those members noted that under those circumstances, in the case of imports of Chinese 
origin into a WTO Member, special difficulties could exist in determining cost and price comparability in the 
context of anti-dumping investigations and countervailing duty investigations. In fact, way back in 1998, i.e. 
prior to China’s accession to the WTO, the EU had recognized that China is an economy in transition when it 
introduced the MET criteria in the basic AD Regulation. 
621 See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Non-Market Economies, Significant Market Distortions, and the 2017 EU Anti-
Dumping Amendment’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law 885, 889; Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao and 
Xue Bai, ‘Building a Market Economy Through Wto-Inspired Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China’ (2019) 
68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 977, 1008; Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market 
Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
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basis. One issue relating to these provisions is the ambiguous thresholds of the 
treatments including: “in the ordinary course of trade”, a “the particular market situation” 
or a “low volume of sales”. Article 2.2 does not provide necessary instructions to 
demonstrate these thresholds, thus interpretations of these thresholds are requisite.  
 
On 12 December 2017, the European Parliament and the Council published an anti-
dumping regulation on special treatment, which was a response to the CAP issue. 
Revisions of the “non-market economy treatment” is reflected in two parts in the 2017 
Regulation. First, the Commission is vested with authority to disregard the domestic 
price of a producer or exporter due to “significant distortions” in that country. The 2017 
Regulation further explains “significant distortion” as ‘distortions which occur when 
reported prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials and energy, are not the 
result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government 
intervention’ in Article 6a: (b). Moreover, in identifying “significant distortion”, the 
Commission shall consider six elements,622 which are mainly on the same basis as the 
five criteria evaluating China’s economy status. Unlike the five criteria, not all of these 
elements need to be satisfied, this might be because the burden of proof is transferred 
from producers to the Commission, and as a result, reduces the pressure on the 
Commission.623 Therefore, the Commission still has wide discretion in identifying any 
of the elements.624 The second revision of the “non-market economy treatment” is that 
 
622 The potential impact of elements to assess the existence of significant distortions includes: 
— the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, 
control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country; 
— state presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs; 
— public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free 
market forces; 
— the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws; 
— wage costs being distorted; 
— access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting 
independently of the state. 
623 See Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-
Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
624 See ibid. 
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the expression of surrogate country is removed from discriminatory treatment and 
‘normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and 
sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’ as long as a “significant distortion” is 
proved. A list of referential sources is provided by the 2017 Regulation for the 
construction of normal value.625 In this regard, the EU 2017 Regulation seeks to apply 
Article VI: (b) of the GATT1994 and Article 2.2 of the ADA to justify discriminatory 
treatment in an anti-dumping investigation. Therefore, it is required to assess the EU 
2017 Regulation and its conformity with WTO standards.  
 
Concerning the countervailing perspective, it is required to clarify the determination of 
subsidy through the interpretation of the WTO countervailing rules. The determination 
of subsidy has been embodied by the “public body” issue. In this regard, necessary 
instructions and substantial references are absent for identifying the “public body” 
under the ASCM, which leaves potential controversary on the determination of subsidy. 
In the United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China Case, one major debate is whether China’s SOEs and SOCBs 
belong to “public bodies” and whether their behaviours comply with countervailing 
law.626 In other words, does an entity link with state qualifies to provide a subsidy under 
WTO rules? China filed a complaint at the WTO rebutting US’s affirmative 
determination of China’s state-owned banks and SOEs being “public bodies”, which 
were qualified to conduct subsidization under the ASCM. The Panel sided with the US, 
 
625 The sources the Commission may use include: 
— corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country with a similar level of 
economic development as the exporting country, provided the relevant data are readily available; where there 
is more than one such country, preference shall be given, where appropriate, to countries with an adequate 
level of social and environmental protection; 
— if it considers appropriate, undistorted international prices, costs, or benchmarks; or 
— domestic costs, but only to the extent that they are positively established not to be distorted, on the basis of 
accurate and appropriate evidence, including in the framework of the provisions on interested parties in point 
(c). 
626 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
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but the Appellate Body held opposite view (in respect of SOE), it declared that ‘the 
precise contours and characteristics of a public body are bound to differ from entity to 
entity, State to State, and case to case’.627  
 
The WTO tribunals’ decision clarifies only limited Chinese firms that may belong to 
“public bodies”. And even for those confirmed “public bodies”, such as SOCBs, there 
still has controversary. According to the tribunal, BOC is a “public body” based on 
several factors such as state ownership; relevant Chinese commercial banking law; and 
risk management and analytical skill of SOCBs. For example, Article 34 of China’s 
Commercial Banking Law stipulates that banks must ‘carry out their loan business upon 
the needs of the national economy and the social development and under the guidance 
of State industrial policies’.628 According to the tribunal, the BOC is a “public body” 
because its governmental factor is formally acknowledged by Chinese law. Nonetheless, 
commentators remain sceptical of the tribunal’s arguments noting that ‘a lack of 
business flair, as illustrated by inadequate risk management and analytical skills and 
poor loan-making practices, has little to do with whether SOCBs are exercising 
government authority’ and that ‘Article 34 of the Commercial Banking Law is a very 
general statement and its implications to the SOCBs’ loan business are not clear’.629 
 
Compared with the SOCBs, many Chinese firms, especially the SOEs, may not have 
formal links with the state like the BOC. Potential controversary may arise, for example, 
would SASAC's ability to remove the firm’s top management suffice to render the firm 
a “public body”? For now, the Appellate Body is relying on “government authority” 
standard and does not clarify what is necessary to demonstrate such authority. 630 
Nevertheless, the WTO cannot avoid these questions. Since the United States - 
 
627 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para 317. 
628 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010. 
629 See Ming Du, ‘China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law’ (2014) 63 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 409, 439. 
630 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
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Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China 
Case, the “public body” question has raised three disputes.631 Even without China as 
party at issue, there still has a high percentage that occurs. For example, in the United 
States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from India Case, the tribunal rejected the US argument that one can identify whether a 
firm is a “public body” on account of whether the government can employ the resources 
of an entity that it controls as its own.632 
 
Therefore, the systematic and comprehensive countermeasures of the “double remedy” 
issue are required where the interpretations of legal basis of the “non-market economy 
treatment” and “public body” determination are major concerns. 
 
7.2 How to regulate the trade remedies in the context of the “double remedy” issue 
under the WTO legal system 
 
The findings of this research have proposed four points to deal with the “double remedy” 
issue. First, the “double remedy” issue should be thoroughly prohibited by the WTO 
law as long as it leads to a duplication of duties. Second, compared with offsetting the 
damage of the “double remedy” issue, prevention of such issue is an efficient alternative. 
Third, to prevent the abuse of “double remedies” from countervailing perspective, a 
new definition of the “public body” has been proposed. Last but not least, to avert the 
abuse of “double remedies” from anti-dumping perspective, a procedure to determine 
the normal value has been provided. 
 
 
631 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014. Panel Report United t, States - Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/ R, adopted 14 July 2014. Appellate Body Report, 
United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/RW, adopted 16 
July 2019. 
632 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014, at paras 4.27 – 4.29. 
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7.2.1 The “double remedy” issue should be regulated by the WTO law 
 
To begin with, as analysed in Chapter 2 of this research, it is necessary to highlight that 
the “double remedy” issue should be regulated by the WTO law, specifically, Article VI 
of the GATT 1994. In contrast with the regulations for export subsidies in Article VI: 5 
of GATT 1994, WTO law does not literally prohibit the issue of “double remedies” 
raised by domestic subsidy. The Panel, in the United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China Case, considered that ‘these 
terms are self-explanatory in their intention to limit the scope of the prohibition in 
Article VI: 5 to situations involving export subsidy’.633 The Panel considered that, 
because the explicit prohibition in Article VI:5 is limited to potential “double remedy” 
issue in respect of export subsidies, Members could not have intended to prohibit the 
issue of “double remedies” in respect of domestic subsidies in Articles 19.3 or 19.4 of 
the ASCM.634  
 
However, the issue of “double remedies” under domestic subsidy shall not be left blank 
and interpreted as absent based on WTO law. According to the Appellate Body, when 
interpreting Article VI of the GATT 1994, ‘omissions in different contexts may have 
different meanings’635 and the phrase ‘same situation: is central to an understanding of 
the rationale underpinning the prohibition contained in Article VI:5’.636 “Same situation” 
is explained by the Appellate Body as being where an export subsidy results in a pro -
rata reduction in the export price of a product, but will not affect the price of domestic 
sales of that product, thus the situation of subsidization and the situation of dumping 
are the “same situation”.637 The “same situation” here, then, refers to the determination 
of subsidization and dumping by investigation relying simply on export subsidy.  
 
633 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010, at para 14.117. 
634 See ibid, at para. 14.118. 
635 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011, at para. 567. 
636 See ibid. 
637 See ibid, at para. 568. 
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What is more, the “same situation” may have a further interpretation based on the 
rationale of “double remedy” issue. Since an export subsidy leads to the implementation 
of an anti-dumping measure and a countervailing measure, it leads to a duplication of 
duties. Then, the “same situation” can also refer to any situation that has the same effect 
as “double counting”. In other words, it is not the “export” or “import” subsidy that 
violates the law, but the “double remedy” issue itself is inconsistent with Article VI: 5 
of the GATT 1994. In any case, the issue of “double remedy” under domestic subsidy 
should be under the guidance of WTO law.  
 
The Appellate Body further reaffirmed the illegality of “double remedy” issue by 
contending that it violated requirements in Article 19.3 of the ASCM.638 Article 19.3 of 
the ASCM requires that the countervailing duty shall be levied ‘in the appropriate 
amounts in each case’. According to the Panel, “the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
calculated under an NME methodology has no impact on whether the amount of the 
concurrent countervailing duty collected is 'appropriate' or not”. 639  However, the 
Appellate Body disagrees with the Panel’s analysis that Article 19.3 of the ASCM does 
not address the issue of “double remedies”. In contrast, the Appellate Body contends 
that the evaluation of the amount of the countervailing duty cannot ignore anti-dumping 
duty imposed on the same product to offset the same subsidization.640 Therefore, the 
amount of the countervailing duty cannot be “appropriate” without having regard to 
anti-dumping duty connected with the same subsidization. In this regard, the Appellate 
Body finds that the imposition of “double remedies” based on “non-market economy 
treatment” is inconsistent with Article 19.3 of the ASCM.641 
 
7.2.2 Compared with offsetting the damage of the “double remedy” issue, 
prevention of such issue is an effective alternative 
 
638 See ibid. at para. 582. 
639 See ibid. at para. 583. 
640 See ibid. at para. 582. 
641 See ibid. at para. 583 
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Offsetting the damage of the “double remedy” issue is considered as mainstream 
solution to the issue of “double remedies”. For example, calculating the overlap of 
duties (the “pass-through” rate)642 and reduce the duplication of duties is proposed by 
experts.643 Theoretically, a scientifically calculated “pass-through” rate could reduce 
the injury of “double remedy” issue by eliminating price discrimination under 
subsidization, and this is reflected in US GPX law.644 
 
However, it is in practise difficult to calculate the influence of subsidy on a relevant 
price and separate it from anti-dumping duty. According to the GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. 
United States Case, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) expressed that it did not 
have a method for identifying overlapping remedies, the Court also admitted that it is 
difficult for the Commerce to decide the degree and extent of potential “double remedy” 
issue.645 Besides, the “pass-through” method belongs to a remedy behaviour, which 
means it aims to eliminate the injury of unfair trade remedy measures. Comparatively, 
a preventative method is preferential as it predicts the risk and prevents the existence 
of future injury by providing transparent regulations through the interpretation of law. 
 
Four scenarios that a product may receive trade remedies646 
 Whether Implementation Whether Implementation Whether 
 
642 “Pass-through” rate, in the context of “double remedy” issue, refers to the extent that a subsidy is passed through 
to the price and reflected in the calculation of dumping margin. 
643  See for example, Thomas J Prusa and Edwin Vermulst, ‘United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China: Passing the Buck on Pass-Through’ (2013) 12 World Trade 
Review 197; Thomas J Prusa, ‘NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem’ (2017) 16 World Trade Review 619; Brian 
D Kelly, ‘Market Economies and Concurrent Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies’ (2014) 17 Journal 
of International Economic Law 105. 
644  On March 6, 2012, US Congress enacted anti-dumping provisions (GPX Law), which provided the US 
Department of Commerce with a legal basis to apply anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties to China’s 
products; and through providing adjustments (by calculating pass-through rate) to anti-dumping duties to avoid the 
situation of “double remedies”. See Public Law 112–99, 112th Congress, 126 STAT. 265 (MAR. 13, 2012). 
645 Based on the case, the Commerce explained that “it would not allow a constructed export price (‘CEP’) offset or 
a circumstances of sales (‘COS’) adjustment in this investigation because Commerce ‘cannot accurately determine 
the specific indirect selling expenses incurred on sales reflected in the surrogate financial statements’”. The Court, 
in its latter analysis, stated that “it is too difficult for Commerce to determine, using improved methodologies, and 
in the absence of new statutory tools, whether and to what degree double counting is occurring”. See GPX Int'l Tire 
Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1345 (CIT 2010) ("GPX III"). 
646 The four scenarios based on the hypothesis that if there exists a subsidization or dumping behaviour, there is a 
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The above table illustrates four scenarios that a product may receive from trade 
remedies. Among four scenarios, there is only one scenario that the issue of “double 
remedies” may inevitably occur and should consider the offsetting solution. More 
scenarios relate to single anti-dumping or countervailing duty issues. And this thesis 
focusses more on the other three scenarios that should not, but indeed, result in disputes 
of “double remedies” due to the vague WTO trade remedy provisions.  
 
Accordingly, this research advocates preventing the “double remedy” issue through 
interpreting the WTO provisions. When confronting a dispute of the “double remedies”, 
it is preferable to first identify the existence of subsidization and determine the legality 
of the related countervailing measure. Then move to deal with the anti-dumping 
investigation based on the “non-market economy” methodology. The specific proposals 
from anti-dumping and countervailing perspectives are provided in the following 
section. 
 
7.2.3 To prevent the abuse of trade remedies from countervailing perspective: the 
interpretation of countervailing law on the “public body” issue 
 
Chapter 4 analyses factors for “public body” identification. Accordingly, a “public body” 
refers to an entity that exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental 
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authority that the Party has directed or delegated to such an entity.  
 
Footnote 1: Examples of ‘exercising any regulatory, administrative or other 
governmental authority’ include: the power to expropriate, grant licenses, approve 
commercial transactions, or impose quotas, fees, or other charges. 
 
Footnote 2: The determination of a “public body” shall focus on ‘whether the entity 
itself possesses the core characteristics and functions’ that constitute a “public body”, 
and follow the principle to ‘avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single 
characteristic without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant’. In 
this regard, state intervention, as well as the scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates. 
 
Footnote 3: Approaches to demonstrate “public body” may include, but not be 
exhausted by: 
 
(a) A state or other legal instrument expressly vests authority in the entity 
concerned; 
(b) An entity is exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence, 
particularly where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice; 
(c) A government exercises meaningful control over an entity in certain 
circumstances; (Formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there 
is evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way.) 
 
The findings also highlighted that SOEs in China, especially Chinese central SOEs 
(Yang Qi), are potentially “public bodies” when serving specific responsibility, for 
example, stabilizing supply and ensuring security of relevant industries through strictly 
following national macro-control measures. However, it may be impossible to identify 
the Yang Qi as a whole “public body” due to its diversified functions and 
responsibilities, further feedback and more evidence through questionnaires could help 
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to refine the evaluation during the “public body” investigation. 
 
7.2.4 To prevent the abuse of trade remedies from anti-dumping perspective: the 
interpretation of anti-dumping law relating to the non-market economy 
methodology 
 
As analysed in Chapter 5 of this research, despite the CAP directly and expressly 
stipulating a discriminatory treatment to China in its Article 15, WTO Members cannot 
resort to the CAP applying a surrogate method to calculate dumping margins for China’s 
products in the wake of expiry of provisions of Article 15. And especially, such 
discriminatory treatment for China cannot be based on its special market status.  
 
In detail, based on textual and contextual analysis of Article 15 of the CAP, WTO 
Members may not resort to remaining provisions of Article 15 (a) to apply the “non-
market economy treatment” to China in anti-dumping investigation. Besides, the first 
and third sentences of Article 15 (d) may not justify a surrogate method on China’s 
products. At least, China is not obliged to prove a market economy condition to justify 
market economy treatment to WTO Members if it is not true that their national law 
‘contains market economy criteria as of the date of (China’s) accession’. The 
preparatory resources of Article 15 of the CAP, such as the Sino-US bilateral WTO 
agreement647 and the working paper on the accession of China648, indicate that the 
market status of China cannot justify a continuance of NME treatment, and such a 
treatment is not recommended for modern China and preferable to be terminated in the 
wake of the expiry of Article 15 (a)(ii). Based on the analysis of international cases, the 
EC-Fasteners Case649 and the Rusal Armenal ZAO V Council of the European Union 
 
647 See ‘U.S. - China Bilateral WTO Agreement’ (1999) <https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/WTO-
Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-004.html> accessed 13 July 2020.  
648 See Doha WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China’ 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/Min01/3.pdf&Open=True> accessed 10 
July 2020. 
649 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel 
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011. 
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Case,650 the remaining provisions of Article 15 (a) and (d) cannot justify the “non-
market economy treatment” for China. And China’s market status cannot support an 
exception to treat China differently in anti-dumping investigations. 
 
However, as discussed by several commentators, ‘this does not mean that the EU or 
other markets will have no defence against genuine Chinese dumping practices’.651 
Article 2 of the ADA and Article VI of the GATT 1994 have stipulated the determination 
of dumping margins in special situations. And the interpretations of the CAP do not 
preclude WTO Members applying the general rules set out in Article 2 of the ADA and 
Article VI of the GATT 1994.652 As a very creative practitioner in this regard, the EU 
has made revisions to its anti-dumping regulations and ‘use certain techniques when 
calculating normal value such as making adjustments to the prices of certain inputs that 
they consider do not reflect market prices’.653 In particular, the EU 2017 anti-dumping 
regulation is enacted to regulate dumping issues relating to WTO Members with a 
special domestic market. It particularly deals with the dilemma that its non-market 
economy provisions of 2016 Regulation may not be efficient in the wake of Article 
15(a)(ii) CAP’s expiry in December 2016.654 Nonetheless, the special treatment in 2017 
Regulation may not conform to WTO regulations. Regarding the thresholds for 
discriminatory treatment, the “significant distortion” relying on “substantial 
government intervention” does not satisfy the interpretations of two standards of WTO 
rules: “in the ordinary course of trade” and “particular market situation”. Moreover, for 
approaches to construct normal value, a constructed normal value without distortion 
 
650 See Case T-512/09 Rusal Armenal ZAO v Council of the European Union [2013] ECLI:EU: T: 2013:571. 
651 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
224; Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-Market 
Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> 
accessed 9 July 2020. 
652  See Weihuan Zhou, ‘China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A Preliminary 
Assessment’ (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 345. 
653 See Edwin Vermulst, Juhi Dion Sud and Simon J Evenett, ‘Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against 
China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal than Others’ (2016) 11 Global Trade and Customs Journal 212, 
224. 
654 See Christian Tietje and Vinzenz Sacher, ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A 
Breach of WTO-Law? ’in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global 
Policy Trends and Legal Challenges (Springer International Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319953052> accessed 14 July 2020. 
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may be contrary to the Appellate Body’s decision in the European Union - Anti-
Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina Case.655 And it may further lead to an 
increase in dumping margin and a “double remedy” issue. 
 
Therefore, as analysed in Chapter 6 of this research, when conducting anti-dumping 
investigations of either market or non-market economies, the primary choice in 
determining the normal value shall be based on the actual cost of production, even 
though such cost is considered to be “distorted”. When the construction of a normal 
value is necessary, all factors related to the costs in that country, including “price 
distortions” should be considered ‘as long as they reflect the prevailing conditions in 
the market of exportation’.  
 
Noticeably, China initiated consultations and later a dispute with EU after 12 December 
2016, arguing that ‘the determination of normal value for “non-market economy” 
countries in anti-dumping proceedings involving products from China’ contrary to 
WTO law.656 China claimed that the EU’s determination of normal value appeared to 
be inconsistent with Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the ADA and Article I:1 and Article VI:1 of 
the GATT 1994. However, for unknown reasons, China requested the panel to suspend 
its proceedings after 7 May 2019. As a result, the legality of the EU’s method remains 
unsettled under the WTO anti-dumping agreement.657 And during this period, “market 
distortions” criteria ‘essentially serve to continue the distinction between MEs and 
NMEs in AD actions’.658  
 
7.3 Development for future research 
 
 
655 Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, 
adopted 6 October 2016, at para. 7.3. 
656  See European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm.  
657 See Stéphanie Noël and Weihuan Zhou, ‘EU’s New Anti-Dumping Methodology and The End of The Non-
Market Economy Dispute?’ (2019) 14 Global Trade and Customs Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3424435> accessed 9 July 2020. 
658 See ibid. 
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Based on the findings of this research, a follow-up research is expected relating to the 
the trade remedies in the context of “non-market economy treatment”. As official 
decisions by the WTO tribunals are still rare and ambiguous, it is foreseeable that more 
discussions and cases will be raised in future. In this regard, there are some potential 
topics that around this research. For example, since China has found that “non-market 
economy” conditions exist in the US energy and petrochemical sector, and accordingly 
adjusted the US expert’s cost in calculating the dumping margin, what will the US 
response to its “non-market economy treatment” and what if the US suffered from the 
“double remedy” issue become the questions.659 And to recall, the US is the landmark 
“double remedy” conductor to China.660  
 
In addition, there are loopholes in determining the normal value, albeit the WTO 
tribunals in three cases (the European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel 
from Argentina Case, the Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate, 
Case and the European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti – 
Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia Case) have affirmed that normal value shall 
base on the actual cost of production, and the out-of-country sources shall reflect the 
costs in the country of origin.661 In the recent European Union – Cost Adjustment 
Methodologies and Certain Anti – Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia Case, 
 
659  See On 17th July 2020, the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (MOFCOM) published its preliminary 
determination on the imposition of antidumping duties on imported propanol from the United States. Accordingly, 
China found that non-market economy conditions exist in the US energy and petrochemical sector. Besides, China 
has initiated another anti-dumping investigation involving NME allegations of Australia’s products. See Henry Gao, 
‘The US Is Now Officially a Non-Market Economy, According to China’ (International Economic Law and Policy 
Blog) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-officially-a-non-market-economy-according-to-
china-.html> accessed 10 July 2020; Zhiguo Yu and Sandeep Thomas, ‘The US Is Now a “Non-Market Economy” 
– Anti-Dumping Ruling by China’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
<https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-a-non-market-economy-anti-dumping-ruling-by-
china.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ielpblog+%28International+
Economic+Law+and+Policy+Blog%29> accessed 10 July 2020; Zhiguo Yu and Jesse Kreier, ‘China and 
Distortions - Bis’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/08/china-
and-distortions-bis.html> accessed 20 August 2020. The ruling is available only on the Chinese webpage of 
MOFCOM. Direct link to the ruling http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/trb/202007/20200717145528534.pdf. 
660 See the Panel Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 October 2010; the Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011. 
661 See Appellate Body Report, Ukraine - Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate, WT/493/AB/R, adopted 
12 September 2019; Appellate Body Report, European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, 
WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016; Pane Report, European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and 
Certain Anti – Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia, WT/494/R, adopted 24 July 2020. 
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the Panel mentions the term “normally” in Article 2.2.1.1 of the ADA does not ‘exhaust 
the circumstances in which costs reflected in the records of the producer or exporter 
under investigation may be rejected’, and the term “normally” is also appeared in the 
first subparagraph of Article 2 (5) of the EU anti-dumping regulation.662 The Panel, 
however, does not provide further analysis with the reason that the EU’ determination 
is based on the second condition prescribed in Article 2 (5) rather than an explanation 
of the term “normally”.663  
 
Nonetheless, invoking the use of the terminology “normally” as a defence may occur 
in future. As highlighted by Jesse Kreier, the WTO tribunal left the possibility that a 
WTO member may disregard reported costs in the dumping margin calculation.664 The 
solution of this question has significant implications on the future anti-dumping 
measures relates to the price margin and government interventions in the market that 





















662 See Pane Report, European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti – Dumping Measures on 
Imports from Russia, WT/494/R, adopted 24 July 2020, at para 7.103. 
663 See ibid at para 7.106. 
664 See Jesse Kreier, ‘Distorted Input Prices - Still in the Dark’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog) 
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